Corruption in dictatorships

In this paper, we consider a simple model capable of explaining why some dictatorships choose to extract rents via seemingly inefficient institutions. In particular, this paper focuses on institutions associated with high levels of corruption and examines the conditions under which such institutions could serve the interests of a dictatorship. Developing such a model requires that we pose alternative institutions that dictators can choose to extract rents. Using this framework, this paper builds a model providing a theoretical basis for some stylized facts about the observed crosscountry variation in corruption levels. Specifically, the model motivates a rationale for the finding that higher levels of corruption are observed in countries characterized as having more heterogeneous populations, longer expected dictator tenure, and more severe punishment norms. The model is then estimated using international country level data.     

Social Capital and Social Influence on the Board of Directors

It is often assumed that directors with human capital such as prior management experience or independence from the company are the most influential board members. By contrast, in a survey of all the board members in 14 companies we found that ties to others in a network of strong ties among those who meet outside of board meetings were more important predictors of social influence than human capital or ties across boards. These ties within the board represent the social capital of members in the form of prior relationships with other directors, ties to others on the board, and membership in cliques within the board's network of ties. These results support a social capital perspective on influence that emphasizes relationships with others on the board as important factors in the social dynamics of board decision-making.     

Understanding prediction intervals for firm specific inefficiency scores from parametric stochastic frontier models

This paper makes two important contributions to the literature on prediction intervals for firm specific inefficiency estimates in cross sectional SFA models. Firstly, the existing intervals in the literature do not correspond to the minimum width intervals and in this paper we discuss how to compute such intervals and how they either include or exclude zero as a lower bound depending on where the probability mass of the distribution of \( u_{i} |\varepsilon_{i} \) resides. This has useful implications for practitioners and policy makers, with greatest reductions in interval width for the most efficient firms. Secondly, we propose an ‘asymptotic’ approach to incorporating parameter uncertainty into prediction intervals for firm specific inefficiency (given that in practice model parameters have to be estimated) as an alternative to the ‘bagging’ procedure suggested in Simar and Wilson (Econom Rev 29(1):62–98, 2010). The approach is computationally much simpler than the bagging approach.     

Product Differentiation and Public Education

We demonstrate that differentiation in public services can arise as a way of reducing competition among cities. Quality differentiation can be particularly relevant to the provision of education. If cities finance education through a property tax that generates "tax competition," we find that quality differentiation in education changes the amount of educational services provided. In the case of property-value maximization, this means a reduction in educational services in both the city with high quality and that with low quality. The reduction in educational services means that under reasonable conditions property values in both cities can increase.     

How Large are the Welfare Gains from Technological Innovation Induced by Environmental Policies?

This paper examines whether the welfare gains from technological innovation that reduces future abatement costs are larger or smaller than the Pigouvian welfare gains from optimal pollution control. The relative welfare gains from innovation depend on three key factors—the initially optimal level of abatement, the speed at which innovation reduces future abatement costs, and the discount rate. We calculate the welfare gains from innovation under a variety of different scenarios. Mostly they are less than the Pigouvian welfare gains. To be greater, innovation must reduce abatement costs substantially and quickly and the initially optimal abatement level must be fairly modest.     

Strong measures of group coherence and the probability that a pairwise majority rule winner exists

A Pairwise Majority Rule Winner (PMRW) exists for a voting situation if some candidate can defeat each of the remaining candidates by Pairwise Majority Rule. The PMRW would be very appropriate for selection as the winner of an election, but it is well known that such a candidate does not always exist. This paper concludes a series of studies regarding the probability that a PMRW should be expected to exist in three-candidate elections, by introducing the notion of a strong measures of mutually coherent group preferences. In order for voting situations to be reasonably expected to fail to have a PMRW in a three-candidate election, voters’ preferences must be generated in an environment that is far removed from the situation in which there is a strong-overall-unifying candidate. So far removed, that it is extremely unlikely that a PMRW will not exist in voting situations with large electorates for a small number of candidates.     

The effect of ESOP adoptions on corporate performance: are there really performance changes?

Employee Stock Ownership Programs (ESOPs) have long been promoted as a motivational tool: employees become profit‐minded owners. Latterly, however, more ESOPs are being used as part of a takeover defense: here the ESOPs main purpose is to put more company stock in friendly hands—the employees—who, like existing management, could suffer layoffs, etc. in a hostile takeover. We find that, as a group, only the takeover‐related ESOPs are associated with increased leverage (itself a takeover defense). Non‐target firms show no long‐term increase in debt‐to‐assets. We find little evidence to support the motivation hypothesis: while actual labor costs are lower for ESOP firms, after industry‐adjusting they tend to be unaffected or higher. We find that a few measures of firm financial performance [return‐on‐equity (ROE), return‐on‐assets (ROA), net profit margin (NPM)] do improve significantly, but this appears to be largely a short‐term effect. Industry‐adjusted holding period returns appear to be unaffected by the ESOP; however, ESOP firms that leverage show evidence of long‐term market underperformance. We conclude that ESOPs provide, at best, only a short‐term boost to corporate performance. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.