Répercussions de la Pension Protection Act de 2006 sur la valeur boursière

Les auteurs étudient les répercussions de la Pension Protection Act de 2006 (PPA 2006) sur la valeur boursière des actions. La PPA 2006 contient deux dispositions principales : 1) les entreprises doivent assurer la capitalisation intégrale de leur régime de retraite en sept ans (alors qu’une période de trente ans leur était auparavant accordée pour capitaliser 90 pour cent de leur passif au titre du régime) et 2) elles peuvent se prévaloir d’une déduction fiscale à l’égard des cotisations à concurrence de 150 pour cent du passif au titre du régime (alors que le plafond de la déduction était antérieurement de 100 pour cent). Une fois contrôlés l’incidence de la norme SFAS 158, les possibilités de croissance, le coût du financement externe et les autres informations publiées au cours de la période d’échantillonnage, les auteurs examinent les rendements anormaux des entreprises ayant un régime de retraite, à proximité des dates marquantes du processus législatif ayant menéà l’adoption de la PPA 2006. Premièrement, ils observent un rendement anormal moyen négatif de – 4,20 pour la période au cours de laquelle la PPA 2006 a fait l’objet d’un premier vote au Congrès. La capitalisation boursière de l’entreprise moyenne (médiane) de l’échantillon a enregistré un déclin de 310 millions de dollars (60 millions de dollars). Deuxièmement, les auteurs constatent que les répercussions sur la valeur boursière sont plus négatives dans le cas des entreprises présentant des passifs non capitalisés plus importants au titre du régime et devant faire face à des dépenses en immobilisations plus substantielles, alors que les entreprises dont les taux d’imposition marginaux sont plus élevés enregistrent des répercussions positives. Troisièmement, les auteurs ne relèvent aucun élément permettant d’affirmer que les répercussions sur la valeur boursière varient selon les différentes catégories de risque définies par la PPA 2006. Enfin, ils recensent un nombre appréciable de cas de blocage du régime au cours de la période soumise à l’étude. Les résultats sont plus marqués encore lorsque ces entreprises sont retirées de l’échantillon.     

The Demise of Investment Banking Partnerships: Theory and Evidence

In 1970 the New York Stock Exchange relaxed rules that prohibited the public incorporation of member firms. Investment banking concerns went public in waves, with Goldman Sachs the last of the bulge bracket banks to float. We explain the pattern of investment bank flotations. We argue that partnerships foster the formation of human capital and we use technological advances that undermine the role of human capital to explain the partnership's going‐public decision. We support our theory using a new data set of investment bank partnership statistics.     

Can Audit Partners Predict Subordinates' Ability to Detect Errors?

This study examines audit partners' predictions of the ability of managers and seniors to detect financial statement errors. If partners are unable to predict the ability of their subordinates to detect errors, audit effectiveness may be affected. Audit partners are asked to predict which members of the audit team (managers or seniors) are able to detect specific types of errors. These predictions are then compared to errors detected by managers and seniors that are seeded in working papers. The results show that partners (1) exhibit significant overconfidence in the ability of subordinates to detect errors, (2) are more accurate in predicting managers' performance than seniors, (3) are more accurate at predicting subordinates' ability to detect mechanical (simple) errors than conceptual (complex) errors, and (4) are not better at predicting subordinates' ability to detect more frequent and more important errors than less frequent and less important errors.     

Unstable Inflation Targets

This paper studies long‐run inflation targets and stability in an imperfect information environment. When central banks set an inflation target that is not fully communicated, agents draw inferences about inflation from recent data and remain alert to structural change by forming expectations from a forecasting model that is estimated via discounted least squares. Inflation targets can lead agents' beliefs to depart from rational expectations through two channels. First, implementing a higher inflation target can lead to overshooting. Second, there can be nearly self‐fulfilling inflation, disinflation, or deflation that arises as an endogenous response to shocks. Policy implications for implementing a higher target without deanchoring expectations are discussed.     

Intergenerational Risk Sharing and Health Insurance Financing

When medical care prices and individual health needs follow stochastic processes with non-zero trends. community rating facilitates lifetime insurance and intergenerational risk sharing. While such a policy is unsustainable in competitive private insurance markets. it provides the basis for the financing of public health systems designed to spread risks efficiently.     

Momentum,Reversal, and Uninformed Traders in Laboratory Markets

We report the results of three experiments based on the model of Hong and Stein (1999) . Consistent with the model, the results show that when informed traders do not observe prices, uninformed traders generate long‐term price reversals by engaging in momentum trade. However, when informed traders also observe prices, uninformed traders generate reversals by engaging in contrarian trading. The results suggest that a dominated information set is sufficient to account for the contrarian behavior observed among individual investors, and that uninformed traders may be responsible for long‐term price reversals but play little role in driving short‐term momentum.     

Tradeoffs Between Price and Quality: How a Value Index Affects

The present research examines how the availability of information about the value of a product, expressed as a ratio of the quality received per dollar, influences preference formation. This index, similar to unit price which provides information about how much quantity is received per dollar, presents consumers with information regarding the quality received per dollar. An experiment that compares consumers' preferences inferred from a choice task with their preferences inferred from a conjoint task was conducted. In the choice task consumers selected the most attractive alternative from a set of options, while in the conjoint task the attractiveness of each option was rated. Consumers, presented with an index of quality received per dollar paid (the value index), are more likely to choose a lower priced, higher value option rather than a higher priced, higher quality option compared to consumers presented with only price and quality information. Clearly, how a consumer chooses to “get the best for his or her money” depends on the ease with which information about the choices can be processed.     

Development and Wealth: A Georgist Perspective

This essay addresses concerns of economic and wealth distribution, especially as they challenge the developing world. The foundation for any new framework of economic thought must embody a structure that allows for a sustainable future, not only for individuals but also for whole societies and economic units, and the assurance of minimal standards of living for the entire world's people. The Georgist position is that all the natural resources of the earth and sky should require payment back to society for the privilege of their use. Hence the recovery of rent is the proper source of finance for government services, restoring what is otherwise an imbalance between the public and the private realms of society. The Georgist philosophy offers economic justice and clarity of vision, restoration of and protection for the commons, and protection for the environment of the earth in a deft and gentle way that is within the capacity of governments to implement.     

Information Cascades and Threshold Implementation: Theory and an Application to Crowdfunding

Economic interactions often involve sequential actions, observational learning, and contingent project implementation. We incorporate all-or-nothing thresholds in a canonical model of information cascades. Early supporters effectively delegate their decisions to a “gatekeeper,” resulting in unidirectional cascades without herding on rejections. Project proposers can consequently charge higher prices. Proposal feasibility, project selection, and information aggregation all improve, even when agents can wait. Equilibrium outcomes depend on crowd size, and project implementation and information aggregation achieve efficiency in the large-crowd limit. Our key insights hold under thresholds in dollar amounts and alternative equilibrium selection, among other model extensions.