Adverse selection as an explanation of credit rationing and different lender types

An adverse selection model is utilized to demonstrate that informational asymmetry may make it wealth optimal for the financial intermediary (FI) to credit ration and to rationalize the existence of different lenders in the credit market. The crucial assumption is that borrowers differ in their tolerance for a lender-imposed default penalty, the severity of which also varies with the lender. The credit rationing portion proves that the FI will: 1) be forced by a binding regulatory constraint to overinvest in capital; 2) ration its worst risk class borrowers; 3) establish its optimal loan interest rate on the basis of the average quality of its loans and the interest rate elasticity of the borrower demand in its best risk category; and 4) decrease the total loan volume and increase the loan interest rate due to an increase in the capital requirement, but the effect on the default risk quality of its loan portfolio is ambiguous. The existence result is that if a lender has a high default penalty, he can charge a lower rate and attract only “good” borrowers, i.e., heterogeneous lender types encourage the screening of borrowers and vice versa.     

REIT Returns and Inflation: Perverse or Reverse Causality Effects?

Contrary to the Fisherian theory of interest, previous studies document a negative relationship between REIT (Real Estate Investment Trust) returns and inflation. In this research, we re-examine this perverse inflation behavior by testing for the causal relationships among REIT returns, real activity, monetary policy, and inflation through a vector error correction model. Our results indicate that the observations of REIT returns as perverse inflation hedges are spurious. The observed negative relationship between REIT returns and inflation is in fact a manifestation of the effects of changes in monetary policies. These findings are consistent with Darrat and Glascocks (1989) evidence of monetary effects on REIT returns.     

Environmental Conditions,Reservation Prices,and Time on the Market for Housing

A general analytical model to describe the impact of environmental disamenities on duration of sales is derived. A statistical technique to recover a sellers reservation price is proposed. An econometric procedure that consistently estimates market duration and a sellers reservation price is described. An application to the impact of highway noise on property values and market duration is presented. The estimation results show that, while highway noise has a significant negative impact on forming reservation prices and predicting sale prices, the noise effect on duration of sales is not statistically significant. Empirical evidence also shows a negative impact of market duration on reservation prices, which indicates an updating process for reservation prices over time.     

Understanding the Welfare Implications of Preferential Trade Agreements

This paper examines various implications of preferential trade agreements, namely customs unions and free trade areas, in the context of a multicountry general equilibrium model. The model is calibrated to represent countries with symmetric endowments, and aggregate and disaggregate welfare change measures are used to quantify the welfare effects of preferential trade agreements. It is found that free trade areas are better than customs unions on welfare grounds for the world as a whole. Welfare decompositions suggest that a significant fraction of the welfare changes is explained by the volume-of-trade effect for both types of preferential trade agreements.     

Free trade: what are the terms-of-trade effects?

Changes in trade policy affect a nation’s economic welfare through terms-of-trade and volume-of-trade effects. A move to global free trade would imply higher world economic welfare equal to the sum of all nations’ volume-of-trade, or efficiency, effects. Since the sum of the terms-of-trade effects across all nations is zero, terms-of-trade effects are contentious. Konishi, Kowalczyk and Sjöström (2003) have shown that if customs unions do not affect trade with non-member countries, immediate global free could be achieved if free trade were proposed together with international sidepayments equal to the terms of trade effects. How large would these terms of trade effects, and hence transfers, be? This paper presents estimates from a simple computable general equilibrium model of a world economy of perfect competition. We show that, in some cases, terms-of-trade effects are small compared to efficiency gains, and transfers are not necessary for free trade. In other cases, terms-of-trade gains may account for more than 50% of a country’s gains from free trade and transfers could be large.