Focusing on individuals' ethical judgement in corporate social responsibility curricula

Adequate discussion of individuals' moral deliberation is notably absent from much of the literature on corporate social responsibility (CSR). We argue for a refocusing on the role of the individual in that context. In particular we regard this as important in CSR course design, for practical, pedagogical and moral reasons. After addressing some of the theoretical background to our argument, and noting some respects in which individual action features in the context of CSR, we consider the usefulness (or otherwise) of academic ethical theory in relation to CSR issues and dilemmas in practice. It is suggested that, without dispensing entirely with ethical theory, emphasis should be placed on informed debate and moral judgement among members of organisations (or seminar groups) and some short case examples are provided. Finally we suggest that such approaches may be appropriate if trends towards ‘mainstreaming’ concern for CSR throughout business school curricula are realised.     

Optimal insurance under maxmin expected utility

We examine a problem of demand for insurance indemnification, when the insured is sensitive to ambiguity and behaves according to the maxmin expected utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (J. Math. Econ. 18:141–153, 1989), whereas the insurer is a (risk-averse or risk-neutral) expected-utility maximiser. We characterise optimal indemnity functions both with and without the customary ex ante no-sabotage requirement on feasible indemnities, and for both concave and linear utility functions for the two agents. This allows us to provide a unifying framework in which we examine the effects of the no-sabotage condition, of marginal utility of wealth, of belief heterogeneity, as well as of ambiguity (multiplicity of priors) on the structure of optimal indemnity functions. In particular, we show how a singularity in beliefs leads to an optimal indemnity function that involves full insurance on an event to which the insurer assigns zero probability, while the decision maker assigns a positive probability. We examine several illustrative examples, and we provide numerical studies for the case of a Wasserstein and a Rényi ambiguity set.