After the famine: food aid policy and management issues in sub-Saharan Africa

The large amount of food aid that was required to meet Africa's emergency food situation resulted in the postponement of some fundamental decisions that were being taken about food aid use in sub-Saharan Africa. Now the donor community and recipient governments are again giving priority to integrating food aid with other available resources in order to meet longer-term food policy and wider development objectives. This paper looks at some of the policy and management issues which need to be addressed if the effectiveness of food aid assistance is to be improved in the current African context. Shortages of locally qualified personnel to administer project food aid have proven to be a major bottleneck in most sub-Saharan countries. Most sub-Saharan states receive food aid from a variety of sources: multilateral, bilateral and a few private-voluntary organizations. As a result, countervailing priorities are set by the donors themselves and give rise to conflicts. The recent drought and famine conditions have compounded an image problem in which food aid is narrowly identified by recipient governments as a project resource to be used primarily for nutrition interventions and for the rural sector. The image problem often limits project selection and overlooks innovative uses of food aid. Many sub-Saharan countries are starting to acquire considerable amounts of counterpart funds from program food aid. However, their use is not coherently integrated with the total aid flow. Multi-year programming has emerged as a management issue which has unnecessarily divided the food aid donor community. The fundamental issue is flexibility in programming, not multi-year programming. The major policy objective now facing the food aid donor community and recipient countries is how to lower emergency allocations while simultaneously increasing project and program aid. Most nonfood-aid donor agencies and their constituent bodies do not treat food aid as a valid economic resource, thereby undermining its effectiveness. The eventual success of food aid use in Africa may be a function of the recipient governments and other major donor and financial organizations.     

Did Leaving the Gold Standard Tame the Business Cycle? Evidence from NBER Reference Dates and Real GNP

Cover and Pecorino (2005) claim that the March 1933 departure from the gold standard is the most probable break point ushering in an era of longer U.S. expansions, both absolutely and relative to subsequent recessions. Their analysis is based on cycle durations as defined by National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) reference dates. However, much of macroeconomic analysis is based on (i) growth cycles (i.e., periods when the economy's production is above or below trend) rather than absolute increases or decreases in economic activity; and (ii) aggregate time series' volatility as the prime indicator of macroeconomic stability. In light of this, we reevaluate the March 1933 break point. First, using HP‐filtered quarterly gross national product (GNP), our analysis of growth cycle durations still implies a break point near 1933. Second, we test for structural breaks in the volatility of GNP growth rates and deviations from trends. These tests suggest a structural break considerably later than 1933, perhaps as late as the 1950s.     

Scientific and technological interactions between Russia and Ukraine: Forecasting opportunities and mechanisms for their implementation

The paper presents the research results of an investigation into the state of scientific, technological, trade and economic interactions between Russia and Ukraine in terms of their potential, prospects, and problems impeding their cooperation. It is shown that there is a considerable scientific and technological potential both in Russia and Ukraine. Opportunities and conditions for the modernization of both countries’ economies are shown to depend on the coordinated use of their potentials.     

Not all trade restrictions are created equally

There has been great focus in the recent trade theory literature on the introduction of firm heterogeneity into trade models. This introduction has highlighted the importance of the entry/exit decision of firms in response to changes in trade barriers. However, it is typical in many of these models to use iceberg transport costs as a general form of trade barriers that can be interchangeable with ad valorem tariffs. I show that this is not always an appropriate conclusion. Specifically, I illustrate that profit for an exporter is more elastic in response to tariffs than iceberg transport costs, which affects the entry/exit decision of firms. This has implications for welfare analysis and empirical specifications.