A theory of development controls in a ‘small’ city

This paper analyzes the implications of an institutional structure in which current residents of an urban area have the power to exercise control over the level and pattern of new residential development. We develop a general equilibrium spatial model of a ‘small’ urban area in which the current residents can control new residential development through a zoning policy determined by majority vote. The current residents are modeled explicitly as home owners, and are allowed to be arbitrarily different in tastes and endowments. The urban government is assumed to provide a public good for its residents, the level of which is also determined by majority vote.The ‘optimal’ development control policy from the point of view of a particular current resident is determined and the allocation resulting from a majority vote of the current residents is described for both head tax and property tax systems. Efficient development control policies are also analyzed.     

Motivational bases for managing diversity: A model of leadership commitment

Given the limited effectiveness of equal employment opportunity and affirmative action programs in promoting minorities in the U.S., the onus to advance women and minority groups may depend on the voluntary efforts from corporate America. In this paper, we apply a general theory of commitment to help explain why top executives may be committed to managing diversity in organizations. We propose that top executive commitment can stem from instrumental, normative, or affective bases. Specifically, top executives may be motivated because of utility maximization, a moral obligation, or a personal desire to be associated with a program of social importance and/or to leave a positive legacy. We further explore the implications of the three motivational bases of top executive commitment to managing diversity on firm diversity outcomes, and we offer some propositions which can serve as a basis for future research.     

Financial competence,overconfidence, and trusting investments: Results from an experiment

Financial transactions sometimes occur in an environment where third-party enforcement is lacking. Behavioral explanations typically allude to the social preferences, where an individual’s utility is directly affected by another’s outcome, as the driver of the trusting investments and reciprocal returns. We hypothesize that, in part, these decisions are determined by an individual’s financial literacy and overconfidence in one’s knowledge. Experimental evidence is coupled with an innovative financial literacy assessment, which measures general competence, numeracy skills, and overconfidence in one’s knowledge. Results indicate that overconfidence is a significant determinant of behavior. Specifically, overconfident individuals make larger contributions in the investment game. We also document that there is an escalated effect in overconfident individuals who are also exhibit risk loving preferences.     

EXCHANGE RATE FUNDAMENTALS,FORECASTING, AND SPECULATION: BAYESIAN MODELS IN BLACK MARKETS

Although speculative activity is central to black markets for currency, the out‐of‐sample performance of structural models in those settings is unknown. We substantially update the literature on empirical determinants of black market rates and evaluate the out‐of‐sample performance of linear models and non‐parametric Bayesian treed Gaussian process (BTGP) models against the random walk benchmark. Fundamentals‐based models outperform the benchmark in out‐of‐sample prediction accuracy and trading rule profitability measures given future values of fundamentals. In simulated real‐time trading exercises, however, the BTGP achieves superior realized profitability, accuracy and market timing, while linear models do no better than a random walk. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Occupational Attainment and Immigrant Economic Progress in Australia*

Using data from the 2001 Australian Census of Population and Housing, on adult men in full‐time employment, this paper augments a conventional human capital earnings function with information on occupations. It also estimates models of occupational attainment. The results from both the earnings function and model of occupational attainment indicate that the limited international transferability of human capital skills results in immigrants entering into relatively low status occupations when they first enter the Australian labour market. Comparison with similar research for the USA suggests that the different immigrant selection regimes (primarily family reunion in the USA, skill‐based immigration in Australia) do not impact on the negative association between current occupational status and pre‐immigration labour market experience.     

Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence

In the contract-theoretic literature, there is a vital debate about whether contracts can mitigate the hold-up problem, in particular when renegotiation cannot be prevented. Ultimately, this question has to be answered empirically. As a first step, we have conducted a laboratory experiment with 960 participants. We consider investments that directly benefit the non-investing party. While according to standard theory, contracting would be useless if renegotiation cannot be ruled out, we find that option contracts significantly improve investment incentives compared to a no-contract treatment. This finding might be attributed to Hart and Moore?s (2008) recent idea that contracts can serve as reference points.     

The Impact of Institutions and Exchange Rate Volatility on China’s Outward FDI

Over the past decade, China’s outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) has rapidly increased. However, its characteristics are not sufficiently studied. In this article, we explore the host country’s determinants of China’s OFDI, with a focus on institutional quality, exchange rate volatility, and natural resources by performing an econometric analysis for the period 2003–2013 for a sample of 49 countries. Our results reveal that China’s OFDI is invested in countries with relatively poor institutional quality and abundant natural resources. Exchange rate variability has a dampening effect on China’s OFDI and that the appreciation of the Chinese renminbi enhances OFDI flows.     

Efficient delays in a stochastic model of bargaining

Summary. We consider a k-player sequential bargaining model in which both the cake size and the identity of the proposer are determined by a stochastic process. For the case where the cake is a simplex (of random size) and the players share a common discount factor, we establish the existence of a unique stationary subgame perfect payoff which is efficient and characterize the conditions under which agreement is delayed. We also investigate how the equilibrium payoffs depend on the order in which the players move and on the correlation between the identity of the proposer and the cake size.Received: November 5, 1996; revised version: December 31, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date.