NEW ESTIMATES OF THE U.S. ECONOMY'S POTENTIAL GROWTH RATE

Using an Okun's law framework, the analysis here estimates potential growth for the 1990s as measured by both fixed- and chain-weighted GDP. It then decomposes estimated potential growth rates into labor productivity growth (LPG) and labor input growth (LIG) using a regression analysis to separate secular from cyclical changes. It compares estimates of potential output and trend productivity growth for the 1990s with estimates from earlier periods. Results indicate that eliminating the substitution bias associated with fixed-weight measures of real GDP raises estimated potential GDP growth in the 1980s but lowers it in the 1990s. A slowdown in labor force growth, with little or no change in long-term productivity growth, largely accounts for the implied slowdown in potential growth.     

The Impact of Wage‐Setting Institutions on the Incidence of Public Employment in the OECD: 1960–1998

Using data on seventeen Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries for 1960–1998, this paper studies the impact of unions on public employment incidence, using macro‐ and microdata. Macrodata show that greater coverage by centralized collective bargaining institutions raises the public employment share, controlling for country effects and country‐specific trends. Microdata show that this effect is more positive for outsiders: women, and younger and older men. Thus, government jobs may in effect partially counteract the employment problems these groups face in highly unionized societies.     

Moral Hazard and Optimal Subsidiary Structure for Financial Institutions

Banks and related financial institutions often have two separate subsidiaries that make loans of similar type but differing risk, for example, a bank and a finance company, or a “good bank/bad bank” structure. Such “bipartite” structures may prevent risk shifting, in which banks misuse their flexibility in choosing and monitoring loans to exploit their debt holders. By “insulating” safer loans from riskier loans, a bipartite structure reduces risk‐shifting incentives in the safer subsidiary. Bipartite structures are more likely to dominate unitary structures as the downside from riskier loans is higher or as expected profits from the efficient loan mix are lower.     

Payments Settlement: Tiering in Private and Public Systems

What are the benefits provided by a payment system? What are the trade‐offs in public versus private payment systems and in restricted versus open payments arrangements? Modern payment systems encompass a variety of institutional designs with varying degrees of counterparty protection. We develop a framework that allows for an examination and comparison of payment systems, and specification of conditions leading to their adoption. We relate these conditions to the design of present large‐value payment systems (Fedwire, CHIPS, TARGET, etc.).