WARRANT PRICING USING OBSERVABLE VARIABLES

The classical warrant pricing formula requires knowledge of the firm value and of the firm‐value process variance. When warrants are outstanding, the firm value itself is a function of the warrant price. Firm value and firm‐value variance are then unobservable variables. I develop an algorithm for pricing warrants using stock prices, an observable variable, and stock return variance. The method also enables estimation of firm‐value variance. A proof of existence of the solution is provided.     

Cooperative and noncooperative protection against transferable and filterable externalities

Given self-protection from an undesirable environmental externality, we examine, under several conditions, the efficiency properties of cooperative and noncooperative behavior. We demonstrate that if self-protection can transfer the externality to another agent, then noncooperative behavior will lead to overprotection. If self-protection filters or dilutes the externality, then noncooperation leads to underprotection. In addition, overprotection will worsen if an agent with more relative power is allowed a first-mover advantage or if the damage function is elastic and transferability is uncertain. Finally, a reduction in uncertainty about transferability will accentuate overprotection if the damage function is inelastic. Our results suggest that coordination of protection activities among agents will enhance the overall gains from environmental policy in the European Single Internal Market of 1992. Coordination minimizes the costs of environmental protection, thereby reducing the public credibility of its foes.     

Marketing norms: The influence of personal moral philosophies and organizational ethical culture

This study develops a scale, using the American Marketing Association’s code of ethics, to measure the marketing-related norms of marketing practitioners. The scale has five dimensions: 1) price and distribution, 2) information and contracts, 3) product and promotion, 4) obligation and disclosure, and 5) general honesty and integrity. The relative influence of personal moral philosophies and organizational ethical climate on the norms of marketers was also examined in this study. He received his Ph.D. in marketing from Texas Tech University. His work has previously appeared in theJournal of Macromarketing, Journal of Business Ethics, Research in Marketing, Business and Professional Ethics Journal, andJournal of the Academy of Marketing Science, as well as various other journals and proceedings. His research has been accepted for publication in theJournal of Pharmaceutical Marketing and Management and theJournal of Business Ethics, and has been published in various national and regional proceedings. His research interests include marketing ethics, health care marketing, international marketing, and direct marketing. He received his Ph.D. in marketing from the University of Mississippi. His work has previously appeared in theJournal of Macromarketing, Journal of Business Ethics, Business and Professional Ethics Journal, Journal of Public Policy and Marketing, andJournal of the Academy of Marketing Science, as well as other journals and proceedings.     

Empirical testing of alternative price spread models in the South African maize market

Reduced-form price spread models have been recently utilized by Wohlgenant and Mullen, and Thompson and Lyon to evaluate the economic factors affecting the marketing margins for agricultural products. Drawing on Gardner, Heien, Buse and Brandow, Waugh, Tomek and Robinson, and others they specify alternative retail-farm price spread models and attempt to determine which best fit the data in the context of underlying theoretical rationale. This paper continues in the spirit of Wohlgenant and Mullen, and Thompson and Lyon by evaluating alternative specifications of the retail-farm price spread for white maize in South Africa. However, several important differences do remain. Wohlgenant and Mullen analyzed the price spread for beef using annual data, while Thompson and Lyon modeled the price spread for oranges using weekly data. The time period under consideration can be expected to affect the choice of model because fixed markup rules that might be evident using a short-run period of analysis (e.g., Thompson and Lyon) become untenable over the long run with underlying supply and demand shifts. In this paper, monthly data, which may be interpreted as an intermediate-run period, are used along with dichotomous supply-demand shifters. In addition, Brorsen et. al. have shown that price uncertainty affects the price spread in the marketing channels of agricultural commodities. Thus, the analysis in this paper extends the framework of Wohlgenant and Mullen, and Thompson and Lyon to include measures of price risk. Finally, like Brorsen et. al. this study pertains to the grain market, while Wohlgenant and Mullen, and Thompson and Lyon studied the marketing margin for non-storable commodities.     

An empirical analysis of bank interest rate swaps

Considering the characteristics of banks that do and do not report interest rate swaps, the long-term interest rate exposure of a bank and the likelihood and extent of swap market participation are found to be positively related. Key to the finding is the inclusion of variables related to the provision of swap market intermediary services, which significantly explain both the likelihood of swap market participation and the notional value of outstanding swaps. The results suggest that the likelihood and extent of swap market participation by low-capitalized banks is less than for other banks.     

Business Ethics: The Bottom Line

Teaching Business Ethics -     

Towards a complete real-time electricity market design

The general design for the real-time electricity market presented in this paper optimizes and prices both real and reactive power simultaneously in an AC setting, where all assets—generation, load and transmission—are allowed to bid and are financially settled at the locational price times energy consumed or produced. The result is that transmission lines are compensated for both capacity and admittance, providing incentives for efficient operation of transmission-related assets such as FACTS devices, if price-taking behavior is assumed. Losses are incorporated into the design and become an operating cost for transmission. The market design is shown to be revenue neutral and, under some assumptions, nonconfiscatory.