Incomplete markets, labor supply and capital accumulation

Endogenous labor supply decisions are introduced in an equilibrium model of limited insurance against idiosyncratic shocks. Unlike in the standard case with exogenous labor (e.g. [Aiyagari, S.R., 1994. Uninsured idiosyncratic risk and aggregate saving. Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 659-684; Huggett, M., 1997. The one-sector growth model with idiosyncratic shocks: steady states and dynamics. Journal of Monetary Economics 39, 385-403]), labor supply is likely to be lower than under complete markets. This is due to an ex post wealth effect on labor supply (rich productive agents work fewer hours) that runs counter the precautionary savings motive. As a result, equilibrium savings and output may be lower under incomplete markets. It is also found that long-run savings remain finite even when the interest rate equals the inverse of the discount factor.     

Exit Options in Corporate Finance: Liquidity versus Incentives

This paper provides a first study of the optimal design of active monitors'exit options in a problem involving a demand for liquidity and costly monitoring of the issuer. Optimal incentives to monitor the issuer may involve restricting the monitor's right to sell her claims on the firm's cash-flow early. But the monitor will then require a liquidity premium for holding such an illiquid claim. In general, therefore, there will be a trade off between incentives and liquidity. The paper highlights a fundamental complementarity between speculative monitoring in financial markets (which increases the informativeness of prices) and active monitoring inside the firm: in financial markets where price discovery is better and securities prices reflect the fundamentals of the issuer better, the incentive cost of greater liquidity may be smaller and active monitoring incentives may be preserved. The paper spells out the conditions under which more or less liquidity is warranted and applies the analysis to shed light on common exit provisions in venture capital financing.     

Three decades of productivity change in French beef production: a Färe‐Primont index decomposition

The Färe‐Primont index is used to evaluate total factor productivity (TFP) change and its components for a sample of French suckler cow farms in grassland areas in 1985–2014. The results reveal an increase in TFP of 6.6 per cent over the whole observation period, with technological progress being the major source of productivity growth. Meanwhile, efficiency decreased. Farms experienced great technological progress from 1991 to 2000. From a methodological point of view, the comparison with results obtained with Malmquist indexes shows similar trends but different magnitudes, with the Malmquist index overestimating the TFP and technological changes compared to the Färe‐Primont index. In addition, the use of a sequential approach that restricts technological change to being positive or null allows for the precise calculation of technology changes, disregarding the effects of external conditions that are captured in efficiency changes. Finally, the estimation of full dimensional efficient facets (FDEFs) that guarantees the positivity of all shadow prices used to assess the mix efficiency component of TFP change is promising.     

Vertical integration versus vertical separation: An equilibrium model

In this paper, the role of strategic forces in vertical relationships is examined. Using a simple model of differentiated products with symmetric demands and costs, the Perfect equilibrium to a vertical integration-vertical separation game between manufacturers is determined. Given the assumptions of the model, I show that the manufacturer's decision whether to vertically integrate or to remain separate from its retailer depends on the degree of product differentiation. I show that when the products are poor substitutes, the only Perfect equilibrium is vertical integration by both manufacturers. As the products become closer substitutes, an additional Perfect equilibrium appears, both firms vertically separated. For manufacturers, the vertically separated equilibrium always Pareto dominates the vertical integration equilibrium when both equilibria exist.This paper is a revision of Chapter 4 of my Ph.D. dissertation. I wish to thank my Senior Supervisor, Professor Thomas W. Ross, for his many helpful comments. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Canadian Economic Association meetings in Kingston, June 1991. Helpful comments and suggestions were also received from Keith Acheson, Leigh Anderson, Jeffrey Church, Chantale Lacasse, Frank Mathewson, and Don McFetridge and two anonymous referees. I am responsible for any errors or omissions.     

Fiscal Consolidation and the Public Sector Balance Sheet in South Africa

Between 1994 and 2008 the South African government reduced its debt/GDP ratio from almost 50% to 27%. Unfortunately this reduction was accompanied by a significant decrease in government's fixed capital/GDP ratio from 90% to 55% – fiscal sustainability might have been restored, but government's balance sheet did not improve. A similar story can be told for State Owned Enterprises. Since the Great Recession the fiscal situation worsened markedly – the public debt ratio again approaches 50%. To restore fiscal sustainability this article suggests that the government faces two options: (1) to create room for future countercyclical policy, the government must cut current expenditure and reduce the public debt/GDP ratio to its pre‐crisis level, or (2) substitute much‐needed infrastructure capital expenditure for current expenditure while stabilising the debt/GDP ratio at its post‐crisis level. Given that the much lower fixed capital/GDP ratio inhibits economic growth, the latter option might be more sensible.     

