Entry deterrence and innovation in durable-goods monopoly

This paper investigates the efficiency of innovation investments in a durable-goods monopoly when a potential entrant threatens to innovate as well. We show that the durability of the good endows the monopolist with the power to discourage rival innovation since current sales alter the demand for a new generation of the good. The equilibrium is therefore determined not only by the incentive for intertemporal price discrimination in durable-goods monopoly, but also by the incumbent's concern for maintaining the technological leadership. We demonstrate that entry deterrence followed by no innovation always implies underinvestment in innovation.     

Innovation timing games: a general framework with applications

We offer a new algorithm for analyzing innovation timing games. Its main advantage over the traditional approach is that it applies to problems that had previously been intractable. We use the algorithm to examine two classical innovation problems. We find that the competition takes the form of a waiting game with a second-mover advantage either for any level of R&D costs (process innovation) or for high R&D costs (product innovation). Moreover, both models predict that the second-mover advantage is monotonically increasing in the costs of R&D.     

An efficient budget allocation policy for decentralisation of responsibility for site decontamination projects

Selection and execution of site decontamination projects is often best left to local authorities, in accordance with the subsidiarity principle, even though the budget for such projects is made available through a central authority. In this paper we suggest a practical budget allocation policy which a central authority can employ to allocate budgets to local authorities, while still optimising the central authority's environmental objective function. The procedure is fully consistent with the principle of decentralisation of responsibility for selection and execution of projects, and requires a minimum information exchange between local and central levels. Despite the information asymmetry between local and central levels, incentive compatibility problems can be (partially) prevented by choosing an appropriate evaluation mechanism. At the same time, the procedure is computationally effective and efficient, and can guarantee a fair budget allocation, making it easy to implement and politically acceptable.     

WEALTH AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME, CANADA 1969–70

This paper explores the sensitivity of the size distribution of family income in Canada to alternative definitions of income. These alternative definitions examine both wealth generally in the form of an annuity equivalent, and home ownership in the form of imputed rent. An adjustment for family size differences is also made. The impact of these adjustments is assessed for average incomes, inequality, and the incidence of low income for different age groups. The adjustments do have significant effects that vary by age; in particular, the economic position of the elderly seems understated by the usual data. Also, methodological considerations, such as the direct use of micro data and the choice of inequality indicator are shown to be significant.     

Sub additive measures of relative information and inaccuracy

Summary In the study of information theoretic measures, additivity has been the basic requirement. However it is quite interesting to investigate the sub-additive measures. Starting from subadditivity for measures associated with a pair of distributions of a discrete random variable, it has been changed into an equality relation using another function of a pair of distributions., Under the sum property of the function and the measures, the relation is expressed in terms of a functional equation of which the most general complex solutions have been obtained. In terms of the real continuous solutions of the functional equation, the sub-additive measures of Relative information and Inaccuracy have been defined and characterized. Particular cases and simple properties particularly the convexities of some of these new measures have also been studied.     

The demand for game day attendance in college football: an analysis of the 1997 Division 1‐A season

This paper develops a predictive model which includes game, team and university specific factors that are likely to influence game day demand for Division 1‐A college football. Attendance during the 1997 regular season is used as the dependent variable. Tobit estimates of two separate equations reveal that the quality of both teams, traditional rivalry and membership of specific conferences have a significant influence on demand. In addition, colleges with lower enrollments and a higher percentage of off‐campus students attract smaller crowds. The presence of a nearby professional football team also detracts from a college team's drawing power. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Slack-adjusted efficiency measures and ranking of efficient units

In non-parametric methods many units are calculated as efficient. The article suggests a method for ranking efficient units, not by their efficiency, but by importance as benchmarks for the inefficient units, in contrast to earlier suggestions in the literature which rank units high if they are specialized. However, the total potentials for improvement frequently remain unrevealed by calculating radial efficiency measures of the Farrell type only. The article therefore first develops efficiency measures that explicitly extend the radial measures to include slacks. The new measures are applied to a typical multidimensional small-sample data set for Norwegian employment offices.