Social Structure in Economic Theory

This paper investigates the factors that drive ruler decision making under democracy. By dividing politicians’ actions into two distinct domains and exploring their compositions, we construct a fuller and more realistic picture of politician decision making. In the non-discretionary domain, the politician’s actions are clearly limited by voter desires; in the discretionary domain the politician is free to make choices as he chooses without voter repercussions. Standard neoclassical models of political behavior suggest that when votes don’t matter, monetary income drives ruler behavior. While monetary pursuit may explain some ruler decisions, it leaves many other observed choices unexplained. Our non-discretionary/discretionary dichotomy highlights the up-to-now neglected role that psychic income plays in explaining otherwise unexplained ruler decisions. The case studies considered support this view.     

Teaching Marginal Cost,Supply, and Efficiency with an English-Auction Experiment

Using a discrete time control model, the authors suggest that faculty may be able to improve their teaching effectiveness by a reallocation of the inputs devoted to teaching (e.g., using student evaluations early in the course), by increasing the level of the resources used in teaching, or by changing the characteristics of the inputs (possibly through such things as teaching practicums, seminars, or sabbaticals). Alternatively, reducing the instructor's opportunity cost of the resources devoted to teaching may increase teaching effectiveness (i.e., reducing the research requirements for promotion). Empirical estimates of the effectiveness of these strategies are not presented.     

Reform of Metropolitan Governments; Minority Perspectives; Metropolitanization and Public Services

America has often been labeled a "throw-away" society due to the large amount of products that could have been reused but are discarded from a typical household on a daily basis. This paper attempts to answer the question of why, when given two consumers with the same income level and socio-economic background, does one consumer choose to replace an older, malfunctioning household product while the other chooses to have the product repaired for further reuse. To help address this question an enhanced replacement model is presented and empirically tested. The replacement model has been around for some time, helping consumers and firms make capital budgeting decisions. This analysis can be extrapolated to the macro level where one economy with a higher societal discount rate might be more strongly characterized as a "throw-away society" than a similar economy with lower societal consumption discount rates.     

Why do diners tip: rule-of-thumb or valuation of service?

When diners decide how much to tip, is the decision based on social convention or on conscientious appraisal of server productivity? Previous researchers in economics and social psychology are generally inconclusive on this question. A common finding in the literature is that tip size and service quality are unrelated, a result usually obtained from OLS regressions. OLS is only appropriate if service quality is exogenous. It is argued that service quality is very likely endogenous in any regression of tip size; good quality encourages good tips, but server expectations of good tips encourage good quality. This simultaneity is accounted for by jointly estimating percentage tips and customer rankings of service quality on a sample of 247 diners in a Central Minnesota restaurant. Included are explanatory variables consistent with both the social psychology and economic views of tipping. In contrast to previous studies, it is found that service quality significantly affects tip size and when servers expect higher tips, customers rank service quality higher. Also it is found that patronage frequency and coupon redemption have no effect on percentage tips, but server gender influences quality significantly. It is concluded that the results are generally supportive of an economic hypothesis of tipping.     

Efficiency in the NFL betting market: modifying and consolidating research methods

Modifying and consolidating previous research methods to generate more reliable estimates, some fairly weak evidence is found of inefficiency in the NFL betting market resulting from a bias favouring home underdog (against away favourite) teams. In contrast to previous research, no evidence is found that ‘momentum strategies’ generate significant returns in this market.     

Do budget maximizing public officials increase the probability of property reassessment?

County governments in Pennsylvania face non‐binding limits on their property tax rates. These are considered non‐binding because they do not place a limit on tax levies or expenditures. Assuming local public officials have monopoly power, tax rate limits can be circumvented by reassessing the property tax base. A two‐stage process was hypothesized in which the probability of reaching tax rate limits first was determined and the probability of reassessment then was determined. The effect of budget maximizing government officials at each stage was tested for 66 Pennsylvania counties over the 1970–1995 period. The empirical results showed that variables associated with budget maximizing behaviour influenced the choice in each stage. Public expenditure growth increased the probability of reaching the tax rate limit in the first stage while reaching the tax rate limit increased the probability of reassessment in the second stage. The estimates also showed that economic, fiscal and taste variables were significant determinants of these probabilities.     

The welfare costs of unreliable water service

Throughout the developing world, many water distribution systems are unreliable. As a result, it becomes necessary for each household to store its own water as a hedge against this uncertainty. Since arrivals of water are not synchronized across households, serious distributional inefficiencies arise. We develop a model describing the optimal intertemporal depletion of each household's private water storage if it is uncertain when water will next arrive to replenish supplies. The model is calibrated using survey data from Mexico City, a city where many households store water in sealed rooftop tanks known as tinacos. The calibrated model is used to evaluate the potential welfare gains that would occur if alternative modes of water provision were implemented. We estimate that most of the potential distributional inefficiencies can be eliminated simply by making the frequency of deliveries the same across households which now face haphazard deliveries. This would require neither costly investments in infrastructure nor price increases.     

On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals

The purpose of this paper is to provide a critical examination of some of the terminology that is common in economic design and to suggest ways in which it can be improved.