Apple's agency model and the role of most‐favored‐nation clauses

The agency model used by Apple and other digital platforms delegates retail‐pricing decisions to upstream content providers subject to a fixed revenue‐sharing rule. Given competition both upstream and downstream, we consider how, under the agency model, retail prices depend on the firms' revenue‐sharing splits and the degrees to which consumers view the platforms and the goods sold on the platforms to be substitutes. We show that the agency model may not be universally adopted even if adoption would mean higher profits for all firms. Use of most‐favored‐nation clauses in these settings can ensure industry‐wide adoption and increase retail prices.     

Hedging Multiperiod Forward Commitments: The Case of Period-by-Period Quantity Uncertainty

This article considers the hedging problem of a producer with along-term forward commitment to deliver a commodity at multiple futurepoints in time. The aggregate quantity to be delivered over time is knownwith certainty; however, the period-by-period quantity is determined bythe customer and is unknown to the producer. A minimum-variancemultiperiod futures position that considers both price uncertainty andperiod-by-period quantity uncertainty is derived. The following resultsare obtained: The individual effects of price uncertainty and quantityuncertainty on the multiperiod minimum-variance are separable. In thetwo-period case, if the spot price is expected to decrease over time, therisk-minimizing hedge considering both price and quantity uncertaintiesis greater than that which considers price uncertainty only. If the spotprice is expected to increase over time, then the hedger would beover-hedged if only price uncertainty were considered. Convenience yieldpromotes a larger risk-minimizing futures position, whereas storage costsand financial costs reduce the size of the risk-minimizing futuresposition. In the multiperiod case, if forward prices are unbiasedestimators of future spot prices, or if spot prices are expected todecrease over time, then quantity uncertainty increases the size of therisk-minimizing hedge. If spot prices are expected to increase, then theeffect of period-by-period quantity uncertainty isindeterminate.     

Cost efficiency among credit card banks

Credit card banks produce a single, relatively homogeneous output, permitting exceptionally clean empirical tests of cost efficiency. The high net interest margins and fees on credit card loans also suggests a large potential for managerial slack or expense preference behavior, possibly fostering a wider range of cost efficiency than observed for general-purpose banks. This paper presents estimates of cost efficiency for a sample of monoline credit card banks over the period 1984–1993; the findings are similar to those previously reported for general-purpose banks. We also explore empirical correlates of the estimated cost efficiency.     

Hassle Costs: The Achilles' Heel of Price-Matching Guarantees*

We show that price-matching guarantees can facilitate monopoly pricing only if firms automatically match prices. If consumers must instead request refunds (thereby incurring hassle costs), we find that any increase in equilibrium prices due to firms' price-matching policies will be small; often, no price increase can be supported. In symmetric markets price-matching guarantees cannot support any rise in prices, even if hassle costs are arbitrarily small In asymmetric markets, higher prices can be supported, but the prices fall well short of maximizing joint profits. Our model can explain why some firms adopt price-matching guarantees while others do not.     

Optimal low-price guarantees with anchoring

Many low-price guarantees are offered by small local firms who compete against much larger rivals. The prices of these larger rivals are often set nationally and thus are independent of local market conditions. Our objective in this paper is to explain why small firms in such environments might nevertheless adopt low-price guarantees. We characterize when offering a low-price guarantee is profitable, and assess which form it should take (i.e.,?conditional on offering a low-price guarantee, should the small firm offer to match or beat its larger competitor??s prices). We also assess the implications thereof (i.e., do the low-price guarantees benefit or harm the small firm??s customers).     

Consumer satisfaction with health-care services: The influence of involvement

The impact of involvement and ambiguity on satisfaction judgments for high-credence property services such as health care has not been studied. This study examines the level and process effects of involvement on satisfaction with two dimensions of a health-care service. We found that higher levels of customer involvement were associated with greater expectations and performance ratings for the ambiguous dimension of the service (physicians). Customer involvement had no influence on ratings for the nonambiguous aspects of the service (access mechanisms). Perceived performance was found to be the most influential predictor of satisfaction for low-involvement subjects. High-involvement subjects used disconfirmation and performance to evaluate physicians and only disconfirmation in forming satisfaction judgments for access mechanisms. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Ownership structure and market conduct among Swiss banks

This paper explores the degree of competition among each of several major categories of Swiss banks, using a structural econometric model. Conduct is found to vary across ownership structures, with foreign-owned banks exhibiting the most market power and state-owned or mutual banks the least. The results are consistent with agency theory but contrast with some previous empirical results. They are also consistent with a Swiss premium in the provision of international banking services, though this latter hypothesis is not formally tested.     

Market-Share Contracts with Asymmetric Information

In this paper, a dominant firm and competitive fringe supply substitute goods to a retailer who has private information about demand. We show that it is profitable for the dominant firm to condition payment on how much the retailer buys from the fringe (market-share contracts). The dominant firm thereby creates countervailing incentives for the retailer and, in some cases, is able to obtain the full-information outcome (unlike in standard screening models, where the agent earns an information rent in the high-demand state and output is distorted in the low-demand state). Our results have implications for fidelity rebates, all-units discounts, and competition policy. Although some crowding out of the fringe may occur when demand is low, we show that market-share contracts need not be harmful for welfare.     

Rendering Alternative Offerings Less Profitable with Resale Price Maintenance

When it was legal, resale price maintenance (RPM) was commonly observed on items such as aspirin, pens, pencils, toothpaste, soap, shaving cream, and milk. In providing a theory that is based on compensating retailers for their opportunity cost of shelf space, and that does not hinge on the existence of externalities in nonprice competition, this article explains why a manufacturer might impose RPM on these and many other products. By contrast, the use of RPM on food, grocery, and drug store items is not easily explained by standard theories such as free riding on presale services and quality certification by high-priced retailers.

The typical supermarket has room for fewer than 25,000 products. Yet there are some 100,000 available, and between 10,000 and 25,000 items aye introduced each year. ¹

     

Economies of superscale in commercial banking

Most previous studies of scale economies in banking have excluded banks larger than $1 billion in assets. Thus study, by contrast, estimates cost functions for the 100 largest US commercial banks. ‘Hedonic’ terms are incorporated to correct for the aggregated nature of the Call Report data available for these banks. In addition, we attempt to quantify the cost benefit of diversification in the model. We estimate efficient bank scale to range from $15 billion to $37 billion in total assets, a thousandfold increase over some previous findings. These results are supported by comparison of actual average costs, as well as by casual historical observation and the level of widespread concern over interstate banking. Our findings suggest some cost incentive or benefit to expansion or consolidation among large regional banks, including interstate expansion or consolidation.