Shrouding Add‐On Information: An Experimental Study*

We explore how increased competition affects firms’ obfuscation strategies in a laboratory experiment. Firms sell a base good and an add‐on product. Besides choosing the base‐good price, sellers take an action that mimics the effects of shrouding the add‐on product. Shrouding is an equilibrium but an unshrouding equilibrium coexists. In our experiment, more competition matters, in that only duopolistic markets are frequently shrouded whereas four‐firm markets are not. With repeated interaction, shrouding rates do not increase. However, the opportunities to shroud facilitate tacit collusion on the base‐good price for the duopolies: the unshrouding equilibrium serves as a credible punishment if deviations occur.     

On the Incentive Effects of Sample Size in Monitoring Agents – A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis

When agents compete for a bonus and their productivity in each of several possible occasions depends stochastically on (constant) effort, the number of times this is checked to assign the bonus affects the level of uncertainty in the selection process. Uncertainty, in turn, is expected to increase the effort made by competing agents (Cowen and Glazer, 1996; Dubey and Haimanko, 2003; Dubey and Wu, 2001). Theoretical predictions are derived and experimental evidence is collected for two competing agents, with the bonus awarded to that agent who outperforms the other. Sampling occasions (1 or 3), cost of production (high or low), cost symmetry (asymmetric or symmetric), and piece‐rate reward are manipulated factorially to test the robustness of the effects of uncertainty. For control, a single‐agent case is included. Results indicate that, for tournaments, greater uncertainty does indeed lead to greater than expected effort and lower average variable costs.     

The influence of pension funds on corporate governance

Although pension funds have gained importance in the last two decades, their role has not been described in detail by economic models. This article focuses on the scope of these institutional investors when they are not satisfied with a management team of a company in which the pension fund holds a block of shares. Stock holdings by pension funds are largely dispersed. Therefore, any intervention by pension funds in corporate governance requires the formation of a coalition of pension funds. The realization of a coordinated intervention, in turn, is subject to the problems related to the provision of public goods, such as free riding. We find that the stock dispersion and the combined share of pension funds, coordination costs and the attractiveness of the exit option are relevant factors for determining the probability of the success of interventions.     

Applied Welfare Economics with Bounded Rationality: Public Policies Toward Remote Sensing

Earlier experimental evidence indicates that some decision makers under-invest in information when it is costly. This insight is applied to the cost–benefit analysis of the provision of data obtained by satellites. In fields like agriculture, remotely sensed information of great precision can be provided to additional farmers at minimal extra costs if a service for farmers with similar information needs is set up. Here, the tendency to under-invest in information asks for creative solutions by the private sector: bankers may work together with rational producers in setting up the information service and promoting it. However, if producers financial resources are insufficient, public intervention, in the form of a free information service may be necessary.The author would like to thank an anonymous referee, Stephan von Cramon-Taubadel, Sean Flynn, Daniel Heller, and Carlos Lenz and participants of the Lisbon Conference of the International Atlantic Economic Society, particularly Asatoshi Maeshiro, for helpful comments.     

Estimating correlation and covariance matrices by weighting of market similarity

We discuss a weighted estimation of correlation and covariance matrices from historical financial data. To this end, we introduce a weighting scheme that accounts for the similarity of previous market conditions to the present situation. The resulting estimators are less biased and show lower variance than either unweighted or exponentially weighted estimators. The weighting scheme is based on a similarity measure that compares the current correlation structure of the market to the structures at past times. Similarity is then measured by the matrix 2-norm of the difference of probe correlation matrices estimated for two different points in time. The method is validated in a simulation study and tested empirically in the context of mean–variance portfolio optimization. In the latter case we find an enhanced realized portfolio return as well as a reduced portfolio risk compared with alternative approaches based on different strategies and estimators.     

Why (not) cooperate? A cognitive model of farmers’ intention to join producer groups in Romania

After the breakdown of the communist regime in Romania, collective farms were replaced by a large number of small-scale private farms. Although cooperation seems to be a favourable choice for these smallholders, it did not develop as perhaps expected. This article explores the factors that determine the formation of the intention of Romanian vegetable farmers to join marketing cooperatives in the form of so called producer groups. Our theoretical framework refers to Ajzen’s Theory of Planned Behaviour, which we model with a structural equation model. We identified as main intention drivers the expectation for better prices and easier access to capital. Perceived family support is another significant factor. The level of distrust is high. Although our trust variable is not significant as a predictor of the intention to cooperate in the model, we find qualitative indications that trust plays a role when the intention is translated into actual behaviour.     

Determinants of spectator no-show behaviour: first empirical evidence from the German Bundesliga

The analysis of stadium attendance demand has a long tradition in the economic literature. However, despite its evident merits, this previous research has been critiqued at several levels, in particular for relying on a suboptimal demand proxy, i.e. published attendance data. In this short note, we address these shortcomings by exploring a highly unique data set containing official information on spectators’ decisions of whether or not to physically attend 704 German football Bundesliga games played between August 2014 and January 2017.     

Adaptation and Mitigation in Long-term Climate Policy

The paper analytically explores the optimal allocation of investments into mitigation and environmental adaptation against climate change damages at a macroeconomic level. The economic-environmental model is formulated as a social planner problem where adaptation and abatement investments are separate decision variables. The existence of a unique steady state is proven. A comparative static analysis of optimal investments leads to essential implications for associated long-term environmental policies. It is shown that the optimal policy mix between adaptation and mitigation is lower for countries with higher economic efficiency for all applicable parameter ranges. Data calibration and numerical simulations are provided to estimate practical validity of theoretical outcomes.