Fixed versus flexible election terms: explaining innovation in the timing of Canada’s election cycle

This paper argues that there is an efficiency gain underlying the recent adoption of legislation calling for a fixed 4-year governing term by the federal and most provincial governments in Canada. The efficiency gain arises from foreclosing an externality produced by the Canadian constitutional provision that sets a maximum length for a legislative term (5 years) while allowing the governing party (through the Governor General) to dissolve the House early. Because the opportunistic use of surprise can improve the governing party’s probability of winning, strategic choice can lead to elections being held at times that most disadvantage the incumbent’s rivals. Evidence from Canada is introduced suggesting that federal elections became less predictable through successive reductions in the campaign time given to competitors, thus raising the cost of this externality. The same reasoning suggests that the party most likely to propose this legislative innovation will be the party in opposition rather than in power and/or the new leader of an established party facing loss in the upcoming election. By fulfilling the fixed term even when it could benefit by calling the election early, the party establishes a precedent that raises the political cost to others of cancelling the fixed term legislation.     

Risk-aversion and the term structure of real interest rates

The term structure of real interest rates is studied in the context of a consumption-based general-equilibrium model. It is shown that the expectations hypothesis is approximately satisfied for low interest rate volatility. Otherwise the term premia are generally positive.     

Measurement of patient-reported outcomes. 1: The search for the Holy Grail

Abstract

Patient-reported outcome measures (PROMs) are used to collect information directly from patients. They may cover several different types of outcomes ranging from symptoms, functioning, utility, satisfaction, through to quality-of-life (QoL). They generally consist of self-completed questionnaires that can be administered by means of hard copies or in a range of electronic formats. PROMs vary considerably in terms of the constructs they assess, the care with which they are developed, and their scientific quality. However, none of the PROMs available approach the quality of measurement achieved by measures/instruments used in physics. PROs are examples of latent variables. These are not directly observable, but can be inferred from, for example, responses to a questionnaire. The only measure of a latent variable that approaches the quality of measurement achieved by the physical sciences is the Lexile Framework for Reading. This framework is based on a construct theory that grew out of an analysis of several available reading measures. A specification equation was generated that was able to link the construct theory to scores obtained with the Lexile measure. A fundamental requirement of this quality of measurement is that the data collected with the model fit Rasch Measurement Theory (RMT). It is argued that PROM developers should aspire to match this level of measurement sophistication if their instruments are to provide valid insights into the impacts of disease and its treatment.     

Poor institutions as a comparative advantage

Classic theories of comparative advantage point to factor productivity and factor abundance as determinants of specialization and trade. Likewise, geography and topography can determine trade patterns. Institutions, however, are increasingly seen as important sources of comparative advantage. A global drug prohibition regime implies that institutional quality matters more than traditional sources in the drug trade. This paper theoretically models trade patterns of illicit goods and confirms the role of institutions empirically with respect to the drug trade. In particular, illicit enterprises gain force in countries where resources are scarce, drug enforcement is uncertain, and institutions are weak in absolute terms and relative to neighboring countries. I propose several policy alternatives that emphasize economic opportunity for the poor and institutional quality that complement drug prohibition.     

Causal ordering and ‘The bank lending channel’

The bank lending channel implies the Federal Reserve can influence real income by controlling the level of intermediated loans. Using the notion of causality developed by Simon (1953) and the causal order methodology developed by Hoover (1990), I test for an operative bank lending channel in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. I find loans did cause real income; there is evidence that a bank lending channel did exist in the 1960s. The data appears to show, however, that by the early 1990s the bank lending channel was no longer operative. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Choosing Among Regulatory Options in the United States Telecommunications Industry

We examine the determinants of the choice between rate-of-return regulation and incentive regulation in the United States telecommunications industry. We find that a state is more likely to select incentive regulation in any year: (1) when it has employed incentive regulation in the past; (2) when the Republican party controls both the executive and the legislative branches of the state government, but the Democratic party has controlled these branches historically; and (3) as the firms earnings under rate-of-return regulation increase toward the industry average. We also find that appointed regulators are more likely than their elected counterparts to revert to rate-of-return regulation.     

The future of farming: The value of ecosystem services in conventional and organic arable land. An experimental approach

In the current work, a novel, experimental ‘bottom-up’ approach is used to quantify the economic value of ecosystem services (ES) associated with highly modified arable landscapes in Canterbury, New Zealand. First, the role of land management practices in the maintenance and enhancement of ES in agricultural land was investigated by quantifying the economic value of ES at the field level under organic and conventional arable systems. This quantification was based on an experimental approach in contrast with earlier value transfer methods. Total economic value of ES in organic fields ranged from US $1610 to US $19,420 ha^− 1 yr^− 1 and that of conventional fields from US $1270 to US $14,570 ha^− 1 yr^− 1. The non-market value of ES in organic fields ranged from US $460 to US $5240 ha^− 1 yr^− 1. The range of non-market values of ES in conventional fields was US $50 — 1240 ha^− 1 yr^− 1. There were significant differences between organic and conventional fields for the economic values of some ES. Next, this economic information was used to extrapolate and to calculate the total and non-market value of ES in Canterbury arable land. The total annual economic and non-market values of ES for the conventional arable area in Canterbury (125,000 ha) were US $332 million and US $71 million, respectively. If half the arable area under conventional farming shifted to organic practices, the total economic value of ES would be US $192 million and US $166 million annually for organic and conventional arable area, respectively. In this case, the non-market value of ES for the organic area was US $65 million and that of conventional area was US $35 million annually. This study demonstrated that arable farming provides a range of ES which can be measured using field experiments based on ecological principles by incorporating a ‘bottom-up’ approach. The work also showed that conventional New Zealand arable farming practices can severely reduce the financial contribution of some of these services in agriculture whereas organic agricultural practices enhance their economic value.     

Do the world’s largest cities follow Zipf’s and Gibrat’s laws?

We examine whether the size distribution and the growth process of the world’s largest cities follow Zipf’s law and Gibrat’s law. The parametric results of the size distribution analysis reject Zipf’s law for all sample sizes and also show the Zipf exponent systematically declines as the sample size increases. The growth process analysis confirms Gibrat’s law and yields a local Zipf exponent of one for cities with a normalized population less than 0.53%, which includes about 95% of the total observations. The deviations from Zipf’s law occur at the extreme upper tail and are likely a result of restricted mobility of population across countries. However, given that Gibrat’s law holds, we can expect the size distribution to converge to Zipf’s law with a decline in the barriers to immigration.     

House Prices,Wealth and Consumption: New Evidence from Australia and Canada

Over the past two decades, a number of countries have experienced appreciation in house prices at the same time that aggregate consumption has increased. This paper tests alternative hypotheses for this phenomenon by using repeated household surveys from Australia and Canada to identify the transmission mechanism that links consumption and household wealth. The empirical analysis suggests that neither a direct wealth effect nor a common causal factor likely accounts for the observed correlation between wealth and consumption in these two countries. Rather, indirect factors such as collateral effects arising from relaxation of credit constraints are a more likely explanation.