Facilitative Leadership and the Challenge of Renewing Local Democracy in Italy

Participatory arrangements have become a popular way of addressing modern challenges of urban governance but in practice face several constraints and can trigger deep tensions. Facilitative leadership can play a crucial role in enabling collaboration among local stakeholders despite plural and often conflictual interests. Surprisingly, this style of leadership has received limited attention within debates linking urban governance and participatory democracy. We summarize the main insights of the literature on facilitative leadership and empirically develop them in the context of participatory urban governance by comparing recent participatory processes in two Italian cities. Whereas in one city facilitative leadership gradually emerged and successfully transformed a deep conflict into consensual proposals, in the other city, participatory planning further exacerbated pre‐existing antagonism, and local democratic culture was only later slowly reinvigorated through bottom‐up initiative. These diverging pathways explain how facilitative leadership is: (1) important for making things happen; (2) best understood as situated practices; (3) an emergent property of the practices and interactions of a number of local actors and (4) a democratic capacity for dealing with continuous challenges. Key to this style of leadership is understanding participatory urban governance as an ongoing democratic process.     

Facing ‘fairness at work’: union perception of employer opposition and response to union recognition

The introduction of statutory mechanisms by which unions can gain union recognition in Britain has stimulated employer activity to avoid and subvert union recognition campaigns. This article examines the nature and extent of such employer activities and how unions have responded.     

Optimal auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders

Summary. The paper analyzes a problem of optimal auction design when the seller faces asymmetrically informed bidders. Specifically, we consider a continuum of risk-neutral uninformed bidders taking part into the auction along with n risk-averse informed bidders. The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, we fully characterize the optimal auction in this non standard environment and in a very general set-up. We find that when informed bidders reveal “bad news” about the value of the good, the seller optimally awards the object to the uninformed bidders. Secondly, we show that the seller is better off in presence of uninformed bidders because this allows to lower the informational rents paid to the informed bidders. Last, we find that, with bi-lateral risk neutrality, the seller always awards the good to the uninformed bidders thereby keeping all the surplus.Received: 22 October 2004, Revised: 21 April 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: D44, D82.We are very grateful to two anonymous referees, Jacques Crémer, Patrick François, Angel Hernando-Veciana and seminar participants at the 2004 SCSE conference (Quebec, Canada) for their valuable comments. Moez Bennouri acknowledges the financial support by the Initiative of the New Economy (INE) program of SSHRC (Canada).     

Working for the family

Recent writing about the ‘service encounter’ suggests that high-quality service requires employee commitment and this will involve a more developed and sophisticated approach to HRM than has traditionally characterised the sector. Through an in-depth study of a sample of high service level hotels in the US and UK this paper argues, in contrast, that commitment can be created through a workplace culture that draws on family discourses and practices. It explores the ways in which this culture is developed and endorsed by both management and employees. This approach to generating commitment has costs in terms of the time and priority employees can give to their ‘real’ friends and family. By drawing on the highly gendered and hierarchical organisation of the family, it is argued that culture also contributes to gender stereotyping and hierarchies within and outside the workplace in ways that limit women's career opportunities.     

Sunspot-like equilibria in an overlapping generations economy with strategic interactions

In this paper I analyze the effect of market uncertainty in an overlapping generations economy with strategic interactions among agents. I demonstrate the existence of sunspot-like equilibria, in which arbitrarily small amounts of intrinsic uncertainty in agents’ offers generate large fluctuations in equilibrium bids and prices. I would like to express my gratitude to Stephen Spear for his guidance during the realization of this project. I thank an anonymous referee for providing insightful comments and suggestions. I have benefited from comments by Alexander Elbittar, Cesar Guerrero, and Vivek Ramachandran.     

Uncertainty and insurance in strategic market games

Summary. For perfectly competitive economies under uncertainty, there is a well-known equivalence between a formulation with contingent goods and one with state-specific securities followed by spot markets for goods. In this paper, I examine whether this equivalence carries over to a particular form of imperfect competition. Specifically, I look at three Shapley-Shubik strategic market games: one with contingent commodities, one with Arrow securities traded under imperfect competition and one with Arrow securities traded under perfect competition. First I compare the feasibility constraints of these three games. Then I compare their equilibrium sets. As in Peck and Shell (1989), the only common equilibria between the first and the second game are those which involve no transfer of income across states. However, if the securities markets are competitive, then the set of equilibria of the contingent commodities game and the securities game coincide. Received: June 16, 1997; revised version: April 30, 1998