Leadership run amok. The destructive potential of overachievers

The desire to achieve is a major source of strength in business, and it is on the rise. The authors' consulting firm has seen a steady increase in the extent to which achievement motivates managers. There's a dark side to the trend, however. By relentlessly focusing on tasks and goals, an executive or company can damage performance. Overachievers tend to command and coerce, stifling subordinates. Psychologist David McClelland identified three drivers of behavior: achievement, meeting a standard of excellence; affiliation, maintaining close relationships; and power, having an impact on others. He said the power motive comes in two forms: personalized, in which the leader draws strength from controlling people, and socialized, where the leader derives strength from empowering people. Studies show that great charismatic leaders are highly motivated by socialized power. To look at how motives and leadership style affect a group's work climate and performance, the authors studied 21 senior managers at IBM.The leaders who created high-performing and energizing climates got more lasting results by using a broad range of styles, choosing different ones for different circumstances. Rather than order people around, they provided vision, sought buy-in and commitment, and coached. If you're an overachiever seeking to broaden your range, you can study your actions and ask your team, peers, and manager to give you honest feedback. You can adopt specific new behaviors, such as engaging your team in a discussion of how to achieve goals, rather than issuing a set of directives. The company as a whole can play a part, too: Organizations must learn when to draw on the achievement drive and when to rein it in.     

Innovation,automation and the long-wave theory

The author considers the role played by technological innovation in the theoretical frameworks found in the literature on long waves. Some writers place emphasis on consumer good innovations, some on capital good innovations, some on new technologies which affect consumer and capital goods, while others take no view on the relative roles of consumer and capital goods innovations. It is suggested that capital goods innovations embodying automation may have been important in the mechanism of the current long wave. Data on employment, rates of return, and value-added for the engineering industries lend support to the view that expectations and propensity to innovate may have been high in the capital goods sector before the upswing of the current long wave.     

The Aggregate Demand for Private Health Insurance Coverage in the United States

This article estimates the aggregate demand for private health insurance coverage in the United States using an error correction model for the period 1966–1999. Both short- and long-run price and income elasticities of demand are estimated. The empirical findings indicate that both private insurance enrollment and the completeness of insurance are relatively inelastic with respect to changes in price and income in the short and long run. Moreover, the results suggest that an increase in the number cyclically and frictionally uninsured generates less welfare loss than an increase in the number of structurally uninsured.     

Can Managers Successfully Time the Maturity Structure of Their Debt Issues?

This paper provides a rational explanation for the apparent ability of managers to successfully time the maturity of their debt issues. We show that a structural break in excess bond returns during the early 1980s generates a spurious correlation between the fraction of long‐term debt in total debt issues and future excess bond returns. Contrary to Baker, Taliaferro, and Wurgler (2006) , we show that the presence of structural breaks can lead to nonsense regressions, whether or not there is any small sample bias. Tests using firm‐level data further confirm that managers are unable to time the debt market successfully.