How Risky Are U.S. Corporate Assets?

We use market data on corporate bonds and equities to measure the value of U.S. corporate assets and their payouts to investors. In contrast to equity dividends, total corporate payouts are highly volatile, turn negative when corporations raise capital, and are acyclical. At the same time, corporate asset returns are similar to returns on equity, and both are exposed to fluctuations in economic growth. To reconcile this evidence, we argue that acyclical but volatile net repurchases mask the exposure of total payouts' cash components to economic growth risks. We develop an asset pricing framework to quantitatively illustrate this economic channel.     

THE SWEDISH MARKET PRICE APPROACH TO MONETARY POLICY OF THE 1930s

Recently, some analysts have prescribed the combined use of certain market prices as a useful strategy for monetary policy. In light of problems with conventional (time-series) empirical tests of the approach, one may consider an alternative "test" of this strategy: examining historical episodes when the strategy was employed. The Swedish experience during the early 1930s provides one such example. This experience, fathered by Knut Wicksell, is an example of a fiat money-flexible exchange rate regime in which (i) a short-term interest rate was used as a policy instrument, (ii) market prices were used as policy guides or intermediate indicators, and (Hi) price stability was the explicitly voiced goal of monetary policy. Monetary or reserve aggregates were neither proposed nor employed as policy guides or targets in pursuing this price stabilization objective. This Swedish experience is important since it provides a rare example of a market price approach to monetary policy. This paper demonstrates that the approach worked remarkably well.     

How Do Quasi‐Random Option Grants Affect CEO Risk‐Taking?

We examine how an increase in stock option grants affects CEO risk‐taking. The overall net effect of option grants is theoretically ambiguous for risk‐averse CEOs. To overcome the endogeneity of option grants, we exploit institutional features of multiyear compensation plans, which generate two distinct types of variation in the timing of when large increases in new at‐the‐money options are granted. We find that, given average grant levels during our sample period, a 10% increase in new options granted leads to a 2.8% to 4.2% increase in equity volatility. This increase in risk is driven largely by increased leverage.     

Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation

This paper examined the returns earned by subscribing to initial public offerings of equity (IPOs). Rock (1986) suggests that IPO returns are required by uninformed investors as compensation for the risk of trading against superior information. We show that IPOs with more informed investor capital require higher returns. The marketing underwriter's reputation reveals the expected level of “informed” activity. Prestigious underwriters are associated with lower risk offerings. With less risk there is less incentive to acquire information and fewer informed investors. Consequently, prestigious underwriters are associated with IPOs that have lower returns.