Relative importance of scheduled macroeconomic news for stock market investors

This paper investigates the relative importance of scheduled U.S. macroeconomic news releases for stock valuation. The study focuses on 11 macroeconomic announcements selected on the basis of the previous literature and the Bureau of Labor Statistics classifications of major economic indicators. The paper shows that five out of the 11 announcements have significant influence on stock valuation. These are the Employment Report, NAPM (manufacturing), Producer Price Index, Import and Export Price Indices, and Employment Cost Index. Of these six announcements, the Employment Report and NAPM (manufacturing) exert the greatest influence. The time of the announcement, measured by days from the beginning of the month to the release day, has a moderating impact on the relationship between macroeconomic announcements and its importance.     

Strategic restraint in contests

Economic policy is modelled as the outcome of a (political) game between two interest groups. The possible ex-post (realized) outcomes in the game correspond to the proposed policies. In the literature policy proposals are exogenous. We extend such games by allowing the endogenous determination of the proposed policies. In a first stage the groups decide which policy to lobby for and then, in a second stage, engage in a contest over the proposed policies. Our main result is that competition over endogenously determined policies induces strategic restraint that reduces polarization and, in turn, wasteful lobbying activities.     

Public Stackelberg Leadership in a Mixed Oligopoly with Foreign Firms

This is the first paper to consider a mixed oligopoly in which a public Stackelberg leader competes with both domestic and foreign private firms. The welfare maximising leader is shown to always produce less than under previous Cournot conjectures. Introducing leadership also alters previous public pricing rules resulting in prices that may be either greater than or less than marginal cost depending on the relative number of domestic firms. Furthermore, entry of a foreign firm will increase welfare only when the relative number of domestic firms is small, but that share is shown to be larger than has been indicated without leadership. Unlike previous models, the influence on public profit of a foreign acquisition is ambiguous and is related to the relative number of domestic firms. Finally, the consequences of privatisation are shown, for the first time, to depend on the relative number of domestic firms.     

Bargaining with the Devil

ABSTRACT . “Bargaining with the Devil: Commentary on the Ostroms’‘Quest for Meaning in Public Choice’” provides a commentary on Elinor Ostrom and Vincent Ostrom's paper, “The Quest for Meaning in Public Choice.” This discussion focuses on the challenging tension that exists between social scientific knowledge and social practices. It suggests that historical agents may have solved the dilemma of cooperation prior to rational choice theorists’ invention of the public goods problem.     

Explicit filters and supply chain design

Due to the complexity of present day supply chains it is important to select the simplest supply chain scheduling decision support system (DSS) which will determine and place orders satisfactorily. We propose to use a generic design framework, termed the explicit filter methodology, to achieve this objective. In doing so we compare the explicit filter approach to the implicit filter approach utilised in previous OR research the latter focusing on minimising a cost function. Although the eventual results may well be similar with both approaches it is much clearer to the designer, both why and how, an ordering system will reduce the Bullwhip effect via the explicit filter approach. The “explicit filter” approach produces a range of DSS designs corresponding to best practice. These may be “mixed and matched” to generate a number of competitive delivery pipelines to suit the specific business scenario.     

Strategy-proofness in many-to-one matching problems

We search forstrategy-proof solutions in the context of (many-to-one) matching problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962). In this model, whenever the firms can hire as many workers as they want (the capacities are unlimited) the stable set is a singleton. There exists aPareto efficient, individually rational, andstrategy-proof matching rule if and only if the capacities are unlimited. Furthermore, whenever the capacities unlimited, the matching rule which selects the unique stable matching is the only matching rule that isPareto efficient, individually rational, andstrategy-proof.     

Vergleich des verallgemeinerten nichtzentralent-Tests mit dem Binomialtest

Zusammenfassung Es sei {F _,(x); –<<, >0} mitF _,(x)=F((x–)/)–F(x) eine standardisierte Verteilungsfunktion — die Familie der zulässigen Verteilungsfunktionen. Der (früher eingeführte) verallgemeinerte nichtzentralet-Test für die Hypothese {PP ₀} mitP:=F _,(x ₀) gegen die Alternative {P>P ₀} zum Niveau wird mit dem entsprechenden nichtparametrischen Test (Test für die Hypothese {pP ₀} über den Parameterp einer Binomialverteilung gegen die Alternative {p>P ₀}) verglichen. Für dent-Test wird die relative asymptotische Effizienz bestimmt.Beide Tests lassen sich als Tests für das zur WahrscheinlichkeitP ₀ gehörende Quantil einer Verteilungsfunktion interpretieren. Der klassische zentrale Student-Test ergibt sich als Spezialfall (F(x)=(x),P ₀=0,5).

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Summary Let {F _,(x);–<<, >0} withF _,(x ₀):=F((x–)/–F(x) a standarized distribution function — the family of admissible distribution functions. The (earlier introduced) generalized noncentralt-test for the hypothesis {PP ₀} withP:=F _,(x ₀) against the alternative {P>P ₀} at level of significance is compared with the corresponding nonparametric test (Binomial test). The relative asymptotic efficiency of thet-test is determined. Both kinds of tests can be interpreted as quantiltests. In caseF(x)=(x),P ₀=0,5 one gets the classical central Student-test.

     

Are serial Condorcet rules strategy-proof?

Abstract. This paper explores the extent to which majority rule is invulnerable to manipulation by individuals and coalitions, even when majority rule is used to select more than one alternative. The resulting rule may or may not be strategy-proof, depending on the size of the coalitions that can form, and on the nature of the individual preferences over sets of alternatives. No individual can manipulate with respect to a wide family of preferences over sets. The only restriction on the domain of true and revealed individual preferences is that the selection rule is always well defined. Received: 1 November 1999 / Accepted: 7 May 2001 We thank two anonymous referees for suggestions that have significantly improved the paper. We are also grateful to l'Université de Caen for sponsoring a Workshop on Social Choice Theory, where a first draft of this paper was presented in May, 1999, and to the workshop participants for helpful observations. Work on the final version of the paper was done while one of the authors was a guest of the Project on Intergenerational Equity supported by the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology of Japan. We are grateful to the Ministry and to the project leader, Professor Kotaro Suzumura, for their support.