Technology and incentive regulation in the Italian motorways industry

Making use of an original dataset containing information on 20 Italian motorways concessionaires over the 1992–2004 period, we study the technology prevailing in the motorways industry in Italy. We focus on the estimation of the technical progress for the years covered by our sample, and on the measurement of the economies of scale and density. We find that the industry has experienced significant technical progress and that there are sizeable economies of density and scale (at least up to a medium-large network size). These results provide valuable insights for regulatory purposes, notably for the definition of the optimal dimension of the network of a concessionaire and the correct setting of the X factor in the price cap formula, which is used to regulate the toll levels. We also control for the effects on the performance of the concessionaires due to the changes in the ownership structure and the regulatory regime, both introduced by the recent reform of the industry. We find that the productivity of the concessionaires has not increased with the adoption of a price cap regime, while it has benefited from the privatization process.      

ON THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: THE CASE FOR A GOLDEN RULE

This paper uses the SVAR methodology to investigate the effects of public investment on GDP and, more specifically, the effects of the introduction of a golden rule of public finance. We extend the existing literature by estimating a model for the British economy that takes into account long-run factors such as public debt accumulation and policy interactions. We find that in such a long-run framework, public investment has a significant and permanently positive effect on GDP; this result runs counter to the most recent literature on the topic using SVAR, which was limited to a short-run specification. We further find, by comparing different subsamples, that the introduction of the golden rule in 1997 strengthened the positive effect of public investment.     

Shifts in autonomy, responsibility and control from centre to periphery in public administration: the case of the ministry of finance in Italy

In tackling administrative reform and in the hope of improving the effective allocation of resources, most European governments have shown a growing interest in adopting private sector management models in the public administration. The assumption underlying this paper is that the decisive variables in the different national contexts have to do with the relationships between the central and the peripheral administrative levels, and the way in which administrative actors at the two levels interpret their roles and participate in the reform process. The paper examines the case of the reform of the Italian Ministry of Finance. In seeking to improve its performance and the services it provides, the ministry reform is intended to introduce a management system in which the key concepts are the planning, programming and control of administrative action and results. According to reform rhetoric, shaping a new class of administrative managers at the local level is the crux of the question. However, research results hint that the “creation” of this new local executive staff is yet to be completed. The working hypothesis advanced is that this is due to local executives’ lack of confidence in the “system”, inasmuch as the reform process has so far been characterised by a tendency to give them responsibility without autonomy and autonomy without control. The greater their lack of trust, the lesser their willingness to risk the consequences of failure and the greater their tendency to stick to defensive positions and to return to previous “bureaucratic” conceptions and ways of operating.     

A stochastic model to evaluate pricing distortions in indemnity insurance methods for MTPL insurance

Direct compensation or the direct reimbursement scheme is an indemnity insurance method that many European and American countries use to manage motor liability claims in which the driver that suffers an accident is paid by his/her insurance company that possibly later receives a flat-rate reimbursement (known as forfeit). Using non-life actuarial methodologies, this article analyses the distortion effects due to the direct compensation mechanisms and the effects of different forfeit reimbursement systems on policyholder tariffs in the management of motor liability claims involving vehicles in two different sectors, i.e. automobile and motorcycle. We empirically analyse and formalize the distortion effects resulting from the mechanism that different direct reimbursement systems produce, and explore the correlation between increasing tariffs for motorcycle policyholders and decreasing tariffs for other vehicle policyholders. We propose some alternative methods to overcome these distortion effects, evaluating their pricing impact through a stochastic model applied to a case study.

     

Public education and redistribution when talents are mismatched

In democratic countries, elected policymakers determine public spending. The level of public spending depends on taxes that are decided by a voting mechanism. Policymakers also decide how to allocate funds among different policies, such as public education and pure redistributive transfers. How are the levels of funding for public education and redistribution determined in the political process? What impacts do votes on these two policies have on inequality, growth and social mobility? We develop a politico-economic model that highlights a novel mechanism: public education provides opportunities for the children of the poor to be recognized for their talent. This reduces the probability of a mismatch, which takes place when individuals with low talent who come from rich families find jobs that should go to people with high talent (and vice versa). Hence, the poor may prefer public spending on education to direct redistribution, while the rich prefer redistribution, as education implies more competition for good jobs from the poor.     

Big data and complexity: Is macroeconomics heading toward a new paradigm?

The paper discusses the extent to which the availability of unprecedentedly rich data-sets and the need for new approaches – both epistemological and computational – is an emerging issue for Macroeconomics. By adopting an evolutionary approach, we describe the paradigm shifts experienced in the macroeconomic research field and emphasize that the types of data the macroeconomist has to deal with play an important role in the evolutionary process of the development of the discipline. After introducing the current debate over Big Data in social sciences, the paper presents a detailed discussion of possible and existing interactions between Big Data and Computational Behavioral Macroeconomics. We argue that Big Data applied to economic questions can lead to new styles of thinking and research methods, namely to the development of a new research paradigm.     

Risk estimation for short-term financial data through pooling of stable fits

Financial Markets and Portfolio Management - We suggest a new, parsimonious, method to fit financial data with a stable distribution. As a result of a stable fitting via maximum likelihood...     

Policymakers' horizon and trade reforms: The protectionist effect of elections

This paper shows that electoral incentives deter politicians from supporting trade liberalization. We focus on all major trade liberalization bills introduced since the early 1970s in the U.S. Congress, in which House and Senate members serve respectively two- and six-year terms and one third of senators face elections every two years. We show that senators are more likely to support trade liberalization than House representatives. However, this result does not hold for the last generation of senators, who face elections at the same time as House members, suggesting that inter-cameral differences are driven by term length. Considering senators alone, we find that the last generation is less likely to support trade liberalization than the previous two. This result is pervasive and holds both when comparing the behavior of different senators voting on the same bill and that of individual senators voting on different bills. The protectionist effect of election proximity disappears for senators who are retiring or hold safe seats.