Interest rate option pricing with volatility humps

This paper develops a simple model for pricing interest rate options when the volatility structure of forward rates is humped. Analytical solutions are developed for European claims and efficient algorithms exist for pricing American options. The interest rate claims are priced in the Heath-Jarrow-Morton paradigm, and hence incorporate full information on the term structure. The structure of volatilities is captured without using time varying parameters. As a result, the volatility structure is stationary. It is not possible to have all the above properties hold in a Heath Jarrow Morton model with a single state variable. It is shown that the full dynamics of the term structure is captured by a three state Markovian system. Caplet data is used to establish that the volatility hump is an important feature to capture. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Development policy and foreign affairs

According to the purist view development policy amounts to the pursuit of its main objective as against those of foreign, economic and agricultural policy, i. e., to ensure that donor interests should give way as far as possible to this target. It is however self-evident that “practical development policy”, being only one part of our whole policy, cannot play such a decisive role. Therefore foreign policy and development policy do not clash if both are properly conceived.     

Rethinking an old empirical puzzle: econometric evidence on the forward discount anomaly

Using both semiparametric and parametric estimation methods, this paper corroborates earlier findings of fractionally integrated behaviour in the forward premium. Two new explanations are also proposed to help reconcile earlier conflicting empirical evidence on the time series properties of the forward premium. Traditional regression approaches used to test the forward rate unbiasedness hypothesis are then evaluated, including regression in levels, in returns (Fama's, 1984 , regression), and in error‐correction format. Interesting statistical and/or interpretive implications are found in all three cases. For example, the predictions of the appropriate nonstandard limit theory are consistent with many of the standard empirical results reported from Fama's regression, including the commonly occurring, yet puzzling negative correlations between spot returns and the forward premium. It is suggested that the principal failure of unbiasedness, may be due instead to the difference in persistence between these two series. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Changes in Technology and Preferences: A General Equilibrium Explanation of Rapid Growth in Trade

We use a computable general equilibrium model in an explanation of the recent rapid growth in Australia's trade, particularly intra-industry trade. Relative to previous studies of trade growth based on multiple regression analysis, our approach allows us to: (i) work at a detailed industry level; (ii) use primary variables to represent changes in technology and preferences rather than proxies; and (iii) use a framework based on explicit microeconomic foundations. We find that most of the growth in Australia's trade relative to GDP is explained by changes in technology and preferences.     

Bargaining solutions with non-standard objectives

I examine the pure-strategy solutions of the sealed-bid bargaining game with incomplete information, when the buyer's and seller's objectives are other than the standard objective, namely maximization of expected profit. The motivation for this exploration lies in three problems of the standard formulation: the necessity of assuming common priors, the existence of uncountably many Nash equilibria, with no means for the players to coordinate on any one of them, and the uncertain relationship between these equilibria and observed behavior in bargaining experiments. Specifically, I consider two alternative objectives: minimization of maximum regret, and maximization of maximum profit. The solution concept here is not Nash equilibrium, but rather -individually rational strategy bundle. For that reason, I shall, where appropriate, use the word “solution” in place of “equilibrium.” Yet we find that the notion of Nash Equilibrium reappears, in a sense to be explained. In the minimax-regret case I find (in contrast to the case of expected profit) a unique solution; this solution reduces, for priors with coincident support, to the linear equilibrium of Chatterjee-Samuelson. In the maximum-profit case there are many solutions; they turn out to be slight generalizations of the one-step equilibria of Leininger-Linhart-Radner.