Rawlsian pricing of access to public facilities: A unidimensional illustration

We consider a setting where citizens using a public facility face an idiosyncratic private access cost and must also contribute to the costs of facility. We show that if the population is uniformly spread over the real line, the cost of a facility is independent of location and access costs are linear in distance, the Rawlsian access pricing is the unique cost sharing solution that satisfies the “core property” of secession-proofness. The latter amounts to the voluntary participation principle under which no group of citizens should be charged more than the cost incurred if it had acted on its own.     

How many voters are needed for paradoxes?

Summary. This paper presents a general procedure for finding profiles with the minimum number of voters required for many important paradoxes. Borda's and Condorcet's classic examples are revisited as well as generalizations. Using Saari's procedure line, we obtain an upper bound for the minimum number of voters needed for a profile for which the Condorcet winner is not strictly top ranked for all weighted positional procedures. Also we give a simple upper bound on the minimum number of voters needed for a set of prescribed voting outcomes. In contrast to situations wherein small numbers of voters are needed, we consider paradoxes requiring arbitrarily large numbers of voters as well as large numbers of alternatives. Finally we indicate connections with statistical rank based tests. Received: April 18, 2001; revised version: May 25, 2001     

Technological change and timing reductions in greenhouse gas emissions

In 2007 Nicholas Stern’s Review (in Science 317:201–202, 2007) estimated that global GDP would shrink by 5–20% due to climate change which brought forth calls to reduce emissions by 30–70% in the next 20 years. Stern’s results were contested by Weitzman (in J Econ Lit XLV(3):703–724, 2007) who argued for more modest reductions in the near term, and Nordhaus (in Science 317:201–202, 2007) who questioned the low discount rate and coefficient of relative risk aversion employed in the Stern Review, which caused him to argue that ‘the central question about global-warming policy—how much how, how fast, and how costly—remain open.’ We present a simulation model developed by Färe et al. (in Time substitution with application to data envelopment analysis, 2009) on intertemporal resource allocation that allows us to shine some light on these questions. The empirical specification here constrains the amount of undesirable output a country can produce over a given period by choosing the magnitude and timing of those reductions. We examine the production technology of 28 OECD countries over 1992–2006, in which countries produce real GDP and CO₂ using capital and labor and simulate the magnitude and timing necessary to be in compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. This tells us ‘how fast’ and ‘how much’. Comparison of observed GDP and simulated GDP with the emissions constraints tells us ‘how costly’. We find these costs to be relatively low if countries are allowed reallocate production decision across time, and that emissions should be cut gradually at the beginning of the period, with larger cuts starting in 2000.     

Misperceiving the value of information in predicting the performance of others

Economic models typically allow for “free disposal” or “reversibility” of information, which implies non-negative value. Building on previous research on the “curse of knowledge” we explore situations where this might not be so. In three experiments, we document situations in which participants place positive value on information in attempting to predict the performance of uninformed others, even when acquiring that information diminishes their earnings. In the first experiment, a majority of participants choose to hire informed—rather than uninformed—agents, leading to lower earnings. In the second experiment, a significant number of participants pay for information—the solution to a puzzle—that hurts their ability to predict how many others will solve the puzzle. In the third experiment, we find that the effect is reduced with experience and feedback on the actual performance to be predicted. We discuss implications of our results for the role of information and informed decision making in economic situations. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9128-y. JEL Classification C91, D83