Institutional design and the closure of public facilities in transition economies

As part of the reforms of their systems for financing and delivering health care, many transition economies, particularly in central and eastern Europe, have adopted national insurance funds that are institutionally separate from ministries of health. Most of these countries have also grappled with the problem of restructuring the delivery system, especially the need to reduce hospital capacity. Although improving the performance of medical care providers through a shift from passive budgeting to explicitly incentive mechanisms is important, why this change in financial relations between the government and providers could not be implemented simply by reforming the role of health ministries is not obvious. This paper presents an explicit rationale for the separation of powers between the regulator (the ministry of health) and the financing body (the insurance fund), based on the inability of a single agency to commit to closing hospitals. JEL classification: L51, P20, P35, I18.     

The Effects of Occupational Injuries After Returns to Work: Work Absences and Losses of On-the-Job Productivity

We extend the research on postinjury employment by estimating productivity losses for workers with permanent partial disabilities (PPDs) in the first three years after injury. Our method distinguishes between productivity losses attributed to spells of work absence versus reduced earnings during spells of employment. The method is applied to data for 800 Ontario workers with PPDs. The results document large productivity losses persisting at least three years after injury, with different loss patterns for workers returning to stable versus unstable employment. Human capital investments or job accommodations can reduce productivity losses, but the significant determinants of losses differ for the stable versus unstable employment groups.     

Evaluating FOMC forecasts

Monetary policy outcomes have improved since the early 1980s. One factor contributing to the improvement is that Federal Reserve policymakers began reporting economic forecasts to Congress in 1979. These forecasts indicate what the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) members think will be the likely consequence of their policies. We evaluate the accuracy of the FOMC forecasts relative to private sector forecasts, the forecasts of the Research Staff at the Board of Governors, and a naïve alternative. We find that the FOMC output forecasts were better than the naïve model and at least as good as those of the private sector and the Fed staff. The FOMC inflation forecasts were more accurate than the private sector forecasts and the naïve model; for the period ending in 1996, however, they were not as accurate as Fed staff inflation forecasts.     

The Only Solution to the Decline in Business Ethics: Ethical Managers

This paper defines business ethics as a seriesof behaviors that adhere to values held by theindividual manager, the manager's supervisorsand subordinates, general society and, mostimportantly, the manager's customers andclients. The concept of business ethics isexplored through several levels of businessorganizations and operating environments.The paper then examines recent evidence of thedecline in business ethics by noting a fewexamples involving Beech-Nut, Hertz, MichaelMilken, E.F. Hutton, Sears, Salomon Brothers,Dalkon Shield, Exxon Valdez, S&L scandal,brokerage analysts. Surveys are cited toindicate that the American public believes thatbusiness ethics are declining.To further analyze the topic, the authorreports on a series of structured interviewswith managers in a variety of organizations.Fourteen senior managers were interviewed: 4from large county government, 3 from stategovernment, 4 from large corporations, 3 fromsmall businesses. The managers were asked theiropinions concerning the decline of businessethics, and for their recommendations topossibly retard the decline. All managers saidthey believed that ethics are in decline andthat the public believes ethics are declining.The recommendations for retarding or reversingthe decline yielded several suggestions: teachethics in schools and business organizations,develop and enforce Codes of Ethical Conductwithin all organizations, establish bettermonitoring and reporting mechanisms, and hireethical managers.The paper builds on theinterview results by coupling the managers'remarks with admonitions from many authors:while teaching ethics and Codes of EthicalConduct are important, the most importantfactor is the ethical behavior of managers(leaders). Ethical leadership is fundamentalsince ethical behavior is an individual – not acorporate – matter. In practice, ethics is notsomething that a manager ``does'; it issomething that the manager ``is.'     

Inferential Causal Models: Integrating Quality & Quantity

In-depth data analysis plus statistical modeling can produce inferentialcausal models. Their creation thus combines aspects of analysis by close inspection,that is, reason analysis and cross-tabular analysis, with statistical analysis procedures,especially those that are special cases of the generalized linear model (McCullaghand Nelder, 1989; Agresti, 1996; Lindsey, 1997). This paper explores some of the roots of this combined method and suggests some new directions. An exercise clarifies some limitations of classic reason analysis by showing how the cross tabulation of variables with controls for test factors may produce better inferences. Then, given the cross tabulation of several variables, by explicating Coleman effect parameters, logistic regressions, and Poisson log-linear models, it shows how generalized linear models provide appropriate measures of effects and tests of statistical significance. Finally, to address a weakness of reason analysis, a case-control design is proposed and an example is developed.     

Time-Based Management of the New Product Development Process

This study explored the problem of compressing new product development by focusing on the specific phases of the innovation process. These phases manifest significant qualitative differences that require attention for understanding the complexities of accelerating new product development. Based on data from 35 high-technology companies, Necmi Karagozoglu and Warren Brown identified several different acceleration methods. Results revealed unexpected and at times inconsistent insights than those reflected in the case study and anecdotally based literature, and implied also that some of the well documented approaches to successful new product development need to be replaced with their time-based versions.     

Risk and the miller equilibrium: Capital structure choice with risk-averse investors

Merton Miller's (1977) tax model of equilibrium capital structure choice results in capital structure irrelevance and the existence of tax clienteles, assuming the restrictive case of risk-neutrality. Relaxation of the assumption of risk-neutrality in Miller's tax framework, allowing utility-maximizing risk-averse investors, indicates that capital structure irrelevance continues to hold under reasonable assumptions about utility. Evaluation of resulting tax clienteles shows that marginal tax rates do not restrict investors from investing in equities but do affect the tax status of purchased bonds.     

AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE IMPACT OF PROFIT SHARING SCHEMES OF EXECUTIVIES ON THE CONTENT OF CORPORATE SUBMISSIONS ON PROPOSED ACCOUNTING STANDARDS

This paper examines the comments submitted by UK companies on 20 proposed accounting standards to test the hypotheses that executives favor standards that increase, or dampen the variance of, accounting profit numbers on which their incentive remuneration is based. Test results were generally as hypothesised but only the profit variance outcomes were statistically significant. Allowing for political environment changes affected only the profit variance results. There was no evidence that the relative monetary size of bonus payments was a significant lobbying factor. No significant differences were found between the lobbying preferences of companies with or without executive incentive schemes.