From the laws of human nature to capital accumulation: James Mill's analysis of the states of society in the Elements of Political Economy

Abstract

James Mill's Elements of Political Economy is usually treated as a textbook of Ricardian political economy. Although this might be justified, there is a passage in this Ricardian textbook that is not Ricardian. The passage deals with Mill's analysis of the states of society, in which he underlines the laws of human nature conducive to capital accumulation. This paper investigates such states.     

A method for implementing counterfactual experiments in models with multiple equilibria

This paper proposes a homotopy method for implementing counterfactual experiments in empirical models with multiple equilibria. A key assumption is that the equilibrium selection function does not jump discontinuously between equilibria as we continuously change the structural parameters.     

Editorial

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

The Transformation of American Law, 1780–1860

It is commonly believed that New Institutional Economics, particularly the theoretical innovations of Douglass North over the past 20 years and more, has lent scientific legitimacy to economic history. Yet, North is a prisoner of a very peculiar conception of historical development which is no more scientific than rival theories. Two particular aspects of his work underline this point. First, his presentation of class struggles and institutions as contractual relations, understood in economic terms, is highly questionable. Second, it remains to be seen whether or not his recent acceptance of the relevance of ideology is convincing: his account of Soviet stagnation and the crises of Muslim societies leads him into an idealist or culturalist deadlock.     

Who controls Allianz?

With cross-ownership among firms a separation between dividend rights on common stocks and voting rights may occur. This paper proposes a method to trace control rights in a company that is based purely upon accounting identities and the underlying data on cross-ownership relations among firms and privately held shares. Examples show that under cross-ownership, control and ownership of dividend rights may be entirely separated, and multiple equilibria may exist in such economies. The proposed methodology is then applied to the conglomerate around the German ‘Allianz’ group.