New venture strategic adaptation: The interplay of belief structures and industry context

We adopt an information processing perspective to investigate how the interplay of belief structures and industry context shapes new venture strategic adaptation in a sample of 104 publicly traded new ventures founded between 1996 and 2006 in several technology‐intensive industries. Results highlight that distinct espoused belief structures attributes (complexity, centrality, proactive causal logics) and industry growth combinations predict diversity, frequency, and speed of new venture strategic actions. We contribute to prior literature on early firm strategic adaptation by providing an elaborated understanding of the role of espoused belief structures in interpreting and translating industry signals into new venture strategic action. Further, we highlight the role of belief structures in facilitating the fast, diverse, and frequent organizational actions typically associated with continuous adaptation. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Social Position and Distributive Justice: Experimental Evidence

Using a simple, double-blind dictator experiment, we examine the extent to which subjects' choices of distributive shares are influenced by unearned social position. We measure social position by the initial distributive shares (resources) and the subjects' ability to determine the final distributive shares (power). We find that subjects' decisions are consistent with Rawls' (1971) hypothesis that individuals expect a greater share when in a position with more power and initial resources. Finally, we test if subjects' choices under a laboratory veil of ignorance are consistent with Rawls' concept of distributive justice. “Veiled” individuals exhibit preferences that are less risk-averse and have greater variance than Rawls hypothesized.     

Aggregate fluctuations, financial constraints and risk sharing

Summary. Private information and costly state verification often result in credit rationing in models with smooth investment, affecting both loan size and total investment. The optimal contract is derived in a dynamic stochastic growth model with capital for two types of models: one with symmetric information and the other with asymmetric information and costly state verification. When all information is observed costlessly, the equilibrium optimal contract provides complete insurance to risk-averse savers against aggregate fluctuations. When information is asymmetric and there is costly state verification, the equilibrium optimal contract provides only partial insurance against aggregate shocks. The extent of insurance is measured by the marginal rate of transformation of consumption between borrowers and lenders which is closely linked to the user cost of capital. The deadweight monitoring costs create a wedge between a borrower's cost of capital and a lender's stochastic discount factor, with two results: (i) fluctuations in the user cost of capital provides a mechanism by which aggregate shocks can be␣propagated; (ii) the distribution of capital's share of output among borrowers, lenders, and monitoring costs varies even if capital's share is constant. Capital market frictions not only amplify aggregate fluctuations but also generate cross-sectional fluctuations that may not be observable in aggregate data. Received: November 17, 1997; revised version: April 20, 1998     

The Dirty Dozen: Common Problem Areas in Principal–Agent Relationships

The main purpose of the article is to educate managers about potential difficulties caused by breach of fiduciary duties on the part of agents/employees within their organization. Managers will learn how to recognize common problem situations so they can take steps to avoid, or at least mitigate, any resulting damage. This article highlights 12 frequent situations—the “dirty dozen”—that pose dangers for business organizations.     

Defending the Beachhead: Telstra versus Optus

Much less has been written about market defence strategy than about market attack. This article focuses on one aspect of defensive strategy, defending against a new market entrant – though much of the thinking would also apply to other competitive assaults, like a major new product launch. The article outlines a model of the response of the Australian telecoms incumbent, Telstra, after deregulation. The authors conclude that market leaders should avoid price wars, understand the points in the consumer decision process that are defendable and use inertial strategies. Consumers' views of the incumbent can dramatically change their perceptions of the new entrant too.     

The Importance of Experimental Control in Testing the Impact of Interviewer Continuity on Panel Survey Nonresponse

The conventional wisdom in survey research suggests that it is advisable to have the same interviewers return to the same respondents in order to maintain good response rates in longitudinal surveys. There has been, however, very little documented experimental research to support this. Work conducted by Campanelli and O'Muircheartaigh (1999) using a subsample of the British Household Panel Study (BHPS) at Wave 2 with experimental control of the allocation of respondents to interviewers showed no evidence of a positive continuity effect on nonresponse; more extensive analysis by Laurie et al. (1999) of the full BHPS sample using Waves 2 through 4 presents contradictory results. This paper extends the earlier analysis and shows that these differences in findings are due to the lack of experimental control for the inferences from the full BHPS sample in the Laurie et al. (1999) report rather than the shorter time frame considered in Campanelli and O'Muircheartaigh (1999). This paper also considers variation in interviewer continuity effects across areas through the use of multilevel statistical models.