Social security and saving — A critical note on the feldstein hypothesis

Zusammenfassung In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird versucht, Feldsteins Hypothese, wonach die Sozialversicherung das Sparen dämpft, an Hand internationaler Querschnittdaten zu überprüfen. Ausgehend von einem Ansatz, den Feldstein aufbauend auf das Lebenszyklusmodell in den Jahren 1977 und 1980 entwickelte, wird versucht, die Validität der Ergebnisse in bezug auf Änderungen in den Variablendefinitionen, der Zeitperiode sowie der Sampleauswahl aufzuzeigen. Weiters wird der Einfluß von geringen Modellmodifikationen (Berücksichtigung der Arbeitslosenrate als Unsicherheits-bzw. Stimmungsindikator) sowie Änderungen der Schätzmethode (gewogene oder ungewogene Regression bzw. OLS oder TSLS) auf die Resultate untersucht. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, daß die Feldstein-Hypothese keineswegs als ein empirisch allgemein gültiges Gesetz angesehen werden kann, sondern eher als zufällig zustandegekommen.     

Demographic implications of autocentric development

The German politicologist Dieter Senghaas reached in his recently published book¹ the conclusion that the attempt to integrate the developing countries with the international economic system as it exists at present is bound to work out to the detriment of the developing countries — that it can only result in their “structural disablement“². Dissociation from the present system of international division of labour and origination of an “autocentric development“ offered to the developing countries their only chance of arresting the previously analysed deformation process and embarking on genuine development³. This model however comes up against demographic obstacles.     

IX. Geld und Kapital

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Editorial

Original Papers

Editorial     

Information Cascades in the Labor Market

A model of herding behavior in the labor market is presented where employers receive signals with limited precision about the workers types, and can observe previous employers decisions. Both the employer and the worker can influence the signal probabilities. In particular, the employer tries to increase the precision of the signal about the workers type whereas the worker wants to get a good signal, independent of her type. In a two-period model, we derive conditions for an equilibrium in which only down-cascades occur, i.e., the second employer does not hire a worker with a bad history even if he receives a favorable private signal about the workers type, but he follows his own signal if the workers history is good.     

Mittlerer quadratischer Prognosefehler bei der Prognose des Abwicklungsergebnisses mittels der Chain-Ladder-Methode

Often in non-life insurance claims reserves are the largest position on the liability side of the balance sheet. The determination of adequate claims reserves in two consecutive accounting years leads to the so-called development result, which is defined as the difference of two successive predictors for the claims reserves. If the predictors for the claims reserves are unbiased the expected development result is equal to zero. However, since in claims reserving one predicts future payments the observed development result will in general deviate from the expected value. In the present paper we analyze this deviation. In an example we discuss the results.