Rezensionen

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

The master equation approach to nonlinear economics

A concept for modelling nonlinear economic dynamics is presented and exemplified by a concrete model. Generally, a configuration of macro-economic variables is considered whose probabilistic evolution is coupled to the decision making of agents and is described by a master equation. The transition rates in the master equation are modelled in terms of utility measures of the agents. Nonlinear dynamic meanvalue equations can be derived from the master equation. The concrete model describes firms producing substitutable durable commodities. They compete with respect to the quality of their products and a positive feedback between quality enhancement and customer's reaction to quality is assumed. The case of two competing firms is treated explicitely. It is shown that beyond a critical value of a “competitivity parameter” a homogenous maret will develop into an inhomogenous one with a winner and a loser firm.     

Exchange market intervention and the US dollar

In the past years central banks of major Western industrialised countries have repeatedly attempted to change the trend of the US-Dollar rate by means of intervention in the foreign exchange markets. Our authors analyse the objectives, effects and chances of success of such exchange market interventions.     

Privatization of public enterprises

In this paper the following results of a transition from public to private ownership are obtained: The manager of a public firm engages in less effort than is efficient; in a privatized firm the manager's effort is chosen efficiently. The reward to the manager of a public firm is more differentiated than efficient. In the case of an unfavourable economic environment the reward is higher than efficient. On the other hand, the manager in a privatized firm is always rewarded efficiently. It is irrelevant whether the public manager is incompletely informed about the particular mix of government's multiple objectives as long as the government chooses the incentive-compatible reward for the manager.

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Zusammenfassung Wird ein Unternehmen vom öffentlichen ins private Eigentum übergeführt, so gilt folgendes: Im öffentlichen Unternehmen sind das Ausmaß der Forschungs- und Entwicklungsinvestitionen sowie der Arbeitseinsatz des Managers niedriger als im Kostenminimum. Im privatisierten Unternehmen werden dagegen der Arbeitseinsatz des Managers und die Forschungs- und Entwicklungsinvestitionen in kostenminimierendem Umfang gewählt. In der öffentlichen Unternehmung führt Informationsasymmetrie zu einer stärkeren Spreizung der Managerentlohnung als im privatisierten Unternehmen. In privatisierten Unternehmen ist die Managerentlohnung so niedrig, daß der Manager nur seinen Reservationsnutzen erhält.