Friedman's Money Supply Rule vs. Optimal Interest Rate Policy

Using New Keynesian models, we compare Friedman's k‐percent money supply rule to optimal interest rate setting, with respect to determinacy, stability under learning and optimality. First we review the recent literature: open‐loop interest rate rules are subject to indeterminacy and instability problems, but a properly chosen expectations‐based rule yields determinacy and stability under learning, and implements optimal policy. We show that Friedman's rule also can generate equilibria that are determinate and stable under learning. However, computing the mean quadratic welfare loss, we find for calibrated models that Friedman's rule performs poorly when compared to the optimal interest rate rule.     

Two–step sequential sampling

Choosing the sample size in advance is a familiar problem: often, additional observations appear to be desirable. The final sample size then becomes a random variable, which has rather serious consequences.
Two such sample extension situations will be considered here. In the first situation, the observed sample variance determines whether or not to double the original sample size. In the second situation, the variances observed in two independent samples are compared; their ratio determines the number of additional observations.     

General training by firms, apprentice contracts, and public policy

Workers will not pay for general on-the-job training if contracts are not enforceable. Firms may if there are mobility frictions. Private information about worker productivities, however, prevents workers who quit receiving their marginal products elsewhere. Their new employers then receive external benefits from their training. In this paper, training firms increase profits by offering apprenticeships which commit firms to high wages for those trainees retained on completion. At these high wages, only good workers are retained. This signals their productivity and reduces the external benefits if they subsequently quit. Regulation of apprenticeship length (a historically important feature) enhances efficiency. Appropriate subsidies enhance it further.     

Children's crusade

There's at least $16 billion available to help more children get health care. But on Capitol Hill, there's a bitter dispute over how the money should be spent. Give the states the money, some say, and let them bolster novel health care programs such as Florida's Healthy Kids. Others want to expand Medicaid.     

Why Democracies Cooperate More and Fight Less: The Relationship Between International Trade and Cooperation

This paper provides an economics-based interpretation of the standard finding in the literature that democracies rarely fight each other. A general theory of conflict between two countries is presented and empirical analysis applies this theory to the question of why democracies rarely fight each other. The results show that the fundamental factor in causing bilateral cooperation is trade. Countries seek to protect wealth gained through international trade, therefore trading partners are less combative than nontrading nations. Democratic dyads trade more than nondemocratic dyads, and thus exhibit less conflict and more cooperation.     

An experimental study of strategic information transmission

Summary We examine strategic information transmission in an experiment. Senders are privately informed about a state. They send messages to Receivers, who choose actions resulting in payoffs to Senders and Receivers. The payoffs depend on the action and the state. We vary the degree to which the Receivers' and the Senders' preferences diverge. We examine the relationship between the Senders' messages and the true state as well as that between actions and the true state and contrast the ability of different equilibrium message sets to explain the data.When preferences are closely aligned Senders disclose more. We assess two comparative statics: (i) as preferences diverge, state and action are less frequently matched, and (ii) messages tend to become less informative as preferences diverge. The first result is weakly confirmed for adjacent treatments but is considerably stronger when non-adjacent treatments are compared. We find that as preferences diverge messages become less informative. While the ex-ante Pareto-optimal Bayesian Nash Equilibrium does not explain our conditions, the equilibrium message sets supported by the data are similar to the ex-ante Pareto Optimal message sets.We would like to thank seminar participants at the Economic Science Association meetings, the University of Iowa, the University of Minnesota, Northwestern University and the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory meetings for their comments. We would like to thank Beth Allen, Joyce Berg, Robert Forsythe, Yong-Gwan Kim, Antonio Merlo, Leonard Mirman, In-Uck Park, Charles Plott, Jennifer Reinganum and an anonymous referee for their suggestions. Financial support from the Accounting Research Center at the University of Minnesota is also acknowledge.     

The maintenance, funding and modification of retiree medical benefits

Retiree medical benefits are an ever-growing concern as costs escalate and the date for implementation of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 106 approaches. These authors summarize case law relevant to employers' right to modify or terminate benefits and discuss methods of funding theses liabilities.