Can governance help in making an IPO “successful”? New evidence from Europe

This paper investigates the determinants of a “successful” IPO from a corporate governance perspective upon a representative sample of European listings from 2000 to 2015. We use an extensive dataset of market performance, financial data, and corporate governance characteristics to run the investigation. Differently from previous studies, our analysis embraces both a short‐term perspective and a medium–long‐term perspective, where the board of directors seems to perform different tasks, moving from a value creation to a value protection strategy. Among the others, we find that board size, board independence, and their qualifications, together with their experience in other boards, are associated with a positive performance of the IPO in a short‐term horizon and in the medium–long‐term period, although significant differences emerge among those time perspectives.     

Post-crisis firm survival,business model changes,and learning: evidence from the Italian manufacturing industry

Small Business Economics - Company survival after recessions depends on the entrepreneurial ability of decision makers to react to the crisis and learn how to make the best use of chances. The aim...     

A comparison of the estimates of expected utility and non-expected-utility preference functionals

This paper extends the literature on the estimation of expected utility and non-expected-utility preference functionals (and the consequent exploration of the superiority of non-expected-utility over expected utility preference functionals) to a comparison of two different ways (pairwise choice and complete ranking) of experimentally obtaining data on such preferences. What is revealed is that the magnitude of the subject error is clearly conditional on the elicitation method used and, rather alarmingly, that the preference functional apparently employed by the subject may also be conditional on the elicitation method.     

Which Governance Mechanisms Promote Efficiency in Reaching Poor Clients? Evidence from Rated Microfinance Institutions

This paper evaluates the effectiveness of several governance mechanisms on microfinance institutions' (MFI) performance. We first define performance as efficiency in reaching many poor clients. Following the literature on efficiency in banks, we estimate a stochastic cost frontier and measure output by the number of clients. Therefore, we capture the cost minimisation goal and the goal of serving many poor clients, both of which are pursued by MFIs. We next explore the impact of measurable governance mechanisms on the individual efficiency coefficients. The results show that efficiency increases with a board size of up to nine members and decreases after that. MFIs in which the CEO chairs the board and those with a larger proportion of insiders are less efficient. The evidence also suggests that donors' presence on the board is not beneficial. We do not find consistent evidence for the effect of competition, and we find weak evidence that MFIs in countries with mature regulatory environments reach fewer clients, while MFIs regulated by an independent banking authority are more efficient.     

Multi-country event-study methods

We provide the first simulation evidence of event-study test performance in multi-country non-US samples. The nonparametric rank and generalized sign tests are more powerful than two common parametric tests, especially in multi-day windows. The two nonparametric tests are mostly well specified, but neither is perfectly specified in all situations. The parametric standardized cross-sectional test can provide a useful robustness check but is less powerful than the nonparametric tests and rejects too often in single-market samples and when firm-specific events affect the market index. Local-currency market-model abnormal returns using national market indexes are sufficient.     

What Affects New and Established Firms’ Expansion? Evidence from Small Firms in Russia

Research on financial constraints of very small firms is scarce because it is difficult to observe and measure their transactions. Previous studies on small enterprises in post-communist countries have focused either on the effect of financing constraints on business growth (Budina et al., 2000, Economics of Transition 8(2), 453–475; Bratkowski et al., 2000, Economics of Transition 8(1), 101–116) or on the effect of property rights (Johnson et al., 2002, American Economic Review 92(5), 1335–1357). This paper provides evidence on both. It turns out that financing constraints and property rights considerations affects investment in firms of different age differently. Younger firms face higher information costs and their expansion is more dependent on the availability of internal funds than is the expansion of older firms. This paper also finds that while the financial sector did not channel funds to the most successful businesses, there is evidence that loans were given to firms that had more transparent transactions. Results also indicate that the security of property rights does not influence investment in young firms, which is interpreted to mean that only the most efficient entrepreneurs entered the market. In older small firms, investment is negatively influenced by the index of security of property rights suggesting that these firms might have “secured” their property rights by bribes. Improvements in the security of property rights, therefore, would help more micro enterprises to be born as well as decrease transaction cost of established enterprises.      

Options and efficiency in spaces of bounded claims

In a seminal contribution, Ross (1976) showed that a static finite state-space market can be completed by supplementing the primitive securities with ordinary call and put options. Galvani (2009) extends this result to norm separable _Lp$L_p$-spaces, with 1≤p<∞$1\le p<\infty$. This study concludes that options maintain the same spanning power in the space of bounded payoffs topologized by the duality with the space of the state price densities. In particular, under mild assumptions on the probability space, options written on a claim that is a.s. equal to an injective function complete the market.