哥伦比亚大学全球化下的成本计算

美国外交政策争议的核心是硬权力（即诉诸武力）与软权力及公共外交之间的对立,后者即哈佛大学教授约瑟夫·奈伊所说的“利用魅力而非威压手段实现目标的能力”。在商界．这两种力量的对峙也同样明显。不过,软权力在商界赢得了胜利。     

Is the decline in the value relevance of accounting driven by increased conservatism?

This paper examines the association between conservatism and the value relevance of accounting information over the 1975 through 2004 period. We measure conservatism using approaches developed in Penman and Zhang, The Accounting Review 77:237–264, (2002) and Beaver and Ryan, Journal of Accounting Research 38:127–148, (2000) and value relevance using (1) adjusted R ² from regressions of price on earnings and book values, (2) adjusted R ² from regressions of returns on earnings and changes in earnings, and (3) returns earned by perfect foresight of earnings and book values. We find no evidence that firms with increasing conservatism exhibit greater declines in value relevance. Rather, we observe most significant declines in value relevance for firms where conservatism has not increased. When we adjust financial statements for the effects of conservatism, we find that the value relevance of adjusted numbers is generally lower and trends in value relevance unaffected. Based on these results, it is implausible that increasing conservatism drives the decline in value relevance.     

Wealth effects and committed cost allocation: An agency theory perspective

In this article we examine the effects of committed costs (CC) on compensation and effort (production) decisions in a principal-agent (P-A) setting. In the case where moral hazard is present, the compensation and effort (production) decisions are independent of CC whenever P has constant absolute risk aversion. When P has decreasing absolute risk aversion, he demands as increased risk premium, therefore increases the spread of the compensation schedule, and induces A to increase effort (production) and vice versa. The optimal compensation scheme can be decomposed to conform to incentive schemes that are generally observed in practice. In particular, we decompose the optimal compensation scheme that depends on CC into two parts—a part that is based on cash flows and a part that is based on income (after allocating committed costs). In the case where effort is observable, CC does not effect the compensation scheme and effort decisions, when P has constant absolute risk aversion. In contrast to earlier studies that examine the owner-manager case, when P has decreasing absolute risk aversion, effort (production) could either increase or decrease. The presence of moral hazard affects the effort (production) decision differently than when risk-sharing considerations alone exist. The reduction in A's compensation induced by increased CC never exceeds the amount of CC.     

Using residual income to refine the relationship between earnings growth and stock returns

We use residual income (RI) to decompose earnings growth into growth in RI, growth in invested capital and other components and use this decomposition to explain stock returns. Our approach provides a significant increase in explanatory power vis-à-vis a regression of returns on levels and changes in earnings. While the market values growth in RI more than growth in invested capital, it still undervalues growth in RI and overvalues growth in invested capital. Earnings growth from growth in RI is more persistent, while earnings growth from growth in invested capital is more likely to reverse. Future returns are positively associated with growth in RI and negatively associated with growth in invested capital. A trading rule based on these findings generates significant hedge returns that persist after controlling for known risk factors. Hence, RI, a measure long recommended by accountants, allows investors to differentiate and evaluate different sources of earnings growth.     

Dividend reductions,the timing of dividend payments and information content

Australian companies pay dividends semi-annually with smaller “interim” payments and larger “final” payments. Interim dividends are declared and paid within a less full information environment than final dividends. We analyze the interactions between the timing of dividends and their information content, controlling for share repurchase and tax effects. Dividend reductions that are not associated with share repurchases are statistically significantly related to future abnormal earnings and provide strong support for the information content of dividend reductions. The percentage of dividend reduction is stronger for interim than for final dividend reductions. The market reaction is negatively related to the reduction in imputation tax credit and reacts more aggressively and negatively to interim as compared to final dividend reductions.