ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

Recent contributions by Brookes (1990), Saunders (1992), and Inhaber and Saunders (1994) argue that cost-effective improvements in energy efficiency may, in the long run, lead energy use to grow more rapidly than it would in a world of fixed technologies. Since efficiency improvements may be viewed as a form of technological change that both reduces the effective cost of energy services and stimulates economic activity, energy demand may, under some circumstances, rise even as energy productivity improves. This paper examines this hypothesis using a simple model that distinguishes the roles of energy and energy services in production activities. In this model, improved energy efficiency can-not give rise to increased energy use unless: (i) energy costs dominate the total cost of energy services and (ii) expenditures on energy services constitute a large share of economic activity. Since neither of these assumptions is empirically plausible, the paper concludes that energy efficiency improvements will yield long-run reductions in energy use under the assumptions of the model.     

FABRIC SPECIALITY STORES: CONSUMER DISSATISFACTION WITH SELECTED IN-STORE ATTRIBUTES

This consumer dissatisfaction study focused on selected in-store attributes of the fabric speciality store. The procedure was to select fifteen fabric speciality stores at random in the Phoenix area and distribute thirty questionnaires to customers at each store. The 264 returns were analysed by examining the respondents' comments about the fabric speciality store most often shopped in, the respondents' ratings of the statements concerning the average fabric speciality store's attributes and the complaints the respondents made to fabric speciality stores. The fabric speciality store attributes found to be both important and dissatisfying included: salesperson's helpfulness, variety of fabrics, quality of fabrics, salesperson's product knowledge and fabric price.     

ECONOMIC INCENTIVES AND CONTRACTS: THE USE OF PSYCHOTROPIC MEDICATIONS

The advent of novel psychotropic medications has revolutionized treatments for mental illnesses over the past few decades. Concurrently, changes in mental health coverage, particularly for Medicaid patients, created economic incentives for insurance carriers to shift costs and to encourage the use of psychotropic drugs. To quantify these effects, based on the framework in Griliches' seminal study on hybrid corn, we estimate logistic diffusion models using a longitudinal data set on Medicaid drug utilization. We find that financial incentives played a significant role in encouraging use of new medications that have lower physician specialty skill requirements. ( JEL O30, O33, I18, L14)     

What Do Consumers’ Fund Flows Maximize? Evidence from Their Brokers’ Incentives

We ask whether mutual funds’ flows reflect the incentives of the brokers intermediating them. The incentives we address are those revealed in statutory filings: the brokers’ shares of sales loads and other revenue, and their affiliation with the fund family. We find significant effects of these payments to brokers on funds’ inflows, particularly when the brokers are not affiliated. Tracking these investments forward, we find load sharing, but not revenue sharing, to predict poor performance, consistent with the different incentives these payments impart. We identify one benefit of captive brokerage, which is the recapture of redemptions elsewhere in the family.     

Contingent capital and bank risk‐taking among British banks before the First World War1

The recent financial turmoil highlights the incentive of highly leveraged financial institutions to take excessive risk, given the protection of limited liability. During the nineteenth and early twentieth century, many banks operated under liability rules which obligated shareholders to bear larger costs of bank insolvency in the form of contingent, or even unlimited, liability. This article examines the empirical relationship between the size of banks' contingent liability and their risk‐taking behaviour using data on British banks from 1878 to 1912. We find that banks with more contingent liability appear to have taken less risk. We also find evidence that the risk‐reducing effects of contingent liability were larger for banks with higher leverage, suggesting that contingent capital mitigated the moral hazard problem at banks.     

What Has—and Has Not—Been Learned about Monetary Policy in a Low‐Inflation Environment? A Review of the 2000s

As the world economy recovers from the worst financial crisis and most severe global slump in 75 years, policymakers, regulators, and academics are focusing intensely and appropriately on lessons to be learned for monetary policy. There are certainly many questions to answer. Among the most important are: Are inflation expectations “well anchored”? What, if any, influence should asset quantities and prices have on monetary policy? Do we have sufficient confidence in our alternative monetary policy tools to stabilize the economy at the zero lower bound?     

Financial Flexibility,Bank Capital Flows,and Asset Prices

In our parsimonious general‐equilibrium model of banking and asset pricing, intermediaries have the expertise to monitor and reallocate capital. We study financial development, intraeconomy capital flows, the size of the banking sector, the value of intermediation, expected market returns, and the risk of bank crashes. Asset pricing implications include: a market's dividend yield is related to its financial flexibility, and capital flows should be important in explaining expected returns and the risk of bank crashes. Our predictions are broadly consistent with the aggregate behavior of U.S. capital markets since 1950.     

Financial Expertise as an Arms Race

We show that firms intermediating trade have incentives to overinvest in financial expertise. In our model, expertise improves firms’ ability to estimate value when trading a security. Expertise creates asymmetric information, which, under normal circumstances, works to the advantage of the expert as it deters opportunistic bargaining by counterparties. This advantage is neutralized in equilibrium, however, by offsetting investments by competitors. Moreover, when volatility rises the adverse selection created by expertise triggers breakdowns in liquidity, destroying gains to trade and thus the benefits that firms hope to gain through high levels of expertise.     

Orderly exits from adjustable pegs and exchange rate bands

This paper examines the exit process from adjustable pegs and exchange rate bands, and the role of capital flows in these exits. It dwells on the experience of various countries, including Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Israel, India, Poland, and Yemen. It begins by identifying conditions under which exits are sought. Next, it discusses the prerequisites for a successful exit, factors affecting the pace of exit, and the nature of the post‐exit regime. It then examines the behavior of private capital flows, interest rates, and official reserves before and after three successful exits (Chile, India, and Poland), and draws broad policy lessons.