Customer perceived value,satisfaction, and loyalty: the role of willingness to share information

This study proposes and tests an integrative model to examine the relationships among customers’ willingness to share information, satisfaction, perceived value, and loyalty in a retailing context. This study extends research on customers’ willingness to share information from trust and privacy concerns toward key outcome measures such as perceived value, customer satisfaction, and loyalty, and is thus among the first to model customers’ willingness to share information with companies in robust theoretical retailing frameworks. The proposed relationships were tested using data from two retailing contexts – groceries (N = 429) and do-it-yourself (DIY) (N = 895). Findings from the two samples suggest that both perceived value and satisfaction are significant determinants of customers’ willingness to share information with a company. Although some differences emerge in the two studies, structural modeling largely supports the hypothesized framework and positions customers’ willingness to share information as an important antecedent of their loyalty intentions and behavior. This study provides practitioners with preliminary insight into the relationship between willingness to share information and perceived value, customer satisfaction, and customer loyalty. This study advances retailing research, as it is one of the few empirical studies investigating the role of customers’ willingness to share information in driving loyalty and its relationship with perceived value and satisfaction in a retailing context.     

Effects of time pressure,type of shopping,and store attributes on consumers’ satisfaction with grocery shopping

The aim of this study is to investigate whether satisfaction with grocery stores is affected by type of grocery shopping in conjunction with time pressure, and which attributes are important for satisfaction. Fictitious grocery stores are constructed according to a fractional factorial design by varying access, price level, supply quality/range, and service quality. In an Internet survey, 1023 Swedish consumers rated satisfaction with major vs. fill-in shopping imagining they were under high or low time pressure. The results showed that satisfaction is higher for fill-in shopping than major shopping, that time pressure has no effect on satisfaction, and that price level, service quality, and product quality/range are more important for satisfaction with major shopping, whereas access is more important for satisfaction with fill-in shopping. It is also found that the importance of attributes for satisfaction depends on type of shopping more than on individual characteristics.     

The effects of (incentivized) belief elicitation in public goods experiments

Belief elicitation is an important methodological issue for experimental economists. There are two generic questions: 1) Do incentives increase belief accuracy? 2) Are there interaction effects of beliefs and decisions? We investigate these questions in the case of finitely repeated public goods experiments. We find that belief accuracy is significantly higher when beliefs are incentivized. The relationship between contributions and beliefs is slightly steeper under incentives. However, we find that incentivized beliefs tend to lead to higher contribution levels than either non-incentivized beliefs or no beliefs at all. We discuss the implications of our results for the design of public good experiments.     

The Complementary Relationship Between Institutional and Complexity Economics: The Example of Deep Mechanismic Explanations

Analyzing economic systems from an evolutionary-institutional or a complexity perspective are two complementary approaches to economic inquiry. I discuss three arguments in favor of this hypothesis: (i) eminent institutional economists have examined the economy as what today could be considered a complex system; (ii) complexity economists lack meta-theoretical foundations which could be provided by institutionalist theory; and (iii) institutional economists could benefit from using methods of complexity economics. In this context, I argue that scholars considering the economy to be complex should seek to explain it by discovering social mechanisms instead of focusing on prediction. In order to distinguish between alternative explanations, scholars should refer to the deepness of an explanation, rather than to Occam’s razor.     

静脉曲张是高科技？外行也能做得很出色

世界上有很多人有过不错的创意，但是他们当中的大部分人缺少自信、专业知识和经验。宰吾（Zeev）相信，有好的想法以后，可以自学所需要的知识，积累所需要的经验，以实践自己的想法     

The Heckscher–Ohlin model and the network structure of international trade

This paper estimates for 28 product groups a characteristic parameter that reflects the topological structure of its trading network. Using these estimates, it describes how the structure of international trade has evolved during the 1980–2000 period. Thereafter, it demonstrates the importance of networks in international trade by explicitly accounting for their scaling properties when testing the prediction of the “Heckscher–Ohlin” model that factor endowment differentials determine bilateral trade flows. The results suggest that factor endowment differentials increase bilateral trade in goods that are traded in “dispersed” networks. For goods traded in “concentrated” networks, factor endowment differentials are less important.     

Sensibler Umgang verhindert Retraumatisierung

Traumatische Erfahrungen begleiten Betroffene ein Leben lang - Wird bei einer Krankenhauseinweisung oder beim Umzug in ein Pflegeheim die Posttraumatische Belastungsst?rung nicht erkannt, kann es leicht zu Traumareaktivierungen kommen, die auch juristisch bedeutsame Entscheidungen nach sich ziehen k?nnen.     

Information Cascades in the Labor Market

A model of herding behavior in the labor market is presented where employers receive signals with limited precision about the workers types, and can observe previous employers decisions. Both the employer and the worker can influence the signal probabilities. In particular, the employer tries to increase the precision of the signal about the workers type whereas the worker wants to get a good signal, independent of her type. In a two-period model, we derive conditions for an equilibrium in which only down-cascades occur, i.e., the second employer does not hire a worker with a bad history even if he receives a favorable private signal about the workers type, but he follows his own signal if the workers history is good.