Dynamic coordination with timing frictions: Theory and applications

We present a general framework of dynamic coordination with timing frictions. A continuum of agents receive random chances to choose between two actions and remain locked in the selected action until their next opportunity to reoptimize. The instantaneous utility from each action depends on an exogenous fundamental that moves stochastically and on the mass of agents currently playing each action. Agents' decisions are strategic complements and history matters. We review some key theoretical results and show a general method to solve the social planner's problem. We then review applications of this framework to different economic problems: network externalities, statistical discrimination, and business cycles. The positive implications of these models are very similar, but the social planner's solution points to very different results for efficiency in each case. Last, we review extensions of the framework that allow for endogenous hazard rates and ex ante heterogeneous agents.     

Determinants of CEO and Board Turnover

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, to document changes in top management and board of directors in Danish firms during 1996–98. Second, to examine whether these changes are related to the performance of firms during the preceding years. Our study differs from earlier investigations in that we not only consider removal of CEOs but also turnover of board chairmen and board members. We find that turnovers of CEOs, board chairs and members have a number of common determinants like firm size and age of the firm. Risks of removals increase with lower rates of solvency but are unaffected by profitability changes. The hypothesis that competition increases the turnover risk is not supported by the estimations.     

Feedback and incentives: Experimental evidence

This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay schemes and relative performance feedback policies on employee effort. We explore three feedback rules: no feedback on relative performance, feedback given halfway through the production period, and continuously updated feedback. We use two pay schemes, a piece rate and a tournament. We find that overall feedback does not improve performance. In contrast to the piece-rate pay scheme there is some evidence of positive peer effects in tournaments since the underdogs almost never quit the competition even when lagging significantly behind, and front runners do not slack off. But in both pay schemes relative performance feedback reduces the quality of the low performers' work; we refer to this as a “negative quality peer effect”.