Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear

In this paper, we develop a differentiable approach to deal with incentives in a, possibly small, subset of a general domain of preferences in economies with one public and one private good. We show that, for two agents, there is no mechanism which is efficient, strategy-proof and where consumption of both goods is positive for all agents. For the case of two or more agents the same result occurs when nondictatorship is replaced by Individual Rationality. We are very grateful to Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Carmen Beviá, Xavier Calsamiglia, Marco Celentani, Bernardo Moreno, Antonio Romero-Medina, William Thomson, Walter Trockel, an associate editor, three anonymous referees and participants at seminars at Universities of Alicante, Autónoma de Barcelona and Rochester and the Spanish Economic Association meeting in Sevilla for very helpful comments and suggestions.     

A note on the “size” of determinacy and indeterminacy

Summary. It is shown in this note that in an incomplete markets economy with uncountably many states of the world there may be uncountably many isolated equilibria as well as uncountably many non-isolated equilibria. Moreover, both subsets can be simultaneously of second category. Therefore, none of the subsets can be considered negligible with respect to the other, neither from a cardinality point of view nor from a topological one. Unfortunately, this fact prevents from claiming that these economies may have “typically” determinate equilibria – even though uncountably many of them – as would have been desirable for comparative statics exercises. Received: May 19, 1995; revised version: March 24, 1997     

Rubinstein bargaining with two-sided outside options

Summary. In this note we show that if in the standard Rubinstein model both players are allowed to leave the negotiation after a rejection, in which case they obtain a payoff of zero, then there exist a continuum of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes, including some which involve significant delay. We also fully characterize the case in which, upon quitting, the players can take an outside option of positive value. Received: February 27, 1996; revised version: March 28, 1997     

The Subdominant Eigenvalue of a Large Stochastic Matrix

Using intuition and computer experimentation, Brady conjectured that the ratio of the subdominant eigenvalue to the dominant eigenvalue of a positive random matrix (with identically and independently distributed entries) converges to zero when the number of the sectors tends to infinity. In this paper, we discuss the deterministic case and, among other things, prove the following version of this conjecture: if each entry of the matrix deviates from 1/n by at most θ/n^1+е, then the modulus of the subdominant root is at most θ/n^е where θ and ε are arbitrary positive real parameters.     

The New Member States and the Process towards EMU

The authors apply two complementary empirical criteria to eight new member states (NMSs) of the European Union to assess how ready they are to adopt the euro. As a first step, they recover demand and supply shocks and calculate the social losses implied by the two relevant exchange rate regimes: flexible rates and currency board. As a second step, the authors calculate the real exchange rates variability that these countries are currently experiencing and compare it to that of three Mediterranean countries during a similar period before they joined the EMU. The combination of the results of both tests shows that Estonia and Slovenia are the only countries that seem ready to adopt the euro within the shortest period of time foreseen by the Maastricht criteria; that is, after the two mandatory years in the ERM2. The rest of the countries will probably still need some exchange rate flexibility to absorb external shocks in the coming years.     

Information acquisition and financial contagion

This paper incorporates costly voluntary acquisition of information à la Nikitin and Smith (2007) [Nikitin, M., Smith, R.T., 2007. Information acquisition, coordination, and fundamentals in a financial crisis. Journal of Banking and Finance, in press, doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2007.04.031], in a framework similar to Allen and Gale (2000) [Allen, F., Gale, D., 2000. Financial contagion. Journal of Political Economy 108, 1–33], without relying on any unexpected shock to model contagion. In this framework, contagion and financial crises are the result of information gathering by depositors, weak fundamentals and an incomplete market structure of banks. It also shows how financial systems entering a recession can affect others with apparently stronger economic conditions (contagion). Finally, this is the first paper to investigate the effectiveness of the Contingent Credit Line procedures, introduced by the IMF at the end of the nineties, as a mechanism to prevent the propagation of crises.