Hedging to market-wide shocks and competitive selection

This paper examines hedging against a large market-wide shock in a model with heterogeneous firms and sunk costs of entry. If hedging is voluntary only the most efficient firms hedge against this shock, a finding in line with empirical evidence but at odds with standard motivations for risk management. Hedging affects the critical level of the marginal cost needed to operate in the market. A setting with mandatory hedging is associated with stronger competition than when hedging is voluntary which, in turn, is associated with stronger competition than when hedging is unavailable.     

Regret in auctions: theory and evidence

The sealed-bid first-price auction of a single object in the case of independent privately-known values is the simplest auction setting and understanding it is important for understanding more complex mechanisms. But bidders bid above the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium theory prediction. The reasons for this “over bidding” remain an unsolved puzzle. Several explanations have been offered, including risk aversion, social comparisons, and learning. We present a new explanation based on regret and a model that explains not only the observed over bidding in sealed-bid first-price auctions, but also behavior in several other settings that is inconsistent with risk aversion. The authors gratefully acknowledge support from the National Science Foundation.     

Value and exchange: Two windows for economic theorizing

This essay introduces a symposium on value and exchange as alternative organizing concepts for the pursuit of economic theorizing. These concepts pertain to two distinct conceptual windows through which economic phenomena can be examined. The immediate inspiration for this symposium was the articulation of Kohn (2004) of the distinction, a distinction that, in turn, was central to the articulation of Buchanan (1964). Furthermore, this distinction is central to the divergent orientations toward economic theorizing that were set forth in the early 1870s by Carl Menger (1971) and Léon Walras (1874).     

Underwriter reputation and IPO issuer alignment 1981–2005

We examine the long-term performance and characteristics of firms that went public from 1981 to 2005. We find that long-run returns declined and the proportion of failed and failing firms increased with underwriter reputation. The IPOs marketed by the more reputable underwriters were more likely to fail or be failing in the post-1980s period, but were still better than those of less reputable counterparts. The characteristics of the firms marketed by the more reputable underwriters did not appear to change substantially from decade to decade. We conclude that external market forces rather than conscious changes by underwriters caused the shift in the relation between failure rates and underwriter reputation from the 1980s to the subsequent period. We also find the “flip” in relationship between underwriter reputation and initial IPO return identified in the literature disappears after controlling for additional factors.     

On Teasing Out Sociology from Economics

A bstract .   Of the many interesting pieces of information that can be found in Parsons's March 10, 1973 seminar at Brown University, one concerns his relationship to Schumpeter, and it is to this that this brief note is devoted. Parsons and Schumpeter knew each other for some 20 years, and one of the many things that Schumpeter taught Parsons was that one can read the texts of economists for the sociological insights that they contain. In Parsons's formulation from the seminar: "economists must have some sociological ideas."     

The weighted average cost of capital is not quite right: Reply to M. Pierru

In this journal [Miller, R. A. (2009). The weighted average cost of capital is not quite right. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 49, 128–138], I argued that the standard WACC formula is inadequate in most circumstances to reward stockholders and bondholders where the necessary cash flows are calculated separately to exactly cover the respective costs of capital. Axel Pierru [2009. ‘The weighted average cost of capital is not quite right’: A comment. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 49, 1219–1223] observes correctly that my assumed repayment schedules (equal periodic payments to bondholders; similarly for stockholders) imply a temporal drift in the debt (or leverage) ratio; he would recalculate the WACC annually. He proposes an alternative calculation of the repayment schedules under the constraint of a constant debt ratio. Here I suggest three additional possible repayment schedules; in general repayment schedules determine the drift in the debt ratio. However, the expected repayment schedules are established at the time the project is accepted and financed, hence the relevant debt ratio is that which exists at that time. The WACC for a specific project need not (and should not) be recalculated for that project throughout its financial life when that project has already been accepted and financed.     

Virtual stewardship in the age of new media: have nonprofit organizations' moved beyond Web 1.0 strategies?

• Stewardship has been identified as an important relationship cultivation strategy. The four dimensions of stewardship—reciprocity, responsibility, reporting, and relationship nurturing—consist of one‐way and two‐way messaging strategies that can be carried out in a variety of manners on the Internet using both Web 1.0 and Web 2.0 technologies. Through a content analysis of the Nonprofit Times 100 organizations, this study found that nonprofit organizations overwhelmingly prefer to use their website to cultivate relationships with their stakeholders with stewardship strategies. Despite the hype of social media technologies, including Facebook, there remain many significant questions and obstacles to seeing nonprofits truly embrace social media communication.

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