Minority owned banks and efficiency revisited

U.S. Government support for minority owned banks (MOBs) dates to the late 1960s. Evidence through the early 1990s suggested these banks are relatively inefficient. This study updates that research, using Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) and panel data from 2003 to 2014 on minority owned banks and other banks. It is, as far as we know, the first such study to exclude outliers in SFA estimation, while recovering the outliers for efficiency estimation. Initial results identify a disruption in cost efficiency during 2008, with statistically distinct regimes for 2003–2007 and 2009–2014. Including recovered observations alters the patterns of MOB efficiency in significant ways, and leads us to conclude that current MOB inefficiency is mainly limited to Asian American owned and Multi-racial and minority serving banks. Tests for the effects of government deposits under a U.S. Treasury program suggest these did not adversely effect efficiency among covered MOBs, but may have improved survival rates for those MOBs subsequent to the financial collapse.     

Aggregate implications of indivisible labor, incomplete markets, and labor market frictions

We study the impact of tax and transfer programs on steady-state allocations in a model with search frictions, an operative labor supply margin, and incomplete markets. In a benchmark model that has indivisible labor and incomplete markets but no trading frictions we show that the aggregate effects of taxes are identical to those in the economy with employment lotteries, though individual employment and asset dynamics can be different. The effect of frictions on the response of aggregate hours to a permanent tax change is highly nonlinear. There is considerable scope for substitution between “voluntary” and “frictional” nonemployment in some situations.     

Regulator performance,regulatory environment and outcomes: An examination of insurance regulator career incentives on state insurance markets

In this paper we test whether the past or future labor market choices of insurance commissioners provide incentives for regulators in states with price regulation to either favor or oppose the industry by allowing prices that differ significantly from what would otherwise be the competitive market outcome. Using biographical data on insurance regulators, economic and state specific market structure and regulatory variables, and state premium and loss data on the personal automobile insurance market, we find no evidence consumers in prior approval states paid significantly different “unit prices” for insurance than consumers in states that allow competitive market forces to determine equilibrium prices during the time period 1985–2002. We do, however, find evidence regulators who obtained the position of insurance commissioner by popular election and those who seek higher elective office following their tenure as insurance commissioner allow higher overall “unit prices” relative to competitive market states. The “unit price” of insurance in regulated states is not statistically different from the competitive market outcome for regulators that make lateral moves back into state government and it is mildly higher for regulators who enter the insurance industry following their tenure. Finally, we find some evidence regulators who describe themselves as consumer advocates are successful reducing the price of insurance in favor of consumers in regulated markets. Overall the results are consistent with the existence of asymmetric information in the regulatory process that agents use to enhance their career aspirations.     

Measuring the unmeasurable: an application of uncertainty quantification to Treasury bond portfolios

We extract from the yield curve a new measure of fundamental economic uncertainty, based on McDiarmid’s diameter and related methods for optimal uncertainty quantification (OUQ). OUQ seeks analytical bounds on a system’s behaviour, even where aspects of the underlying data-generating process and system response function are not completely known. We use OUQ to stress test a simple fixed-income portfolio, certifying its safety—i.e. that potential losses will be ‘small’ in an appropriate sense. The results give explicit tradeoffs between: scenario count, maximum loss, test horizon, and confidence level. Unfortunately, uncertainty peaks in late 2008, weakening certification assurances just when they are needed most.     

Expert opinion and probabilistic volcanic risk assessment

We present data from an international survey of scientists working at volcanic observatories concerning eruption likelihoods. The scientists were asked a range of questions using different types of phrasing. The data suggest that the phrasing of questions affects the ways in which probabilities are estimated. In total, 71% of respondents (N = 70) exhibited some form of inconsistency in their answers between and/or within different question formats. The data also allow for an analysis of the use of scaling in probabilistic assessment, and the use of quantitative versus verbal risk measurements. However, some respondents were uncomfortable with providing any numerical probability estimate, perhaps suggesting that they considered the uncertainty too high for meaningful judgements to be made.     

Assembly FG: An Educational Case on MRP II Integrated within ERP

This case teaches students how discrete (job order) manufacturing companies use Manufacturing Resource Planning (MRP II) within Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems to plan purchase orders for direct materials and shop orders for work‐in‐process and finished goods. Students simulate MRP II integrated within ERP, using Microsoft Excel to learn MRP II's bill‐of‐materials (BOM) Explosion that plans order quantities and MRP II's scheduling logic that uses lead‐times to determine start dates for planned orders. Students explain why MRP II is most practical and effective when executed within ERP and how MRP II can reduce excess inventories, prevent inventory shortages, and help companies deliver quality products to customers on schedule. Also, students explain why BOM, inventory, and lead‐time inaccuracies can adversely affect the accuracy of MRP II‐planned replenishments and identify controls that reduce the risks of these inaccuracies.