The hot house and the politics of production: Piecework Bargaining in retrospect

Brown's studies of piecework bargaining are reviewed in light of later research and changing conditions. Some extensions are needed, for example, in relation to the definition of custom and practice. And some neglected themes, notably the role of gender in workplace bargaining, need attention. But the analytical framework is essentially robust. Its theoretical pay‐off is elaborated, and arguments that industrial relations lacks an adequate theory of pay are disputed. Its current relevance is illustrated in relation to the explosion of pay at the top of the earnings distribution.     

In the mirror of the market: The disciplinary effects of company/fund manager meetings

This paper draws upon empirical qualitative research with Finance Directors and Investor Relations managers to examine the disciplinary consequences of their meetings with institutional investors. These ‘private’ meetings have increased both in frequency and importance in the last decade, but, when compared to public disclosure, they are relatively under researched. Existing studies have focussed on the role that the meetings play either in the market for information, or as a mechanism for corporate governance. By contrast, in this paper we draw upon Foucault’s analysis of power/knowledge to explore how the meetings shape executive subjectivity. The meetings take place in the context of a proliferation of techniques through which corporate performance is disclosed, modelled, compared and ranked. Such visibility makes possible processes of executive subjection which the paper traces firstly in the anticipatory self-discipline of executive’s extensive rehearsals for the meetings, and secondly in the rituals of face-to-face scrutiny of the meetings themselves where the body of the executive is understood to represent the company. The paper then explores the ways in which subjection to investors enables executives to speak on behalf of the investor within the business and effect its restructuring in the name of shareholder value. We suggest that these neglected disciplinary effects of company/fund manager meetings have been all too potent in recent years.     

Do institutional shareholders police management?

Some have argued that legislation limits the ability of institutional shareholders to discipline shirking management teams. However the level of takeover activity in the 1980s suggests that the cost of using takeovers to discipline management has decreased. This may give institutional shareholders the ability to participate actively in corporate governance. This paper presents an empirical examination that is consistent with this hypothesis. First, institutional ownership concentration varies across firms according to the benefits of policing firms in 1988. The relationship is less pronounced in 1980. Second, firms characterized by concentrated institutional ownership are more likely to use takeovers as the disciplinary mechanism. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why has Irish Social Partnership Survived?

The present system of social partnership in Ireland is in its twentieth year. A range of explanations have been put forward to explain why social partnership has been so durable even though it does not possess the institutional endowments often considered necessary to sustain tripartite industrial relations arrangements. Although these accounts are considered to have merits, this article suggests that they also suffer from a range of weaknesses. The article suggests that the longevity of the social partnership regime is a result of it being part of an unorthodox system of institutional complementarities that triggered a spectacular period of economic and employment growth.     

Comovement,information production,and the business cycle

Recent theoretical research suggests that information production is a positive externality of aggregate economic activity (Veldkamp, 2005). Both the quantity and quality of information increase during periods of economic expansion and decrease during periods of contraction. Based on this insight, we hypothesize and confirm that time-varying information production drives the comovement patterns observed in stock returns. We examine stock return comovement in 36 countries from 1980 to 2007 and show that, consistent with the theory, comovement patterns are countercyclical; that is, when information production is high (low), comovement is low (high). We also find that the relation between comovement and the business cycle is stronger in countries that experience large intertemporal swings in information production. Finally, we show that the relation between business cycle and comovement is stronger in poor countries, countries with less developed financial markets, and countries with weaker accounting and transparency standards. These results suggest that financial development and transparency are conducive to a steady flow of financial information over the business cycle.     

The Risk Microstructure of Corporate Bonds: A Case Study from the German Corporate Bond Market

This article presents joint econometric analysis of interest rate risk, issuer‐specific risk (credit risk) and bond‐specific risk (liquidity risk) in a reduced‐form framework. We estimate issuer‐specific and bond‐specific risk from corporate bond data in the German market. We find that bond‐specific risk plays a crucial role in the pricing of corporate bonds. We observe substantial differences between different bonds with respect to the relative influence of issuer‐specific vs. bond‐specific spread on the level and the volatility of the total spread. Issuer‐specific risk exhibits strong autocorrelation and a strong impact of weekday effects, the level of the risk‐free term structure and the debt to value ratio. Moreover, we can observe some impact of the stock market volatility, the respective stock's return and the distance to default. For the bond‐specific risk we find strong autocorrelation, some impact of the stock market index, the stock market volatility, weekday effects and monthly effects as well as a very weak impact of the risk‐free term structure and the specific stock's return. Altogether, the determinants of the spread components vary strongly between different bonds/issuers.     

Examining bank SEOs: Are offers made by undercapitalized banks different?

Despite extensive monitoring, banking operations are often considered opaque, and despite explicit capital adequacy regulation, banks may have substantial discretion in their financing. Both monitoring and capital regulation have changed substantially over time, with the adoption of FDICIA being one important breakpoint. This article empirically studies seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) by banks to understand how opacity and capital regulation interact to determine the timing of bank SEOs and their market valuation. SEOs both by banks that are undercapitalized relative to regulatory standards and also well-capitalized banks are fully discretionary when it comes to SEOs, even before FDICIA. Both undercapitalized and well-capitalized banks experience similar and significantly negative stock price reactions to SEO announcements, and also have similar prior patterns of insider trading and similar economic drivers of the issuance decision. Moreover, post-SEO abnormal stock returns are similar to benchmark returns for both types of issuers in the long run, suggesting that, contrary to the well-documented evidence for industrial SEOs, investors understand the value implications of bank SEOs upon announcement. The evidence implies that undercapitalized banks' SEOs are more discretionary and that all bank SEOs are less opaque than implied by earlier studies.     

Noise Trading and the Management of Operational Risk; Firms,Traders and Irrationality in Financial Markets*

abstract Efficient market models cannot explain the high level of trading in financial markets in terms of asset portfolio adjustment. It is presumed that much of this excessive trading is irrational ‘noise’ trading. A corollary is that there must either be irrational traders in the market or rational traders with irrational aberrations. The paper reviews the various attempts to explain noise trading in the finance literature, concluding that the persistence of irrationality is not well explained. Data from a study of 118 traders in four large investment banks are presented to advance reasons why traders might seek to trade more frequently than financial models predict. The argument is advanced that trades do not simply occur in order to generate profit, but it does not follow that such trading is irrational. Trading may generate information, accelerate learning, create commitments and enhance social capital, all of which sustain traders' long term survival in the market. The paper treats noise trading as a form of operational risk facing firms operating in financial markets and discusses approaches to the management of such risk.