Rent extraction,principal–agent relationships,and pricing strategies: vendor licensing during the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta

Two‐part pricing, price‐discrimination, rent creation and extraction, principal–agent theory, and public choice perspectives on public bureaucracies are used to interpret a vendor‐license marketing arrangement and controversy arising out of the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta, GA. Containing features predicted by principal–agency theory, Atlanta's arrangement with its marketing agent was a response to the behavior of public bureaucracies and a low cost method of converting visitors' consumer surplus to rent, which could be extracted by the marketing agent and then by Atlanta. Atlanta's incentive to enforce vendor property rights was influenced by the nature of the game between Atlanta and prospective vendors. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Family business goal formation: a literature review and discussion of alternative algorithms

Management Review Quarterly - Goals represent an organization’s desired outcomes, and family businesses are known to pursue multiple goals, which commonly include both financial and...     

Four strategies for the age of smart services

Most industrial manufacturers realize that the real money isn't in products but in services. Companies such as General Electric and IBM have famously made the transition: A large proportion of their revenues and margins come from providing value-added services to customers. But other companies attempting to do the same might miss the boat. It is not enough, the authors say, just to provide services. Businesses must now provide "smart services"--building intelligence (awareness and connectivity) into the products themselves. Citing examples such as Heidelberger Druckmaschinen's Internet-connected printing presses and Eaton Electrical's home-monitoring service, the authors demonstrate how a product that can report its status back to its maker represents an opportunity for the manufacturer to cultivate richer, longer-term relationships with customers. Four business models will emerge in this new, networked world. If you go it alone, it may be as an embedded innovator- that is, your networked product sends back information that can help you optimize service delivery, eliminate waste and inefficiency, and raise service margins. Or, you may pursue a more aggressive solutionist business model- that is, you position your networked product as a "complete solution provider," able to deliver a broader scope of high-value services than those provided by the embedded innovator's product. In the case of a system that aggregates and processes data from multiple products in a building or home, you may be either an aggregator or a synergist, partnering with others to pursue a smart-services opportunity. An aggregator's product is the hub, collecting and processing usage information- and creating a high-value body of data. A synergist's product is the spoke, contributing valuable data or functionality. Woe to the company that takes none of these paths; it'll soon find its former customers locked in--and happily--to other smart service providers.     

U.S. Corporate Governance: Accomplishments and Failings A Discussion with Michael Jensen and Robert Monks

Two of America's most prominent shareholder activists discuss three major issues surrounding the U.S. corporate governance system: (1) the case for increasing shareholder “democracy” by expanding investor access to the corporate proxy; (2) lessons for public companies in the success of private equity; and (3) the current level and design of CEO pay. On the first of the three subjects, Robert Monks suggests that the U.S. should adopt the British convention of the “extraordinary general meeting,” or “EGM,” which gives a majority of shareholders who attend the meeting the right to remove any or all of a company's directors “with or without cause.” Such shareholder meetings are permitted in virtually all developed economies outside the U.S. because, as Monks goes on to say, they represent “a far more efficient and effective solution than the idea of having shareholders nominate people for the simple reason that even very involved, financially sophisticated fiduciaries are not the best people to nominate directors.” Moreover, according to both Jensen and Monks, corporate boards in the U.K. do a better job than their U.S. counterparts of monitoring top management on behalf of shareholders. In contrast to the U.S., where the majority of companies continue to be run by CEO/Chairmen, over 90% of English companies are now chaired by outside directors, contributing to “a culture of independent‐minded chairmen capable of providing a high level of oversight.” In the U.S., by contrast, most corporate directors continue to view themselves as “employees of the CEO.” And, as a result, U.S. boards generally fail to exercise effective oversight and control until outside forces—often in the form of activist investors such as hedge funds and private equity—bring about a “crisis.” In companies owned and run by private equity firms, by contrast, top management is vigorously monitored and controlled by a board made up of the firm's largest investors. And the fact that the rewards to the operating heads of successful private equity‐controlled firms are typically multiples of those received by comparably effective public company CEOs suggests that the problem with U.S. CEO pay is not its level, but its lack of correlation with performance.