Household Response to Government Debt: Evidence from Life Insurance Holdings

We use state‐level panel data on life insurance in force in the United States and find that a $1 increase in government debt, at either the state or federal level is associated with a $0.96 increase in the face value of the average life insurance holdings per capita for a household in the average state. This increase represents an intention to save that would almost completely offset the government debt in specific states of the world (i.e., if the insured dies). Because this state of the world is rare, the immediate increase in actual savings is only about $0.03, the cost of the additional insurance. We find, in addition, that this response occurs mainly on the intensive margin, meaning that the size of the average life insurance policy increases when government debt increases. Along the extensive margin, we find the number of policies in force falls slightly with federal debt, and rises slightly with state debt increases. The results show altruistic planning in response to changes in government debt that are consistent with Ricardian Equivalence and the long‐run neutrality of government debt.     

Preemptive Competition in City Development

The rise of decentralization and polycentrism in cities raises questions of optimality. This paper proposes a model of two competing developers that generates new development prior to the optimal time. If demand is growing for new developments, the development built later will have potentially lower present value profitability, due to discounting, when compared to the earlier development. Both developers compete to gain the “first‐mover advantage” to build the first of the two developments, and developing sooner than what is optimal achieves this goal. This preemptive theory of competition offers a result that cities are more decentralized and polycentric than what is optimal.     

Which Microfinance Institutions Are Becoming More Cost Effective with Time? Evidence from a Mixture Model

Microfinance institutions (MFIs) play a key role in many developing countries. Utilizing data from Eastern Europe and Central Asia, MFIs are found to generally operate with lower costs the longer they are in operation. Given the differences in operating environments, subsidies, and organizational form, this finding of increasing cost effectiveness may not aptly characterize all MFIs. Estimation of a mixture model reveals that roughly half of the MFIs are able to operate with reduced costs over time, while half do not. Among other things, we find that larger MFIs offering deposits and those receiving lower subsidies operate more cost effectively over time.     

Delayed Reaction to Good News and the Cross-Autocorrelation of Portfolio Returns

We document a directional asymmetry in the small stock concurrent and lagged response to large stock movements. When returns on large stocks are negative, the concurrent beta for small stocks is high, but the lagged beta is insignificant. When returns on large stocks are positive, small stocks have small concurrent betas and very significant lagged betas. That is, the cross-autocorrelation puzzle documented by Lo and MacKinlay (1990a) is associated with a slow response by some small stocks to good, but not to bad, common news. Time series portfolio tests and cross-sectional tests of the delay for individual securities suggest that existing explanations of the cross-autocorrelation puzzle based on data mismeasurement, minor market imperfections, or time-varying risk premiums fail to capture the directional asymmetry in the data.     

Rents and Quasi Rents in the Wage Structure: Evidence from Hostile Takeovers

We test whether industry-related variation in wage premium and slopes of wage profiles reflects payments of rents or quasi rents, taking our cue from the wealth-transfer hypothesis, which argues that hostile takeovers target such rents. If these wage structure characteristics reflect extramarginal payments, then hostile takeover attempts that sought to transfer wealth from workers to shareholders should have targeted firms with the highest wage premia or the steepest wage profiles. We find that the likelihood of being a hostile takeover target between 1979 and 1989 was generally unrelated to these industry-related characteristics of the wage structure.     

On the Benefits of Concurrent Lending and Underwriting

This paper examines whether there are efficiencies that benefit issuers and underwriters when a financial intermediary concurrently lends to an issuer while also underwriting its public securities offering. We find issuers, particularly noninvestment‐grade issuers for whom informational economies of scope are likely to be large, benefit through lower underwriter fees and discounted loan yield spreads. Underwriters, both commercial banks as well as investment banks, engage in concurrent lending and provide price discounts, albeit in different ways. We find concurrent lending helps underwriters build relationships, increasing the probability of receiving current and future business.