Making yourself indispensable

Peter Drucker and other leadership thinkers have long argued that leaders should focus on strengthening their strengths. How should they do that? Improving on a weakness is pretty easy and straight forward: You can make measurable progress by honing and practicing basic techniques. But developing a strength is a different matter, because simply doing more of what you're good at will yield only incremental improvements. If you are strong technically, becoming even more of a technical expert won't make you a dramatically better leader. If, however, you use what the authors call "nonlinear development"--similar to an athlete's cross-training--you can achieve exponential results. Your technical expertise will become more powerful if, for instance, you build on your communication skills, enabling you to explain technical problems both more broadly and more effectively. The authors, all from the leadership development consultancy Zenger Folkman, present a step-by-step process by which developing leaders can identify their strengths (through either a formal or an informal 360-degree evaluation), select appropriate complementary skills (the article identifies up to a dozen for each core strength), and develop those skills to dramatically improve their strengths--making themselves uniquely valuable to their companies.     

Testing alternative theories of the firm: transaction cost,knowledge-based,and measurement explanations for make-or-buy decisions in information services

Firms boundary choices have undergone careful examination in recent years, particularly in information services. While transaction cost economics provides a widely tested explanation for boundary choice, more recent theoretical work advances competing knowledge-based and measurement cost explanations. Similar to transaction cost economics, these theories examine the impact of exchange attributes on the performance of markets and hierarchies as institutions of governance. These theories, however, offer alternative attributes to those suggested by transaction cost economics or offer alternative mechanisms through which similar attributes influence make–buy choices. Traditional empirical specifications of make–buy models are unable to comparatively test among these alternative theories. By developing and testing a model of comparative institutional performance rather than institutional choice, we examine the degree of support for these competing explanations of boundary choice. Hypotheses are tested using data on the governance of nine information services at 152 companies. Our results suggest that a theory of the firm and a theory of boundary choice is likely to be complex, requiring integration of transaction cost, knowledge-based, and measurement reasoning. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Recent Developments at DG Competition: 2017/2018

The Directorate General for Competition at the European Commission enforces competition law in the areas of antitrust, merger control, and state aids. This year’s article provides first a general presentation of the role of the Chief Competition Economist’s team and surveys some of the main achievements of the Directorate General for Competition over 2017/2018. The article then reviews: the Google Search (Shopping) case, the role of price discrimination in state aid cases; and the use of counterfactuals in merger cases where alternative transactions might have occurred absent the merger.