This paper studies an optimal insurance and reinsurance design problem among three agents: policyholder, insurer, and reinsurer. We assume that the preferences of the parties are given by distortion risk measures, which are equivalent to dual utilities. By maximizing the dual utility of the insurer and jointly solving the optimal insurance and reinsurance contracts, it is found that a layering insurance is optimal, with every layer being borne by one of the three agents. We also show that reinsurance encourages more insurance, and is welfare improving for the economy. Furthermore, it is optimal for the insurer to charge the maximum acceptable insurance premium to the policyholder. This paper also considers three other variants of the optimal insurance/reinsurance models. The first two variants impose a limit on the reinsurance premium so as to prevent insurer to reinsure all its risk. An optimal solution is still layering insurance, though the insurer will have to retain higher risk. Finally, we study the effect of competition by permitting the policyholder to insure its risk with an insurer, a reinsurer, or both. The competition from the reinsurer dampens the price at which an insurer could charge to the policyholder, although the optimal indemnities remain the same as the baseline model. The reinsurer will however not trade with the policyholder in this optimal solution. 相似文献
Purpose: This article aims to integrate consumers into a channel dependence framework and explores the influence of consumers’ brand loyalty and store loyalty on the dependence structure within the supplier–retailer relationship. It also examines effects of the dependence structure on perceived conflict.
Methodology/approach: The authors test the proposed triadic relationship model among department store, supplier, and consumer by collecting matched data from both retailers and consumers in a Chinese retailing channel of sports and leisure apparel. Polynomial regression in conjunction with a response surface analysis (RSA) approach is used to test the hypotheses.
Findings: The results indicate that consumers’ brand loyalty positively affects retailer’s dependence on supplier, while consumers’ store loyalty positively affects supplier’s dependence on retailer. In addition, the retailer’s dependence is higher when consumers’ brand loyalty is higher than store loyalty; the supplier’s dependence is higher when consumers’ store loyalty is higher than brand loyalty; and the retailer’s dependence increases with the increase of both consumers’ brand and store loyalty when consumers’ brand and store loyalty are equal. Moreover, supplier’s dependence has a negative linear effect on retailer’s perceived conflict, whereas retailer’s dependence has an inverted U-shape effect on perceived conflict. A retailer would perceive more conflict when the retailer is relatively more dependent on the supplier; but the symmetrical interdependence has no significant effect on retailer perceived conflict.
Research implications: Researchers are encouraged to explore channel behaviors from a network perspective. Consumers, in particular, should be included in research frameworks related to channel dependence and behaviors. Suggestions for further research on the effects of dependence on the conflict are also proposed.
Originality/value/contribution: This study goes beyond the dyadic paradigm by integrating consumers into the framework of the channel dependence structure. It develops and tests a mechanism of consumers’ brand and store loyalty influencing dependence structure within a supplier–retailer dyad. It also enriches the literature of channel conflict by exploring the effects of retailer and supplier unilateral dependence on retailer perceived conflict with RSA methods.
Practical implications: The article provides several insightful implications for managers in understanding and managing interdependence structure in business-to-business marketing, especially in supplier–retailer relationships. 相似文献
Purpose: The article aims to test the appropriateness of deterrence and conflict spiral models in marketing channels. Both models have been alternatively used as bases to explain firms’ power-related behaviors in marketing channels. However, the issue of the appropriateness of such an application in various contexts has not yet been addressed.Methodology/approach: The authors develop the hypotheses based on deterrence theory and their alternatives based on conflict spiral theory. They gather data from 204 sales representatives of suppliers in China and use linear regression analysis to test their hypotheses versus alternatives.Empirical findings: The data analysis offers supportive evidence for the deterrence logic but with unexpected results. By elaborating on the empirical results, the original assumption of deterrence theory, and the nature of interfirm relationship in marketing channels, the authors modify the deterrence model for research on power related-behaviors in the given context. The analysis implies a possible explanation for inconsistent findings in the literature regarding exercises of coercive power.Originality/value/contribution: This article proposes a revised deterrence model that can interpret the empirical results with a consistent logic and better predict power-related behaviors in marketing channels.Research limitations/implications: The research results may lack generalizability with respect to channel type and culture. It does not directly test the cognitive mechanisms that mediate the impact of power on its exercise. Researchers are encouraged to directly test the mediating constructs in other channels or countries.Practical implications: The article includes some insights and implications for managers in understanding power structure and implementing influence strategies in business-to-business marketing. 相似文献
This article extends the economics of exchange for bilateral monopolists to more general situations in marketing channels, that is, exchange between two members with alternatives, by incorporating insights drawn from power-dependence theory, interdependence theory, and the concept of switching cost. It proposes a framework of three factors of channel dependence and reviews the literature on the operationalizations of channel dependence based on the framework. This study concludes that the approaches used by channels researchers, explicitly or implicitly, more or less, capture the three factors of channel dependence. It also notices weaknesses in some approaches, including missing important aspects of a factor, possibilities of inflating or deflating channel dependence, and falling short of being a one-dimensional construct. The article finally draws conclusions and reports implications from the findings of this inquiry and literature review. 相似文献