The Walk‐down to Beatable Analyst Forecasts: The Role of Equity Issuance and Insider Trading Incentives*

It has been alleged that firms and analysts engage in an "earnings‐guidance game" where analysts first issue optimistic earnings forecasts and then "walk down" their estimates to a level that firms can beat at the official earnings announcement. We examine whether the walk‐down to beatable targets is associated with managerial incentives to sell stock after earnings announcements on the firm's behalf (through new equity issuance) or from their personal accounts (through option exercises and stock sales). Consistent with these hypotheses, we find that the walk‐down to beatable targets is most pronounced when firms or insiders are net sellers of stock after an earnings announcement. These findings provide new insights on the impact of capital‐market incentives on communications between managers and analysts.     

Money and Output: Friedman and Schwartz Revisited

More than 50 years ago, Friedman and Schwartz examined historical data for the United States and found evidence of procyclical movements in the money stock, which led corresponding movements in output. We find similar correlations in more recent data; these appear most clearly when Divisia monetary aggregates are used in place of the Federal Reserve's official, simple‐sum measures. When we use information in Divisia money to estimate a structural vector autoregression, identified monetary policy shocks appear to have large and persistent effects on output and prices, with a lag that has lengthened considerably since the early 1980s.     

Monetary Policy Uncertainty and the Response of the Yield Curve to Policy Shocks

This paper studies the nonlinear response of the term structure of interest rates to monetary policy shocks and presents a new stylized fact. We show that uncertainty about monetary policy changes the way the term structure responds to monetary policy. A policy tightening leads to a significantly smaller increase in long-term bond yields if policy uncertainty is high at the time of the shock. We also look at the decomposition of bond yields into expectations about future policy and the term premium. The weaker response of yields is driven by the fall in term premia, which fall more strongly if uncertainty about policy is high. Conditional on a monetary policy shock, higher uncertainty about monetary policy tends to make securities with longer maturities relatively more attractive to investors. As a consequence, investors demand even lower term premia. These findings are robust to the measurement of monetary policy uncertainty, the definition of the monetary policy shock, and to changing the model specification.     

Robustness and U.S. Monetary Policy Experimentation

We study how a concern for robustness modifies a policymaker's incentive to experiment. A policymaker has a prior over two submodels of inflation‐unemployment dynamics. One submodel implies an exploitable trade‐off, the other does not. Bayes' law gives the policymaker an incentive to experiment. The policymaker fears that both submodels and his prior probability distribution over them are misspecified. We compute decision rules that are robust to misspecifications of each submodel and of the prior distribution over submodels. We compare robust rules to ones that Cogley, Colacito, and Sargent (2007) computed assuming that the models and the prior distribution are correctly specified. We explain how the policymaker's desires to protect against misspecifications of the submodels, on the one hand, and misspecifications of the prior over them, on the other, have different effects on the decision rule.     

Contracting in Peer Networks

We consider multiagent multifirm contracting when agents benchmark their wages to those of their peers, using weights that vary within and across firms. When a single principal commits to a public contract, optimal contracts hedge relative wage risk without sacrificing efficiency. But compensation benchmarking undoes performance benchmarking, causing wages to load positively on peer output, and asymmetries in peer effects can be exploited to enhance profits. With multiple principals, a “rat race” emerges: agents are more productive, with effort that can exceed the first best, but higher wages reduce profits and undermine efficiency. Wage transparency and disclosure requirements exacerbate these effects.     

Dissecting Earnings Recognition Timeliness

We dissect the portion of stock price change of the fiscal year that is recognized in reported accounting earnings of the year. We call this portion earnings recognition timeliness (ERT). The emphasis in our dissection is on empirical identification of two fundamental precepts of financial accounting: (1) the matching principle, which is manifested in the recognition of expenses in the same period as the related benefits (i.e., sales revenue) accrue; and (2) recognition of expenses in the current period due to changes in expectations regarding earnings of future periods (we refer to these expenses as the expectations element of expenses). Although the expectations element has implicitly been at the core of much of the recent empirical literature on asymmetry in the earnings/return relation, it has not been explicitly identified. This recent literature is based on the premise that bad news about the future leads to more recognition of expenses in the current period (such as write‐downs) whereas good news about the future tends to have a much lesser effect on expenses of the current period; asymmetry in the expenses/return relation is captured implicitly via the observation of asymmetry in the earnings/return relation (i.e., asymmetry in ERT). Since the ERT reflects the relation between sales revenue and returns, matched expenses and returns, as well as the relation between the expectations element of expenses and returns, a focus on the expectations element may lead to sharper inferences. Our straightforward empirical procedure permits a focus on this element.     

Briefing Paper

Between the end of 1979 and the end of 1981 unemployment rose by 1.4 million. After that exceptional period unemployment continued to rise rather less rapidly to its current level of 3.2 million, Of this 3.2 million, about 1.3 million have been unemployed for more than a year. In this Briefing Paper we describe and attempt to explain the processes by which long-term unemployment rose to its current level.
We also discuss two related questions; the first concerns the relationship between unemployment and vacancies and the second concerns the relationship between long-term unemployment and inflation. The final sections consider the policy implications of these findings.