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91.
We analyze the salary portions of a multi-state sample of police interest arbitration awards to determine what decision criteria (e.g., pay comparability, ability to pay, inflation) arbitrators' mention most frequently. Using the results, we construct measures of these criteria and assess their influence on awarded salaries. We find that arbitrated salaries are related to several of the measures and also to the employer and union salary offers. The parties' offers are also influenced by our measures, indicating that unions and employers attempt to strategically position their offers before the arbitrator. 相似文献
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We dissect the portion of stock price change of the fiscal year that is recognized in reported accounting earnings of the year. We call this portion earnings recognition timeliness (ERT). The emphasis in our dissection is on empirical identification of two fundamental precepts of financial accounting: (1) the matching principle, which is manifested in the recognition of expenses in the same period as the related benefits (i.e., sales revenue) accrue; and (2) recognition of expenses in the current period due to changes in expectations regarding earnings of future periods (we refer to these expenses as the expectations element of expenses). Although the expectations element has implicitly been at the core of much of the recent empirical literature on asymmetry in the earnings/return relation, it has not been explicitly identified. This recent literature is based on the premise that bad news about the future leads to more recognition of expenses in the current period (such as write‐downs) whereas good news about the future tends to have a much lesser effect on expenses of the current period; asymmetry in the expenses/return relation is captured implicitly via the observation of asymmetry in the earnings/return relation (i.e., asymmetry in ERT). Since the ERT reflects the relation between sales revenue and returns, matched expenses and returns, as well as the relation between the expectations element of expenses and returns, a focus on the expectations element may lead to sharper inferences. Our straightforward empirical procedure permits a focus on this element. 相似文献
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More than 50 years ago, Friedman and Schwartz examined historical data for the United States and found evidence of procyclical movements in the money stock, which led corresponding movements in output. We find similar correlations in more recent data; these appear most clearly when Divisia monetary aggregates are used in place of the Federal Reserve's official, simple‐sum measures. When we use information in Divisia money to estimate a structural vector autoregression, identified monetary policy shocks appear to have large and persistent effects on output and prices, with a lag that has lengthened considerably since the early 1980s. 相似文献
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This study examines how factor point systems have treated state government jobs, which are held disproportionately by women, minorities, and union members. The findings indicate that female jobs may gain from comparable worth pay proposals, but the gains are dissipated in actual pay; unionized and minority workers tend to lose both proposed and actual pay; and the dispersion of points and pay is narrowed for jobs covered by collective bargaining agreements 相似文献
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Intrafirm resource allocation: The economics of transfer pricing and cost allocations in accounting*
Abstract. A theory of intrafirm allocation under information asymmetry based on Myerson's general theory of mechanisms is developed. From the general model, it is shown that every Myerson equilibrium resource allocation mechanism is a “cost plus” type of transfer pricing. Specializing the general model to allow risk-neutral agents, we derive the exact form of the compensation schemes in dominant strategy equilibrium transfer pricing mechanism. The general Myerson agency problem is transformed into a central planner's problem enabling us to bypass the first-order approach to the problem. The closed form solution shows that each of the agents' compensation schemes is composed of a profit-sharing component, a cost refund, taxes, and subsidies, making it a Groves-like scheme. Additional results show that if the principal is asymmetrically informed about one of the agents only, the agent may derive rent from private information under monotonic compensation schemes, and we provide additional conditions under which Hirshleifer's classical marginal cost pricing is in equilibrium. Résumé. Les auteurs élaborent une théorie d'affectation des ressources internes au sein de l'entreprise, en situation d'asymétrie de l'information, à partir de la théorie générale des mécanismes de Myerson. En se fondant sur le modèle général, les auteurs démontrent que chaque mécanisme d'affectation des ressources correspondant à l'équilibre de Myerson tient du prix de cession interne de type « prix coûtant majoré ». En spécialisant le modèle général de façon à permettre l'introduction de mandataires neutres à l'égard du risque, ils dérivent la forme exacte de régimes de rémunération correspondant au mécanisme de détermination du prix de cession en situation d'équilibre de la stratégie dominante. Le problème mandant-mandataire général de Myerson se transforme en problème de planificateur central, ce qui permet de court-circuiter le premier ordre d'analyse du problème. La solution de nature fermée révèle que tout régime de rémunération des mandataires est composé d'un élément de participation aux bénéfices, de remboursement de frais, de taxes et de subventions, ce qui l'apparente à celui de Groves. D'autres résultats indiquent que si le mandant obtient de l'information asymétrique de l'un des mandataires seulement, ce dernier peut tirer, dans le cadre de regimes de remuneration monotoniques, un loyer de l'information privilégiée qu'il communique. Les auteurs ajoutent des conditions supplémentaires selon lesquelles l'établissement du prix selon la méthode classique de Hirshleifer en fonction des coûts marginaux est en équilibre. 相似文献