The social cost problem,rights, and the (non)empty core

We revisit the “Coase theorem” through the lens of a cooperative game model which takes into account the assignment of rights among agents involved in a problem of social cost. We consider the case where one polluter interacts with many potential victims. Given an assignment or a mapping of rights, we represent a social cost problem by a cooperative game. A solution consists in a payoff vector. We introduce three properties for a mapping of rights. First, core compatibility indicates that the core of the associated cooperative games is nonempty. Second, Kaldor‐Hicks core compatibility indicates that there is a payoff vector in the core where victims are fully compensated for the damage once the negotiations are completed. Third, no veto power for a victim says that no victim has the power to veto an agreement signed by the rest of the society. We then demonstrate two main results. First, core compatibility is satisfied if and only if the rights are assigned either to the polluter or to the entire set of victims. Second, there is no mapping of rights satisfying Kaldor‐Hicks core compatibility and no veto power for a victim.     

Optimal Monetary Policy, Taxes, and Public Debt in an Intertemporal Equilibrium

This article is devoted to a study of the optimal monetary and fiscal policies within the framework of an overlapping generations model with cash-in-advance constraints. We first characterize the intertemporal equilibrium. Then we show how to decentralize the optimal growth path using available policy instruments (i.e., labor income and capital taxes, public debt, money supply). Between the four instruments: wages and capital taxes, debt and monetary policy, one is redundant among the three last which implies that the Friedman Rule is only a special case.     

A note on control costs and logit rules for strategic games

We consider best response dynamics with endogenous noise based on a finite game in strategic form. A player can reduce the noise level by expending an extra effort and incurring some disutility or control costs. We specify control costs that result in logit adjustment rules. The stochastically stable states of the dynamic process are partial Nash configurations, that is, states where at least one player plays a best response against the others. If the game has a potential, then the stochastically stable states coincide with the Nash equilibria on which the potential is maximized. RID="*" ID="*" Instructive comments of a referee are gratefully acknowledged. Correspondence to:H. Haller     

Productivity,technical efficiency and technological change in French agriculture during 2002-2015: a Färe-Primont index decomposition using group frontiers and meta-frontier

The objective of the article is to assess productivity change in French agriculture during 2002–2015; namely, total factor productivity (TFP) change and its components – technological change and efficiency change. For this, we use the Färe-Primont index which verifies the multiplicatively completeness property and is also transitive, allowing for multi-temporal and -lateral comparisons. We investigate the extent of heterogeneity within each type of farming sub-sample in terms of TFP change, with the help of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). In addition, to compare the technologies among the five types of farming considered, we extend our analysis to the meta-frontier framework. Results indicate that during 2002–2015, all farms experienced TFP progress. The smallest average increase was experienced by the dairy farms and the largest by the field crop farms and the beef farms. The latter had the strongest technological progress but a deterioration in efficiency, while the opposite was found for field crop farms. The analysis of HHI reveals that sheep or goat farms are the most homogenous in terms of the direction of TFP change experienced over the period 2002–2015. The meta-frontier analysis shows that field crop farms’ technology is the most productive of all the types of farming.     

Drastic Times Call for Drastic Measures: The ECB LTROs and Credit in The Eurozone Before and After December 2011

We study the impact of the European Central Bank Long-term refinancing operations (ECB LTROs) on credit to the non-financial sector, using panel data on twelve countries of the Euro area between December 2008 and July 2014. The tests show that LTROs tested as a dummy have a favorable impact. However, till December 2011, the impact of the amount of LTROs was insignificant or negative. This suggests that full allotment liquidity measures, disclosing interbank markets liquidity needs, could generate adverse collateral effect disturbing the unconventional monetary policies transmission channels, in particular the signaling channel. Moreover, the effectiveness of the signaling channel of liquidity measures would rely on their use as the sole monetary policy tool carrying all the information about the policy stance, while the ECB, whose mandate usually focuses price stability, has twice raised twice its policy rate in 2011.