Assessment and development centers: judgment biases and risks of using idiographic and nomothetic approaches to collecting information on people to be evaluated and trained in organizations

Assessment center and development center are two procedures that organizations can use in order to evaluate and train people. They make use of different methods and techniques, some (i.e. interviews) descending from the so called idiographic (or clinical) approach, and some (i.e. standardized instruments) descending from the so called nomothetic (or psychometric) approach. The idea is that different methods and techniques allow assessors and decision makers to collect as much information as possible, in order to come to an integrated judgment of people to be evaluated. Regarding this idea, psychological research has already discovered that it is not the amount of information collected that makes the difference between expert and non-expert assessors and decision makers. Besides, too much information is difficult to manage; and while it increases the confidence of assessors and decision makers about their judgments, it unfortunately does not increase their accuracy as well, since relevant information is mixed with irrelevant one and this makes it difficult to decide which one to consider and which one not. So, the article wants to be a critical review of what psychological science has found, and not so recently, in the field of assessment and development of psychological characteristics, in terms of risks and biases. Finally, it wants to underline the fact that, in spite of risks and biases, nowadays different methods and techniques are actually used to assess one person’s psychological characteristics, which is certainly questionable but also methodologically appropriate if they are appropriately used.     

Does democracy affect taxation and government spending? Evidence from developing countries

Focusing on developing countries in three geographical areas (South-East Asia, Latin America and European Union), we explore the relation between political variables and tax revenue, public spending and their structure. We build a new dataset for the 1990–2005 period with fiscal, political and socio-economic variables. Since democracy is a complex and multidimensional concept, we measure it using two variables, the political strength of democratic institutions, and the protection of civil liberties. We perform three sets of estimates: (i) cross-country pooled OLS regressions with region fixed effects, (ii) country fixed effects regressions and (iii) region specific regressions with country fixed effects. While the first model delivers some significant correlations between political variables and tax items, when controlling for country fixed effects we find that tax revenue and tax composition are in general not significantly correlated with the strength of democratic institutions and the protection of civil liberties. The only exceptions are indirect, trade and property taxes. A similar result applies to public spending, with the exception of defense expenditure. Overall, our findings cast some doubt on the exact public policy channels through which political institutions affect economic development.     

Partnership at Work: Mutuality and the Balance of Advantage

A framework for the analysis of partnership at work is presented, emphasizing the principles, practices and outcomes of partnership. A survey using matched samples of 54 UK management and employee representatives found a link between partnership principles and practices, between practices and ratings of employee attitudes and behaviour, between these and estimates of positive employment relations and quality and productivity, finally between productivity and sales and profitability. The findings support a mutual gains model but show that the balance of advantage is skewed towards management and reflects generally low management trust in employee representatives.     

Painless disinflation? Monetary policy rules in Hungary, 1991‐99

We estimate a small structural model for inflation, the output gap, the domestic interest rate and the exchange rate for Hungary during the period of the transition (1991-99). The transmission of monetary policy impulses to macro variables is characterized in a similar fashion to that of advanced open industrial countries. In particular, in the context of our rational expectations, forward-looking model, the interest rate channel on aggregate demand and the exchange rate channel work together as parts of the same disinflation policy. We draw several conclusions on understanding and modeling the effects of monetary policy, and also on the desirable design of policy rules during the process of disinflation.
JEL classification: E17, E52, P24.     

Book Reviews

Books reviewed in this article:
Richard Friberg, Exchange Rates and the Firm: Strategies to Manage Exposure and the Impact of EMU
Stephen Cecchetti, Hans Genberg, John Lipsky, and Sunil Wadhwani, Asset Prices and Central Bank Policy
Michael J. Greenwood and John M. McDowell, Legal U.S. Immigration: Influences on Gender, Age, and Skill Composition
Pontus Braunerhjelm, Riccardo Faini, Victor Norman, Frances Ruane, and Paul Seabright, Integration and the Regions of Europe: How the Right Policies Can Prevent Polarization     

A simple and effective misspecification test for the double-hurdle model

The commonly-used version of the double-hurdle model rests on a rather restrictive set of statistical assumptions, which are very seldom tested by practitioners, mainly because of the lack of a standard procedure for doing so, although violation of such assumptions can lead to serious modelling flaws. We propose here a bootstrap-corrected conditional moment portmanteau test which is simple to implement and has good size and power properties.     

Credibility and commitment of monetary policy in open economies

We study the delegation of monetary policy to independent central bankers in a two-country world with monetary spillovers. It is shown that, under the hypotheses of imperfect commitment and private information, the equilibrium degree of commitment depends on the correlation structure of the shocks hitting the economies. When the correlation is negative (as when the variance of output depends mainly on shocks to the terms of trade) there is strategic complementarity in the degree of commitment in the two countries. When the correlation is positive (common technological or demand shocks) there is strategic substitutability. In this latter case, the degree of commitment is shown to be increasing in the correlation among shocks. Common components in the international business cycle have been shown in several studies to be relatively more relevant in developed countries. Therefore, our results may contribute to explaining why the institutional solution to the inflationary bias has been adopted in the most advanced countries.