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In this paper we consider the potential gain of a government pursuing a two-part trade policy: an import license for entry, along with a per-unit tariff on imports. The model is a two-stage game of complete but imperfect information. In the first stage, the domestic government sets trade policy, while in the second stage the home and foreign producers behave as Cournot competitors. The paper demonstrates that the optimal trade policy depends upon the number of firms, the degree of heterogeneity in cost functions, and the degree of convexity in cost functions. 相似文献
44.
J. A. L. Cranfield 《Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie》2003,51(3):299-321
Optimal investment rules are developed for a producer agency investing in domestic-market generic advertising, export market promotion, and cost-of-production-reducing research. These rules are derived assuming either maximization of producers' surplus or social surplus. The form of the optimality rules differs according to which objective is pursued. Fixed producer agency budgets are also allowed by incorporating a constraint limiting total expenditure on the three activities. Addition of such a constraint substantially alters the structure of the optimal investment rules. Differences in these rules highlight the importance of accounting for the financing mechanism when modeling optimal checkoff fund investment decisions. Optimality rules are simulated using data for the Canadian beef sector. Results suggest historic underinvestment in domestic-market generic advertising but overinvestment in export market promotion. Sensitivity of simulation results underscores the difficulty in assessing optimality of historic producer investment in cost-of-production-reducing research. 相似文献
45.
This paper analyzes the dynamic relationship between primary and secondary mortgage markets and the short-term and long-term market interest rates. Using a series of monthly data on fixed rate mortgage rates and GNMA rates, we explore the dependence and speed of adjustment in these primary and secondary mortgage rates to each other as well as to the long and short-term government rates. The results indicate that residential mortgage rates in general, appear to follow the long-term rate and are not very sensitive to movements in the short-term interest rate. 相似文献
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Melissa A. Thomasson 《Explorations in Economic History》2004,41(4):313-328
This paper uses a unique data set from 1957 to examine whether or not Blue Cross and Blue Shield suffered from an adverse selection death spiral after for-profit commercial insurance companies entered the market for health insurance. Results suggest that moving to experience rating may have helped the Blues counteract adverse selection in the group health insurance market. Adverse selection posed a greater problem for the Blues in the market for individual health insurance, possibly because of differences in the way the Blues screened potential enrollees relative to commercial insurance companies. 相似文献
48.
Using Turkish industry-level data from 1983 to 1990, we find that politically organized industries receive both higher protection and promotion than unorganized ones. Tariff rates are decreasing (increasing) in the import-penetration ratio and the absolute value of the import-demandelasticity for organized (unorganized) industries. Subsidy rates are decreasing (increasing) in the output-supply elasticity for organized (unorganized) industries. The results are consistent with the predictions of the Grossman–Helpman model and its extension in this paper. The mix of protection and promotion is inversely related to the ratio of their respective marginal deadweight cost measures. 相似文献
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Walter Hömberg 《Publizistik》2002,47(3):324-326
Ohne Zusammenfassung 相似文献
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