When consumers complain: A path analysis of the key antecedents of consumer complaint response estimates

When do consumers complain? This study probes this question by developing a conceptual framework that includes multiple theoretical perspectives, empirically testing a portion of the proposed model, and using dissatisfaction/complaint data from three different service industries. The hypothesized model uses multidimensional consumer complaint response estimates including voice, private, and third-party responses as dependent variables. Results support several proposed relationships, provide a high level of explained variance, and indicate a moderating role for dissatisfaction intensity. The complaint response estimates are characterized by disparate influence pathways, and expectancy value judgments emerge as critical determinants with positive and negative crossover effects. Attitude toward complaining is more dominant under low dissatisfaction intensity than it is under the high dissatisfaction condition. Important differences emerge across service categories. Implications of this work for managers and researchers in understanding when consumers complain are enumerated.     

Multi-Dimensional Procurement Auctions for Power Reserves: Robust Incentive-Compatible Scoring and Settlement Rules

System operators in the electricity industry purchase reserve capacity in a procurement auction in which suppliers offer two-part bids, one part for making capacity available and another part for supplying incremental energy when called. Key ingredients of an efficient auction design are the scoring rule for comparing bids, and the settlement rule for paying accepted bids. We use the principle of incentive compatibility to establish that very simple rules suffice. In particular, the scoring rule uses only the capacity part of the bid, and energy supplies are paid the spot price. This is the design adopted in California.     

Law without justice: The dilemmas of formalization and fairness in the legalistic organization

There is growing evidence of a litigation mentality rampant in organizations, which has created a legalistic mindset in many managers. Increasingly, managerial decisions are becoming dominated by a concern for what is legally defensible at the expense of broader social considerations such as justice and fairness. The papers in this special issue explore how this legalistic mindset has created new organizational and social dilemmas, and situations of law whithout justice.     

Botswana's Macroeconomic Management of Its Mineral-Based Growth: It Used Mining Revenues for Development and Services but Must Now Broaden the Beneficiaries

Abstract . The economic performance and the political history of Botswana during 1974-84 contrasted significantly with the experience of virtually every other African country. The South African republic, immediately north of the Republic of South Africa, achieved steady real economic growth with improved social services and provision for its people's basic needs. This was achieved in spite of world recession and drought because its mineral wealth Was reserved for the people and mining companies had to pay for the privilege of extracting that wealth through a tax program limited to appropriating its surplus, while assuring the investors and entrepreneurs an adequate long-term return on capital and enterprise. But sound macroeconomic policies failed to provide even reasonably equitable benefits for the majority of the people. Sound micropolicies are needed to widen access to employment and earned income and to asset accumulation.     

PROPRIETORIAL CONTROL IN FAMILY FIRMS: SOME FUNCTIONS OF 'QUASI-ORGANIC' MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the strategies of managerial control which are used by the proprietors of family-owned business enterprises. Interviews with the proprietors and senior managers of businesses in the building industry illustrate the ‘quasi-organic’ nature of management structures. These grant some autonomy to senior managers without threatening proprietorial decision-making prerogatives. Although the family firm has certain distinctive features, similar control strategies designed to ensure that delegated decisions are ‘reliable’ and ‘responsible’ are evident in various types of business enterprise. There is, then, scope for further comparative research within a conceptual framework which does not entirely divorce the family firm from other business organizations.     

A different perspective on operating leverage: Comments

A recent article in this journal by Dran (1991) suggests that the usual treatment of degree of operating leverage (DOL) is misleading because it improperly attributes the DOL to the ratio of fixed to total costs rather than the closeness of the firm’s output to breakeven. Managerial economics texts are clear in identification of DOL as an elasticity concept which varies with the nearness to break-even. Examples associating DOL with the relative level of fixed cost arise from association of higher fixed costs with higher breakeven points, and this appears to be the normal economic relationship.     

Productive behavior through the life course: An essay on the quality of life

Present patterns of productive activity are neither well recognized, optimal for society, nor in accordance with individual prefence. Although a great deal of attention has been given to meeting people's needs for income, medical care, and other services, the quality of their lives must also be defined by what they do for themselves and for others. In discovering present patterns of productive activity throughout the life course and optimizing those patterns, we will raise the quality of American life. To accomplish this task, two great changes are needed: we must recognize the full range of productive activities throughout the life course and give people the opportunity to modify the allocation of paid employment.     

On the existence of rational expectations equilibrium

We prove a theorem on the existence of rational expectations general economic equilibrium when agents condition on prices as well as on private information, and maximize the expectation of a state-dependent utility function. The key to the result is a new idealization of what it means for a set of empirical distributions to support agents' expectations. This idealization depends on the notion that agents compare their expectations with continuous versions of the random empirical distributions that are generated by the workings of the economy. The existence theorem covers all strictly concave utility functions, arbitrary distributions of the state variable, and situations in which the dimension of the state variable is large relative to the number of commodities.