Should there exist secondary markets for executive stock options?

This paper investigates the potential disadvantages of the secondary markets for executive stock options (ESOs). The benefits of such markets are evident, but they might also have negative effects for shareholders. Executives might, for example, use inside information to time their ESO selling. We investigate two personal motives of managers that can be assumed to affect their optimal selling decision, that is, managers' personal portfolio management issues and the use of inside information. We explore these motives by analyzing unique data from Finland, where there are secondary markets for ESOs. The results of the study support the traditional portfolio diversification hypothesis according to which managers tend to sell their ESOs when holding an ESO is equivalent to holding the underlying stock; that is, in such a case a manager's wealth is closely tied to the stock price of the firm. With respect to the use of inside information the results indicate that ESO selling activity is not related to future stock price behaviour, suggesting that managers do not use inside information to determine the selling time of their ESOs. These results imply that the existence of secondary markets for ESOs does not weaken the usefulness of ESOs as the management compensation, although the benefits of such markets are evident.     

Orange County Bankruptcy: Financial Contagion in the Municipal Bond and Bank Equity Markets

We examine the spillover wealth effects of the Orange County, California bankruptcy announcement in December 1994 on municipal bonds, municipal bond funds, and bank stocks. This bankruptcy is prominent because of unprecedented losses and because it was caused by a highly leveraged derivatives strategy rather than a shortage of tax revenues and excess spending. We find contagion in the bond market with significantly negative abnormal returns for municipal bond funds without direct exposure to Orange County and for non‐Orange County municipal bonds. In addition, our findings suggest the contagion spills over to the common stocks of investment and commercial banks that deal in or use derivatives; however, the equities of banks unexposed to derivatives are not affected.     

Ideologie vor Eigennutz?

The case study regards the question whether economic self-interests of publishers have a significant influence on the reporting of their own newspapers with regard to crucial topics touching those interests. The conflict about the minimum wage in the mailing business is scrutinized. The newspapers engaged in the mailing business are compared with those of independent newspapers without these interests. Because the political inclination of a newspaper, even beyond the self-interests of its publisher, affects the reporting of a conflict, newspapers with different political views are chosen among economically involved and uninvolved media companies. The study is based on the “public task” of press and researches, using a quantifying analysis of contents, relevance and plurality of conflict reports. The results show that in this case the basic political orientation of a newspaper had a significant influence on the portrayal of the conflict. An additional influence with regard to the economic self-interests could not be proven significantly. Ideology seems to be more important than self-interest. However in this case political orientation and economic self-interests harmonized. Therefore it is still relevant to study the role of economic interests for the realization of the “public task”.     

Why did socialist economies fail? The role of factor inputs reconsidered

This article presents new estimates for investment and new growth accounts for three socialist economies between 1950 and 1989. Government statistics reported distorted measures for both the rate and the trajectory of productivity growth in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. Researchers have benefited from revised output data, but have continued to use official statistics on capital input, or estimated capital stock from official investment data. Investment levels and rates of capital accumulation were much lower than officially claimed and over‐reporting worsened over time. A setback in factor accumulation—both investment in equipment and labour input—contributed very significantly to the socialist growth failure of the 1980s.     

Rules versus discretion - A disinflation case

This paper compares a strict inflation target regime to a conservative central bank regime to determine the monetary regime appropriate for a disinflation process. The analysis shows that in a two-period model, in which policymakers face given first-period inflationary expectations, a strict inflation target could be preferred to the appointment of a conservative central banker who has discretion. The result differs from that of Rogoff (1985), who assumed rational expectations and concluded that a conservative central banker is always preferable. The disadvantage of the conservative central banker derives from his tendency to accelerate disinflation relative to rate that maximizes social welfare.JEL Classification: E52, E58The authors are grateful to Alex Cukierman, Nissan Liviatan, Allan Drazen, Amit Friedman and Yoav Friedmann for their useful suggestions. We also thank the anonymous referees for helpful comments. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Tel Aviv University macroeconomic workshop, at the Research Department seminar, Bank of Israel, and at the Bank of Israels conference on Macroeconomic Policy, October 2002.