Regulation and the provision of quality to heterogenous consumers: The case of prospective pricing of medical services

This paper analyzes the welfare implications of fixed-price regulation of services in a model in which consumers are heterogenous and a firm can endogenously quality discriminate. We consider two different scenarios: The first scenario is when the consumer is also the payer. The second scenario is when the payer (usually the government) is not the consumer. Our major result is that fixed-price regulation causes a distributional welfare loss. We show that it is not possible for fixed-price regulation to induce providers to supply all consumer types with the first-best quality even under perfect information, under either pricing scenario. We show that high and low demand types may receive more than their respective first-best qualities, less than their first-best qualities, or one type may receive more and the other type less depending on the level of the regulated price. It is always true that when consumers are payers, quality is higher for both types than when consumers are not the payers. In this paper, we motivate and discuss the results in terms of price regulation of hospitals where consumers are patients and patient types vary by severity of illness.     

Commitment and matching contributions to public goods

We study multi-stage processes of non-cooperative voluntary provision of public goods. In the first stage, one or more players announce contributions that may be conditional on the subsequent contributions of others. In later stages, players choose their own contributions and fulfill any commitments made in the first stage. Equilibrium contributions are characterized under different assumptions about the commitment ability of players, the number of public goods and whether players commit to matching rates or to discrete quantities. We focus on contribution mechanisms that can emerge and be sustainable without a central authority, and that may be particularly relevant for international public goods. Efficient levels of public goods can be achieved under some circumstances, while in others commitment is ineffective.     

ON IMPROVING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE MARKET MODEL

Data on 4,087 securities from 1988 to 1990 are used to test the relation between market model R² and trading volume. Eliminating high-volume observations increases R² by about 10 percent, confirming results previously reported. This study indicates that this improvement is possible by eliminating a small number of observations. It also indicates that this relation between R² and volume is unrelated to firm size.     

Differentiating Good Soldiers from Good Actors*

abstract In a qualitative interview study, 20 Hong Kong Chinese informants were asked to report stories about colleagues who were either ‘good soldiers’ or ‘good actors’. In stories about good soldiers, informants attributed their colleagues' organizational citizenship behaviour (OCB) primarily to prosocial or pro‐organizational motives. Informants' stories about good actors broke down into three major subcategories of citizenship‐related impression management: OCB attributed primarily to impression management motives; alleged pseudo‐OCB concomitant with minimal compliance; and alleged pseudo‐OCB concomitant with counterproductive behaviour. When distinguishing good soldiers from good actors, informants adopted two criteria for attribution: wilful behavioural inconsistency, i.e. low generality of behaviour across contexts; and alleged false pretence, i.e. discrepancy between claims or allusions and actual deeds. Our findings partially supported a prior hypothesis from attribution theory, that consistency was a criterion for attribution, but indicated that consensus, i.e. correspondence between the focal colleague's behaviour and other employees' behaviour, failed to differentiate good soldiers from good actors. Informants generally regarded OCB as socially desirable only when it was attributed primarily to prosocial/pro‐organizational motives.     

Turning from crime: A dynamic perspective

This paper examines criminal choice using a variant of the human capital model. The innovation of our approach is that it attempts to disaggregate individual capital, not unlike production-based studies which disaggregate physical capital into equipment and structures. We disaggregate an individual’s capital stock into the standard human capital component as well as a utility generating component that we call social capital. In our set-up, social capital is used to account for the influence of social norms on the decision to participate in crime. This is done by modeling the stigma of arrest as a reduction in the individual’s social capital stock. We also allow individuals to account for the impact of their criminal actions on their probability of arrest. In order to estimate the structural parameters underlying the model, we make use of computationally intensive methods involving simulated generalized method of moments and value function approximation. The empirical results, based on panel data from the Delinquency in a Birth Cohort II Study, support the social capital model of crime and reveal significant state dependence in the decision to participate in crime.     

Farrell efficiency under value and quantity data

In 1957, Farrell introduced a nonparametric method to estimate technical efficiency. His original illustration, however, utilized value-based, rather than quantity-based data (p. 279). This common practice raises the question of how value-based DEA models coincide with quantity-based models. It is well known that the two models coincide when firms face identical prices. In practice, however, prices vary across firms and the two models yield materially different results. We decompose the resulting difference into its technology and firm-related components and then use Farrell’s original data set to show that the expected difference is systematic and one-sided.