Education, corruption, and the distribution of income

We examine how the interaction between education and corruption affects institutional reform and economic development. While corruption reduces average income and education, education increases not only output and hence potential corruption rents, but also produces more informed electorates that better monitor government actions. We find that economies with intermediate levels of education remain in a poverty trap since the level of skills creates sufficient corruption rents but not enough monitoring. Economies with low or high levels of education can escape the poverty trap, and inequality plays a key role in determining whether this occurs through a change in institutions or an expansion of education.     

Energy and CO2 emission relationships in the NAFTA trading bloc: a multi-regional multi-factor energy input–output approach

The North-America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has brought together the economies of Canada, Mexico, and the US into forming one of the largest trading blocs worldwide (within the top CO₂ emitters). However, the current global protectionist discourse threatens the agreement. This paper analyzes the energy and energy-related CO₂ emission relationships between NAFTA countries in 2014 to gain insights into the climate change implications of current integration and the possible cancelation of the agreement. The analysis is performed with a multi-regional version of the multi-factor energy input–output model. The results show that NAFTA has not built a single integrated energy system, though it has helped reduce energy-related CO₂ emissions. Moreover, if NAFTA is not revoked, further integration would depend on the capacity of the Mexican energy sector to converge to the performance of its trade partners’ energy sectors. Conversely, a broken deal would induce negative environmental externalities.     

When do managers listen to the market? Impact of learning in acquisitions of private firms

We study the influence of market signals and agency problems on the decision to cancel an announced acquisition. We find major differences between deals involving private vs. public targets. First, controlling for the value of expected synergies, acquisitions are less likely to be cancelled when the target is private rather than public. This finding supports learning rather than the alternative common-information hypothesis. Second, better manager-shareholder interest alignment makes the cancellation of a “bad” deal more likely only when the target is a private firm. This suggests bidder agency problems have a greater influence on acquisition outcome (i.e., learning) when the target is private. Third, cancellation is more likely for private targets when their post-announcement abnormal returns are low, especially if the method of payment includes stock. This indicates that it is important to control for bidder overvaluation when testing the managerial learning hypothesis. Overall, both the learning and agency hypotheses help explain observed differences in deal completion by target type.