CLIMATE CHANGE AND OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS

This paper examines the interplay between discounting and the distribution of welfare between generations in formulating climate change response strategies. The analysis shows that one can understand Nordhaus's (1994) standard representative agent model for climate policy analysis as a reduced form of an overlapping generations model that embodies more realistic demographic assumptions. In this setting, alternative Pareto efficient allocations may be supported as competitive equilibria given appropriate sets of income transfers between generations. Numerical simulations establish that increased intergenerational transfers entail reduced monetary discount rates and increased rates of greenhouse gas emissions abatement. Short-run policy choices are highly sensitive to normative judgments concerning the relative weight attached to the welfare of future generations.     

Taxing Purchases of Home Tape Recorders and Supplies to Compensate for Copyright Infringements: An Econometric Analysis of the Role of Economic and Demographic Factors

Faced with a sharp decline in sales in the early 1980's, the music industry looked for an explanation which could be converted into windfall gains for itself. The explanation proposed by the industry was increased home taping of prerecorded music. Through the introduction of federal legislation, the industry hoped to realize gains at the expense of the consumer of home taping equipment and media. The analysis presented here indicates that the independent effect of taping on prerecorded music sales may not have been as high as the recording industry has claimed, so that consumers may end up paying more than their fair share toward the windfall.     

Was It Real? The Exchange Rate-Interest Differential Relation over the Modern Floating-Rate Period

In this paper, we explore the relationship between real exchange rates and real interest rate differentials in the United States, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Contrary to theories based on the joint hypothesis that domestic prices are sticky and monetary disturbances are predominant, we find little evidence of a stable relationship between real interest rates and real exchange rates. We consider both in-sample and out-of-sample tests. One hypothesis that is consistent with our findings is that real disturbances (such as productivity shocks) may be a major source of exchange rate volatility.     

Labor Law,Economics, and Industrial Democracy: A Reconciliation.

This article analyzes the competing economic and industrial democracy/ voice views of unionism. It points out that the economic arguments vis-àvis unionism and the costs of union rent seeking depend on competitive markets. If markets vary in their competitive characteristics, however, and employers also have an incentive to rent-seek, then decentralized, NLRA-type unionism with minimal government interference in establishing bargaining outcomes may serve to restore competitive wages. The article concludes by evaluating some proposals to amend the NLRA in the context of this “symmetry of motives” framework.     

Can Interest‐Bearing Money Circulate? A Small‐Denomination Arkansan Experiment, 1861–63

Legal restrictions theory suggests that dominance of non-interest-bearing currency is possible only because legal impediments prevent financial institutions from offering interest-bearing alternatives. A viable interest-bearing medium must be issued in denominations low enough for day-to-day use, however, and without historical examples of small-denomination interest-bearing issues we cannot properly test whether interest-bearing currency will circulate as legal restrictions theory predicts. Civil War Arkansas offers a rare instance where large quantities of small-denomination interest-bearing money were actually issued, mostly below $5. The results of this Arkansan experiment show that small-denomination interest-bearing issues can indeed function as the primary medium of exchange.     

Explaining Forward Exchange Bias…Intraday

Intraday interest rates are zero. Consequently, a foreign exchange dealer can short a vulnerable currency in the morning, close this position in the afternoon, and never face an interest cost. This tactic might seem especially attractive in times of fixed-rate crisis, since it suggests an immunity to the central bank's interest rate defense. In equilibrium, however, buyers of the vulnerable currency must be compensated on average with an intraday capital gain as long as no devaluation occurs. That is, currencies under attack should typically appreciate intraday. Using data on intraday exchange rate changes within the European Monetary System, we find this prediction is borne out.     

Aggregative Public Good Games

We exploit the aggregative structure of the public good model to provide a simple analysis of the voluntary contribution game. In contrast to the best response function approach, ours avoids the proliferation of dimensions as the number of players is increased, and can readily analyze games involving many heterogeneous players. We demonstrate the approach at work on the standard pure public good model and show how it can analyze extensions of the basic model.     

Contingent capital and bank risk‐taking among British banks before the First World War1

The recent financial turmoil highlights the incentive of highly leveraged financial institutions to take excessive risk, given the protection of limited liability. During the nineteenth and early twentieth century, many banks operated under liability rules which obligated shareholders to bear larger costs of bank insolvency in the form of contingent, or even unlimited, liability. This article examines the empirical relationship between the size of banks' contingent liability and their risk‐taking behaviour using data on British banks from 1878 to 1912. We find that banks with more contingent liability appear to have taken less risk. We also find evidence that the risk‐reducing effects of contingent liability were larger for banks with higher leverage, suggesting that contingent capital mitigated the moral hazard problem at banks.