Advance Refundings of Municipal Bonds

The advance refunding of debt is a widespread practice in municipal finance. In an advance refunding, municipalities retire callable bonds early and refund them with bonds with lower coupon rates. We find that 85% of all advance refundings occur at a net present value loss, and that the aggregate losses over the past 20 years exceed $15 billion. We explore why municipalities advance refund their debt at loss. Financially constrained municipalities may face pressure to advance refund since it allows them to reduce short‐term cash outflows. We find strong evidence that financial constraints are a major driver of advance refunding activity.     

Inco Ltd.: Market Value, Fair Value, and Management Discretion

We examine management discretion to decide when and how much to write down an asset, in a unique case where a tracking stock provides an observable market value for the asset. We find that, despite market evidence that Inco Ltd.'s financial statements substantially overvalued the Voisey's Bay nickel mine throughout 1997 to 2000, management chose not to write down the mine until 2002. Inco management used an independent fairness opinion to justify its December 2000 redemption of the tracking stock at 25% of its initial value, indicating almost surely that Inco management was aware of the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) impairment. This case illustrates that GAAP's reliance on undiscounted cash flows for impairment decisions allows huge unrecorded disparities between book and market value. The management discretion exercised in this case provides a concrete example of the subjectivity inherent in fair valuation.     

Portfolio Selection and the Investment Performance of the UK Pension Funds*

Pension funds are the main institutional investors, accounting for 38 per cent of personal sector net financial wealth. As a result of their growing importance in mobilizing personal sector saving, they have emerged as the principal institutional investor, controlling over £200bn of funds at the end of 1987, their total net assets equalling 38 per cent of personal sector net financial wealth. Pension funds also dominate domestic asset markets, owning 27per cent of the stock of outstanding UK equity, 23 per cent of UK government securities and 17 per cent of total UK holdings of overseas equity. In this paper we present the conclusions from recent research, undertaken as part of an updating of the LBS Financial Model. Our results suggest that UK pension fund investment since 1980 is better than previous studies have suggested and, in particular, that funds outperformed the equity market in the 1980s, offering a higher return for any given level of risk. In addition fund behaviour is slow to change, with past behaviour exerting the strongest influence on current investment patterns. Fund managers also appear guilty of “short termism” in that they place little weight on events beyond the next three months. However, this has not made them inefficient. Finally, we find that actions to restrict the funds' surpluses should not affect their investment behaviour. Our results also suggest that the costs from exchange controls in the 1970s were substantial, amounting to some £4bn per year.     

Corporate Fraud and Business Conditions: Evidence from IPOs

We examine how a firm's incentive to commit fraud when going public varies with investor beliefs about industry business conditions. Fraud propensity increases with the level of investor beliefs about industry prospects but decreases when beliefs are extremely high. We find that two mechanisms are at work: monitoring by investors and short‐term executive compensation, both of which vary with investor beliefs about industry prospects. We also find that monitoring incentives of investors and underwriters differ. Our results are consistent with models of investor beliefs and corporate fraud, and suggest that regulators and auditors should be vigilant for fraud during booms.     

Labor Force Participation and Monetary Policy in the Wake of the Great Recession

This paper provides compelling evidence that cyclical factors account for the bulk of the post‐2007 decline in the U.S. labor force participation rate (LFPR). We then formulate a stylized New Keynesian model in which the LFPR is practically acyclical during “normal times” but drops markedly following a large and persistent aggregate demand shock. These considerations have potentially crucial implications for the design of monetary policy, especially when interest rate adjustments are constrained by the zero lower bound; specifically, monetary policy can induce a more rapid recovery of the LFPR by allowing the unemployment rate to fall below its natural rate.     

Regulatory Arbitrage and Cross‐Border Bank Acquisitions

We study how differences in bank regulation influence cross‐border bank acquisition flows and share price reactions to cross‐border deal announcements. Using a sample of 7,297 domestic and 916 majority cross‐border deals announced between 1995 and 2012, we find evidence of a form of “regulatory arbitrage” whereby acquisition flows involve acquirers from countries with stronger regulations than their targets. Target and aggregate abnormal returns around deal announcements are positive and larger when acquirers come from more restrictive bank regulatory environments. We interpret this evidence as more consistent with a benign form of regulatory arbitrage than a potentially destructive one.     

Bank Loans, Bonds, and Information Monopolies across the Business Cycle

Theory suggests that banks' private information about borrowers lets them hold up borrowers for higher interest rates. Since hold-up power increases with borrower risk, banks with exploitable information should be able to raise their rates in recessions by more than is justified by borrower risk alone. We test this hypothesis by comparing the pricing of loans for bank-dependent borrowers with the pricing of loans for borrowers with access to public debt markets, controlling for risk factors. Loan spreads rise in recessions, but firms with public debt market access pay lower spreads and their spreads rise significantly less in recessions.     

Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to Monitor

Although monitoring borrowers is thought to be a major function of financial institutions, the presence of other claimants reduces an institutional lender's incentives to do this. Thus loan contracts must be structured to enhance the lender's incentives to monitor. Covenants make a loan's effective maturity, and the ability to collateralize makes a loan's effective priority, contingent on monitoring by the lender. Thus both covenants and collateral can be motivated as contractual devices that increase a lender's incentive to monitor. These results are consistent with a number of stylized facts about the use of covenants and collateral in institutional lending.